Matthew Ray Luckey v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 1, 2024
• Docket: 13-23-00380-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-23-00380-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

MATTHEW RAY LUCKEY, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 24TH DISTRICT COURT OF CALHOUN COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Tijerina and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

Appellant Matthew Ray Luckey was convicted of stalking and was sentenced to

eighteen years’ confinement. 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072. By one issue,

1 The offense of stalking is a third-degree felony, which was enhanced in this case due to appellant’s prior conviction of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.46; 38.04. appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

In a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and reasonable

inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.).

Sufficient evidence exists if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable

based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most

favorable to the verdict.” Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The

fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight

to be given to their testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.

We measure the sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the elements of the

offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Villarreal v. State, 286 S.W.3d

321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997). “Such a charge [is] one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the

indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily

restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for

which the defendant was tried.” Villarreal, 286 S.W.3d at 327 (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d

at 240). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the

offense and those elements “as modified by the indictment.” Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d

2 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Here, as limited by the indictment and a hypothetically correct jury charge, the

State had to prove that appellant: (1) on more than one occasion; (2) pursuant to the

same scheme or course of conduct directed specifically toward A.M.; (3) knowingly

engaged in conduct that constituted an offense under section 42.07 and/or conduct that

appellant knew or reasonably should have known that A.M. would regard as threatening

bodily injury or death for A.M.; (4) did cause A.M. to be placed in fear of bodily injury or

death; and (5) would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death for herself.

See Griswold v. State, 673 S.W.3d 423, 432 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.) (citing

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.072(a)).

A person commits the offense of harassment if, the person “threatens, in a manner

reasonably likely to alarm the person receiving the threat, to inflict bodily injury on the

person or to commit a felony against the person. . . ,” and the threatening person has the

“intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 42.072(a).

II. THE EVIDENCE

A.M. testified in a bench trial that she had known appellant since childhood but

they “went separate ways” after becoming teenagers. A.M. stated that appellant

patronized her place of employment, and they would say “Hello, how are you,” but

“nothing really beyond that.” According to A.M., in “earl[y]” 2022 at approximately 10:00

p.m., appellant “approached [her] in the parking [lot]” of her employment and spoke to her

3 in a manner that she described as “just kind of jumbled.” A.M. explained that she did not

recall exactly what appellant said to her, but he seemed generally agitated, she was

“frightened,” he “was not making a lot of sense, and [she] was just asking him to go.” A.M.

stated that on another night, appellant came to her place of employment “saying

that . . . [she] had stolen money off of his debit card.” However, A.M. “didn’t speak to him

directly then.”

A.M. testified that shortly thereafter, starting in June 2022, appellant left messages

on her cellphone that alarmed her. The State asked, “And how often was he leaving

voicemails for you at first?” A.M. replied, “Not often at first. There would be one maybe

every couple of weeks, and then they started more often.” A.M. stated that in the “early”

messages, appellant “accused [her] of dealing drugs” and of “own[ing]” and “sell[ing]”

social security numbers. According to A.M., in October 2022, the messages “escalated”

in frequency and the content of the messages became “more threatening.” A.M. testified

appellant left “graphic” messages describing “how he was going to kill” her. A.M. recalled

that on “one particular weekend . . . there were several [messages] during the day, at

night, some at 2:30 in the morning, 3 o’clock. This particular weekend [of October 15 and

16, 2022,] it escalated [and] there were several [messages] within a three-day time

period.” A.M. testified that she was “scared, fearful,” and “felt targeted, terrorized.” A.M.

agreed with the State that appellant was harassing her and “capable of carrying through

with the threats.” A.M. said she recognized appellant’s voice, and appellant stated his

name in some of the messages. The State asked, “Was it clear to you that these

4 messages were being directed at you specifically?” A.M. replied, “Absolutely, yes.”2 A.M.

testified she was afraid that appellant “was going to kill” her or cause her bodily injury.

According to A.M., on one occasion appellant left a message stating that he “would

be looking through” her windows and she “found both [her] bedroom and bathroom

windows unlocked.” A.M. emphasized that she “always” keeps her windows locked, she

does not “open them.” A.M. believed that appellant had been in her house because she

had just purchased a new “clawfoot bathtub,” and shortly thereafter appellant “specifically

[referenced] a big, new bathtub” in one of the messages. A.M. eventually reported

appellant’s behavior to the police.

The trial court admitted State’s Exhibit No. 1, without objection, which is a flash

drive containing the voicemail messages and a video that appellant sent to A.M. In the

video, appellant said that he was “calling” the “FBI” to tell them that A.M. had “illegally

filed charges on [him] for something [A.M. was not] involved in at all.” Appellant stated,

“My charges have been dismissed and thrown away. You refiled them, caused me a lot

of trouble, and you were involved in something that was in Victoria County because

[someone told me] about [it]. So, you need to know that I am pursuing charges against

you.”

Then in a subsequent voicemail message, appellant stated he knew that A.M. “filed

charges” against him. Appellant said that he “[saw] something” at A.M.’s house, and “it

2 On redirect examination, A.M. emphasized that she “instantly” recognized appellant’s voice and

that appellant “mentioned” her name several times in the messages. The State asked, “Did you have any doubts who left those voicemail messages on your phone?” A.M. said, “No.”

5 looks like” A.M. “is trying to become part of that house, like a monster house.” Appellant

stated that he was accused of murder “because of” A.M. In another message, appellant

(1) wanted to know “if there [was] a reason” that A.M. was trying to speak to him, (2)

accused her of contacting his work, (3) claimed she had him arrested, (4) told A.M. to

never call him or his wife again, and (5) advised A.M. to stop pretending to be his wife.3

In another message, appellant stated that A.M. “will not be okay when [she] gets scalped,”

that she “won’t like it when they kill [her],” and “when they peel . . . [her] skin.” Appellant

stated: (1) “You won’t like it when you’re covered in iodine”; (2) “I’m coming for your life,

I’m coming for your die [sic]”; (3) “I’m gonna put a laceration in your eye. I’m gonna make

you die. I’m gonna make you cry”; (4) “I’m gonna make you bleed”; (5) “I’m gonna come

in”; (6) “I’m gonna cut your tongue out through your throat”; and (7) “It might be in the

day.” Appellant called A.M. “a whore” and “a slut” and said, “I’m an angel, and I’m going

to tear you down. . . . I’m an animal . . . my blood will give you AIDS, it will make you die.”

Next, appellant left a message stating that he was worried that A.M. was “still

thinking” of killing herself and said that he walked into her house, he saw her “dirty

panties,” he looked in her refrigerator, and he drew things on her wall. Appellant asked,

“Have you ever seen what oil does when it reaches its boiling point, what it does to the

skin,” and said, “One of these days, you are going to wake up with tomahawks sticking

out the back of your head [indecipherable]. You’re easy to get to.” In another message,

appellant repeated, “Geneva Convention, Geneva Convention, war is game, game is

3 A.M. denied appellant’s claims that he made about her in the messages.

6 war.” Appellant then said: “I know where you live. I know where your home is. I know how

to get in your house,” and “I’m not scared of anything. . . . Am I in your window? Am I in

your house? Am I looking in your door? . . . Do you know that I will scalp you[, and] I will

boil you in glue? Do you know what I will do to you?”

Appellant testified that A.M. had him arrested for burglary of a habitation and

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, although she was not the victim of these crimes.

Appellant said he sent the video to “protect” himself because he was “concerned that

[A.M.] was going to contact whatever cop that she had [him] arrested for the first time.”

Appellant stated, “I wasn’t intending on going back to prison” as he had just been released

from a four-year prison term. Appellant “felt like [A.M. intended] to [send him] back to

prison.” Appellant denied leaving the other messages on A.M.’s phone. When defense

counsel asked him if he had “any idea how those voicemails would have ended up in her

cellphone,” appellant claimed that someone could have made the calls using a special

“app.” According to appellant he reported the “prank texts” to someone at “ATT” who said,

“[T]his was an ongoing thing with several people.” Appellant testified that when he

approached A.M. in the parking lot of her employment, he did not “talk jumbled”; he asked

A.M. for her father’s phone number, which she refused to give him.

III. DISCUSSION

By his sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support

his conviction for stalking. Specifically, appellant argues that there is no evidence that he

“had the requisite intent to commit the predicate offense of harassment to legally support

7 the judgment of conviction for the offense of stalking.”

The evidence showed that appellant left messages on A.M.’s phone in the early

morning hours threatening to cause her harm and to kill her. Appellant sent A.M. a video

accusing her of “illegally filing charges” against him and stating that he would be

contacting the FBI and filing charges against her. Appellant testified that he sent the video

to A.M. to “protect” himself, he was “not intending on going back to prison,” and he was

willing to do “whatever” he had to do “to protect” himself. He told her that she would not

“like it when they kill you . . . when they peel . . . your skin,” he is an “animal,” and his

blood would give her “AIDS, it [would] make [her] die.” Appellant stated that A.M. would

wake up with a tomahawk sticking out of her head and that A.M. “would not be okay when

[she got] scalped.” Finally, appellant told A.M. he had been looking into her windows and

claimed that he had broken into her home. A.M. testified that she felt terrorized and feared

that appellant would either kill her or cause her bodily injury.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the trial court could

have rationally concluded that appellant, on more than one occasion and pursuant to the

same scheme or course of conduct directed at A.M. knowingly engaged in conduct that

appellant knew or reasonably should have known that A.M. would regard as threatening

bodily injury or death for A.M. by leaving alarming and threatening messages on her

phone and that A.M. regarded appellant’s messages as threatening bodily injury and

caused A.M. to feel harassed, annoyed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or

offended. See Whatley, 445 S.W.3d at 166; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898–99; see also TEX.

8 PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 42.07, 42.072. On the record before us, we determine that a rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense as set out in the

hypothetically correct charge for stalking beyond a reasonable doubt. See Whatley, 445

S.W.3d at 166; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898–99; see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 42.07,

42.072. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAIME TIJERINA Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the 1st day of August, 2024.