Matthew J Rovnan v. Department of the Interior

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedFebruary 21, 2025
DocketPH-0752-23-0126-X-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Matthew J Rovnan v. Department of the Interior (Matthew J Rovnan v. Department of the Interior) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matthew J Rovnan v. Department of the Interior, (Miss. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MATTHEW J. ROVNAN, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, PH-0752-23-0126-X-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, DATE: February 21, 2025 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Matthew J. Rovnan , Bristol Township, Pennsylvania, pro se.

Pernell Telfort , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

The administrative judge issued a compliance initial decision finding the agency noncompliant with Board’s Final Order in the underlying appeal. Rovnan v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-23-0126-C-1, Compliance File, Tab 6, Compliance Initial Decision (CID); see Rovnan v.

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-23-0126-I-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID). For the reasons discussed below, we now find the agency in compliance and DISMISS the petition for enforcement.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE ON COMPLIANCE On June 9, 2023, the administrative judge issued a compliance initial decision finding the agency noncompliant with Board’s Final Order in the underlying appeal, which reversed the appellant’s termination and required the agency to reinstate him with back pay and appropriate benefits. 2 See ID at 8. The administrative judge granted the appellant’s petition for enforcement and ordered the agency to take certain actions to comply with the Final Order in the underlying appeal. CID at 3. In the compliance initial decision, the administrative judge informed the agency that, if it decided to take the compliance actions required by the decision, it must submit to the Office of the Clerk of the Board, within the time limit for filing a petition for review under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), a statement that it had taken the actions identified in the compliance initial decision, along with evidence establishing that it had taken those actions. CID at 4; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(a)(6) (i) (2023). He also informed the parties of their option to request Board review of the compliance initial decision by filing a petition for review by July 14, 2023, the date on which the findings of noncompliance would become final unless a petition for review was filed. CID at 5; see 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.114(e), 1201.183(a)(6)(ii), (b) (2023). Neither party petitioned for review. Accordingly, pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(b)-(c), the administrative judge’s findings of noncompliance became final, and the appellant’s petition for enforcement was referred to the Board for a final decision on the issues of compliance. Rovnan v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-23-0126-X-1, Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tab 1.

2 The initial decision became the Board’s final decision upon the expiration of the petition for review deadline. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. 3

The Clerk of the Board issued an acknowledgement order instructing the agency to file evidence of compliance within 15 calendar days and advising the appellant that he should respond within 20 days of the date of the agency’s submission. The order noted that, if he did not do so, the Board may assume he was satisfied and dismiss the petition for enforcement. CRF, Tab 1 at 3. Subsequently, the parties filed various pleadings disputing whether the agency had achieved compliance. CRF, Tabs 2-5. In its final submission, the agency informed the Board for the first time that the parties had entered into a settlement agreement in June 2023—apparently within days of the issuance of the compliance initial decision—that resolved the remaining disputed issues. 3 CRF, Tab 5 at 4. The agency asserted that the appellant’s claims that the agency had failed to comply with its obligations under the Board’s Final Order were, in reality, claims of alleged failure to comply with the agency’s obligations under the settlement agreement. Id. The agency asserted that it had complied with its obligations and, to the extent the appellant identified additional deficiencies, that it had complied as best it could, given the appellant’s change of employers. Id. at 6. The agency argued that it had therefore achieved full compliance with the Board’s Final Order. On August 6, 2024, the Board ordered the appellant to respond to the agency’s submission within 20 days. The Board warned the appellant that, if he failed to respond, the Board may assume he was satisfied and dismiss his petition for enforcement. CRF, Tab 6 at 2. The appellant did not file a response.

ANALYSIS When the Board finds a personnel action unwarranted or not sustainable, it orders that the appellant be placed, as nearly as possible, in the situation he would have been in had the wrongful personnel action not occurred. House v. Department

3 Earlier submissions by the appellant vaguely referenced an unspecified settlement agreement without explaining that the agreement concerned this petition for enforcement. CRF, Tab 2 at 3; CRF, Tab 4 at 3. 4

of the Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 530, ¶ 9 (2005). The agency bears the burden to prove its compliance with a Board order. Vaughan v. Department of Agriculture, 116 M.S.P.R. 319, ¶ 5 (2011). An agency’s assertions of compliance must include a clear explanation of its compliance actions supported by documentary evidence. Id. The appellant may rebut the agency’s evidence of compliance by making “specific, nonconclusory, and supported assertions of continued noncompliance.” Brown v. Office of Personnel Management, 113 M.S.P.R. 325, ¶ 5 (2010). Here, the agency has asserted compliance with its obligations stemming from the Board’s Final Order, as well as with a settlement agreement entered into by the parties that addressed, among other things, the relief ordered by the Board. CRF, Tab 5. The appellant did not respond to the agency’s submission, despite being ordered to do so and being warned that failure to respond may cause the Board to assume he was satisfied and dismiss his petition for enforcement. Because the appellant has not challenged the agency’s assertions regarding its compliance with the Final Order, we find the agency in compliance with that order and the compliance initial decision. We note that the settlement agreement provided by the agency does not specifically provide for enforcement before the Board. See CRF, Tab 5 at 16. Nor did the parties attempt to enter it into the record for enforcement before the administrative judge or in the current proceeding, or explain how, if at all, the settlement agreement might affect the findings in the compliance initial decision.

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Bluebook (online)
Matthew J Rovnan v. Department of the Interior, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matthew-j-rovnan-v-department-of-the-interior-mspb-2025.