Matthew Nixon v. Vegas.com, LLC

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 MATTHEW NIXON, Case No. 26-cv-02213-CRB

9 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 10 v. REMAND

11 VEGAS.COM, LLC, 12 Defendant.

13 This case is a removal redux—with a twist. In a separate action, Defendant 14 Vegas.com, LLC (“VDC”) removed Plaintiff Matthew Nixon’s case and sought dismissal 15 of his equitable claims, arguing that the Court lacked equitable jurisdiction. The Court 16 agreed and dismissed those claims. After Nixon refiled his equitable claims (under the 17 Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and False Advertising Law (“FAL”)) in state court, 18 VDC again removed the action and brought it back to this Court. Only now, VDC argues 19 that the Court should keep Nixon’s equitable claims and deny Nixon’s motion to remand. 20 Because the Court does not have equitable jurisdiction over Nixon’s claims and judicial 21 estoppel bars VDC from waiving its equitable jurisdiction defense, the Court GRANTS 22 Nixon’s motion to remand.1 23 I. LEGAL STANDARD 24 “[W]hen a case is removed from state court and the district court concludes it lacks 25 equitable jurisdiction, the court has the authority to remand the case to state court.” Ruiz 26 v. Bradford Exch., Ltd., 153 F.4th 907, 913 (9th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-1125, 27 1 2026 WL 1127205 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2026). However, courts may “remand a removed case to 2 state court for lack of equitable jurisdiction . . . only after the removing defendant is given 3 the opportunity to waive” the equitable jurisdiction defense. Id. at 909. Non-statutory 4 grounds for remand, including a lack of equitable jurisdiction, do not fall under the 5 removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1447. Id. at 913–14. 6 The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See 7 Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 8 2009); see also Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chemical Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683–85 (9th Cir. 9 2006) (“[U]nder CAFA the burden of establishing removal jurisdiction remains, as before, 10 on the proponent of federal jurisdiction.”). Courts “apply a presumption against removal 11 and construe any uncertainty as to removability in favor of remand.” Romo v. Teva 12 Pharms. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2013). 13 II. BACKGROUND 14 Nixon moves to remand, arguing that the Court lacks equitable jurisdiction over his 15 claims because he fails to allege the lack of an adequate legal remedy. VDC argues that 16 Nixon’s motion should be denied for two reasons. First, VDC asserts that the Court has 17 equitable jurisdiction because Nixon has not demonstrated he has an adequate remedy at 18 law. Opp’n (dkt. 19) at 2. Second, VDC attempts to waive the equitable jurisdiction 19 defense it used to defeat Nixon’s equitable claims in the prior case. Id. at 5; see Nixon v. 20 Vegas.com, LLC, No. 25-cv-05688-CRB, 2025 WL 3719885 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025) 21 (“Nixon I”). VDC’s arguments fail because a plaintiff can selectively plead to avoid 22 equitable jurisdiction and judicial estoppel bars VDC’s waiver. 23 A. Equitable Jurisdiction 24 Nixon argues that the Court does not have equitable jurisdiction over his claims. 25 Mot. (dkt. 18) at 4. The Court agrees. 26 “[T]raditional principles governing equitable remedies in federal courts, including 27 the requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party requests restitution under 1 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Sonner I”). “[A] plaintiff who fails to allege the lack of an adequate 2 remedy at law cannot utilize a federal court’s equitable jurisdiction.” Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 3 912. “[P]laintiffs are free to selectively plead claims to avoid federal court 4 jurisdiction . . . [and are] not required to plead all claims available to [them].” Id. at 914. 5 1. Adequate Remedy at Law 6 Here, the Court does not have equitable jurisdiction over Nixon’s claims because he 7 does not allege that he lacks an adequate remedy at law. See Compl. (dkt. 1-1); Mot. at 4. 8 Ruiz is instructive. In that case, the plaintiff brought UCL and FAL claims in a putative 9 class action and sought remand for lack of equitable jurisdiction, just like Nixon does here. 10 See Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 909; Compl. ¶¶ 65–84. Similarly to Nixon, the Ruiz plaintiff failed 11 “to allege the lack of an adequate remedy at law.” See Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 912; see 12 generally Compl.; Mot. at 4. Accordingly, barring a waiver of the equitable jurisdiction 13 defense, Nixon “cannot utilize” the Court’s equitable jurisdiction, just as the court held in 14 Ruiz. See Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 912. 15 Nevertheless, VDC argues that three Ninth Circuit cases establish that the Court has 16 equitable jurisdiction over Nixon’s claims. Opp’n at 2–4 (citing Sonner I, 971 F.3d at 844; 17 Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 49 F.4th 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Sonner II”); 18 Guzman v. Polaris Indus. Inc., 49 F.4th 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 2022)). VDC reads these 19 cases to mean that, to avoid equitable jurisdiction, Nixon must demonstrate that he has an 20 adequate remedy at law. See Opp’n at 4. But this argument fails because Ruiz held that 21 “[t]he Sonner cases and Guzman . . . yield a few key conclusions,” including that “a 22 plaintiff who fails to allege the lack of an adequate remedy at law cannot utilize a federal 23 court’s equitable jurisdiction.” See Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 912 (emphasis added).2 Here, as 24 discussed above, Nixon fails to allege the lack of an adequate remedy at law and cannot 25 avail himself of the Court’s equitable jurisdiction. See Mot. at 4; Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 912.3 26 2 The remainder of VDC’s cases predate Ruiz. See, e.g., Opp’n at 4 (citing Linton v. Axcess Fin. 27 Servs., Inc., No. 23-cv-01832-CRB, 2023 WL 4297568, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2023); Baton v. 1 VDC next argues that the Court has equitable jurisdiction because Nixon seeks 2 injunctive relief. Opp’n at 5. But the plaintiff in Sonner I also requested injunctive relief. 3 See Sonner I, 971 F.3d at 837. And Ruiz clarified that Sonner I stands for the proposition 4 that “a plaintiff who fails to allege the lack of an adequate remedy at law cannot utilize a 5 federal court’s equitable jurisdiction.” See Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 912. Essentially, it is the 6 allegations in the complaint (or here, the lack of them) that control. As Nixon has not 7 alleged a lack of an adequate remedy at law, he has failed to sufficiently plead entitlement 8 to equitable relief. 9 2. Waiver of Equitable Jurisdiction Defense 10 A court may not remand solely because a plaintiff fails to establish equitable 11 jurisdiction. Under Ruiz, “a defendant can defeat remand on equitable jurisdiction grounds 12 by waiving the adequate-remedy-at-law issue.” Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 912. Here, VDC 13 attempts to waive its equitable jurisdiction defense. See Opp’n at 5. However, judicial 14 estoppel bars VDC from abandoning its prior decision not to waive the equitable 15 jurisdiction defense. See MTD (dkt. 15) at 15, Nixon I, 2025 WL 3719885 (No. 25-cv- 16 05688-CRB); Opp’n at 6. 17 “Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that precludes a party from gaining an 18 advantage by asserting one position, and then later seeking an advantage by taking a 19 clearly inconsistent position.” Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 783 20 (9th Cir. 2001). “[J]udicial estoppel applies to a party’s stated position, regardless of 21 whether it is an expression of intention, a statement of fact, or a legal assertion.” Helfand 22 v. Gerson, 105 F.3d 530, 535 (9th Cir. 1997). Judicial estoppel is “appropriate to bar 23 litigants from making incompatible statements in two different cases.” Hamilton, 270 F.3d 24 at 783. Courts also invoke the doctrine “because of ‘general consideration[s] of the 25 orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings,’ and to 26

27 claims to avoid federal court jurisdiction.” See Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 914. If Nixon had to 1 ‘protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts.’” Id. at 783 (alteration in 2 original) (quoting Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990)). 3 Courts consider three factors when “determining whether to apply judicial 4 estoppel.” Randle v. Crawford, 604 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010). First, courts 5 evaluate “whether a party’s position in the later judicial proceeding is clearly inconsistent 6 with that party’s earlier position.” Id. Second, courts consider “whether the party 7 persuaded the first court to accept the earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an 8 inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the perception that one of the two 9 courts was misled.” Id. Third, courts determine “whether the party seeking to assert an 10 inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on 11 the opposing party if not estopped.” Id. at 1053–54. All three factors are met here. 12 First, VDC’s attempt to waive the equitable jurisdiction defense is “clearly 13 inconsistent” with its “earlier position” in Nixon I. See Randle, 604 F.3d at 1053. In 14 Nixon I, VDC made a “decision not to waive” its equitable jurisdiction defense. See 15 Opp’n at 6; Nixon I MTD at 15. But now, VDC is trying to waive that defense against the 16 same equitable claims it faced in Nixon I to keep those claims in federal court. See Opp’n 17 at 5; cf. Iglesias v. Welch Foods Inc., No. 17-cv-00219-TEH, 2017 WL 1227393, at *2 18 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2017) (“clearly inconsistent” position when a defendant previously 19 moved to dismiss a case from federal court for lack of Article III standing and later 20 attempted to remove the plaintiff’s refiled state court case). VDC argues that the lack of a 21 Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) claim this time around makes its contradictory 22 positions consistent. That argument is unavailing because in both cases the Court’s lack of 23 equitable jurisdiction turns on the plaintiffs’ failure to allege the lack of an adequate legal 24 remedy, rather than the specific claims before the Court. See Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 912. In 25 fact, this was VDC’s prior position. See Nixon I MTD at 15–16 (“Plaintiffs’ claims for 26 equitable relief . . . should be dismissed for failure to allege that Plaintiffs lack an adequate 27 remedy at law.” (emphasis added)). 1 equitable jurisdiction defense should prevail. See Randle, 604 F.3d at 1053; Nixon I MTD 2 at 15. The Court adopted VDC’s position that it lacked equitable jurisdiction over 3 Plaintiffs’ claims because they had failed “to allege they lack an adequate remedy at law.” 4 Order (dkt. 39) at 22, Nixon I, 2025 WL 3719885 (No. 25-cv-05688-CRB); cf. Nixon I 5 MTD at 16 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that she lacks adequate remedies at law if she seeks 6 equitable relief.” (emphasis in original) (citation modified)). Relying on VDC’s 7 representations, the Court dismissed the equitable claims in Nixon I. Nixon I Order at 22. 8 Permitting VDC to waive its equitable jurisdiction defense so the Court may hear the same 9 claims it previously dismissed “would create the perception” that VDC “misled” the Court. 10 See Randle, 604 F.3d at 1053. 11 Third, VDC would “derive an unfair advantage” and “impose an unfair detriment 12 on” Nixon “if not estopped.” See Randle, 604 F.3d at 1054. By successfully deploying its 13 equitable jurisdiction defense, VDC delayed Nixon in pursuing his equitable claims and 14 forced him to spend additional time and resources just to wind up back before the Court. 15 See Mot. at 6. Such litigation tactics interfere with “the orderly administration of justice.” 16 See Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 783 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, judicial 17 estoppel bars VDC from abandoning its prior use of the equitable jurisdiction defense. 18 VDC cites Ruiz to argue that it should not be estopped from waiving its defense 19 because the complaint here is materially different from the complaint in Nixon I. Opp’n at 20 6. That argument fails for three reasons. First, Ruiz is inapposite because it did not 21 concern judicial estoppel. See Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 909. Second, unlike the defendant in 22 Ruiz, VDC had a prior opportunity to waive its equitable jurisdiction defense and chose 23 not to. See Nixon I MTD at 15; Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 909. Third, courts routinely apply 24 judicial estoppel in later proceedings with materially different claims. See, e.g., Finn v. 25 Sullivan, 228 F. Supp. 3d 972, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (estopping defendant in breach-of- 26 fiduciary-duty litigation from claiming ownership of a winery after disclaiming ownership 27 in prior divorce proceedings). 1 || jurisdiction defense. 2 B. Remand 3 Because VDC may not waive the equitable jurisdiction defense and Nixon fails to 4 || allege that he lacks an adequate remedy at law, this Court lacks equitable jurisdiction over 5 || Nixon’s equitable claims. See Ruiz, 153 F.4th at 912. Therefore, the Court may “remand 6 || [this] removed case to state court for lack of equitable jurisdiction.” See id. at 915. 7 Applying the “presumption against removal and constru[ing] any uncertainty as to 8 || removability in favor of remand,” the Court remands the case to state court. See Romo, 9 || 731 F.3d at 921. 10 || II. CONCLUSION 11 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Nixon’s motion to remand. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: May 26, 2026 — 5 □□ CHARLES'R. BREY 14 United States District Judge 15

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