Matthew Martinez v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-26-00154-CR

MATTHEW MARTINEZ, APPELLANT V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 137th District Court Lubbock County, Texas

Trial Court No. DC-2024-CR-2880, Honorable John J. “Trey” McClendon III, Presiding

August 25, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.

Appellant, Matthew Martinez, appeals from the trial court’s judgments convicting him, on his open plea of guilty, of two counts of aggravated robbery.1 He was sentenced to fifty years of confinement on each count, with the sentences to run concurrently. His court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders2 brief in support of a motion to withdraw,

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 29.03.

2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). When appointed

appellate counsel, after a conscientious examination of the record, concludes that an appeal is frivolous, counsel must file a brief identifying anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. Id.

concluding that no arguable grounds for reversal exist. Because our independent review of the record confirms counsel’s assessment, we grant the motion to withdraw and affirm.

BACKGROUND

In the late hours of October 19, 2024, Appellant left his mother’s house on foot, carrying a machete. His mother called police out of concern for his welfare. Appellant walked to a Toot’n Totum convenience store a short distance away. Inside, he waved the machete, screamed, and demanded that the two employees give him the money in the registers. Appellant took the store’s cash, struck the machete against one register’s drawer and computer screen, shouted profanities, and gestured at the employees before leaving.

Appellant returned home. An officer responding to the mother’s welfare call was flagged down by Appellant in his driveway. Appellant said his mother would not let him inside. The officer had heard the dispatch describing the robbery suspect, and he recognized that Appellant matched the description. While waiting for backup, he asked whether Appellant had any weapons. Appellant answered that he had a knife and a machete. A second officer arrived, and the two removed both weapons and handcuffed Appellant. A pat-down turned up wadded cash in his pockets.

Officers placed Appellant in a patrol car and drove him to the store, where an employee and the surveillance video identified him as the robber. During the investigation, Appellant slipped his handcuffs and used them to break the rear passenger window of the patrol car. He screamed slurs and obscenities and threatened the officers. He was re-cuffed and returned to the car. He continued to curse, spit, and threaten. In

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the course of that tirade, he shouted that he had robbed the Toot’n Totum, that robbery is “what I do,” and that he would do it again. Because he had broken the window and spit on an officer, a transport van was called. Officers placed a spit mask over his head and strapped him to a board for transport to the jail.

A grand jury indicted Appellant on two counts of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE. § 29.03. The indictment included two enhancement paragraphs alleging sequential prior felony convictions. On February 23, 2026, Appellant entered an open plea of guilty to both counts and pleaded true to both enhancement paragraphs. Following a punishment hearing, the trial court found Appellant guilty on each count, found the enhancement paragraphs true, made an affirmative deadly-weapon finding as to a weapon other than a firearm, and assessed punishment at fifty years of confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice on each count. The trial court later signed nunc pro tunc orders correcting clerical matters in the judgments, including a recitation that the sentences run concurrently. This appeal followed.

ANDERS FRAMEWORK

An Anders brief must present a professional evaluation of the record and explain why the appeal presents no arguable grounds for reversal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). Counsel need not identify specific arguable points where none exist, but the brief must include record references and pertinent legal authorities. Id.; Davis v. State, 683 S.W.3d 828, 829–30 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2023, no pet.). Counsel must also serve the client with the brief and the motion to withdraw; he must inform the client of the right to review the record, to file a pro se

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response, and to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408.

Appellate counsel has complied with these requirements. We have carefully conducted an independent review, examining the record, counsel’s Anders brief, and Appellant’s pro se response. Our independent review confirms appellate counsel’s assessment that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Counsel’s brief examines whether the length of Appellant’s sentences supplies an arguable ground for appeal. A sentence that falls within the range the Legislature prescribed is ordinarily not subject to challenge as excessive. Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Barrow v. State, 207 S.W.3d 377, 379–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). With two sequential prior felony convictions found true, the range here was twenty-five to ninety-nine years, or life. TEX. PENAL CODE § 12.42(d). The fifty- year sentences fall within it. The record presents no arguable claim that they are grossly disproportionate to the offenses.

Appellant filed a pro se response. In it, he complains that officers failed to give Miranda warnings before he shouted that he had robbed the store and would do so again. No objection was lodged when that evidence was admitted at the punishment hearing, which forfeited the complaint. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). The complaint would fail in any event. Miranda safeguards apply to custodial interrogation. Statements made voluntarily, and not in response to interrogation, remain admissible. See Warren v. State, 377 S.W.3d 9, 17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d); Badall v. State, 216 S.W.3d 865, 868–69 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, pet. ref’d). Appellant was under arrest

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when he spoke, but he spoke spontaneously, from the back of a patrol car, while no officer was questioning him. Thus, he presents no arguable claim that his right against self- incrimination was violated.

CONCLUSION

We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the judgments of the trial court.3

Lawrence M. Doss

Justice

Do not publish.

3 Counsel shall, within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the

opinion and judgment, along with notification of Appellant’s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4. This duty is informational and ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and continues after this Court grants counsel’s motion to withdraw. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.33.