Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before Sep 15 2014, 9:56 am any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARCE GONZALEZ, JR. GREGORY F. ZOELLER Dyer, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ANGELA N. SANCHEZ Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MATTHEW J. KNIGHT, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 45A03-1401-CR-31 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Thomas P. Stefaniak, Jr., Judge Cause No. 45G04-1303-MR-6
September 15, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Matthew J. Knight appeals his eleven-year sentence after he pleaded guilty to
reckless homicide, a Class C felony, and to the use of a firearm in the commission of an
offense, a sentencing enhancement. He presents one issue1 for our review, namely,
whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his
character.2
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on March 27, 2013, sixteen-year-old Knight and three
others drove a vehicle through the 7500 block of Marshall Street in Merrillville. One of
the four members of the vehicle fired six rounds from a .45 caliber handgun into a home
on Marshall Street. Knight had purchased that handgun earlier that day. A bullet passed
through a window frame of the home and struck fourteen-year-old Depree Mims in the
head. Eight other members of Mims’ family, including several small children, were also
in the room when the bullet struck Mims. Mims subsequently died as a result of the
gunshot wound. Neither Mims nor any member of his family knew Knight.
1 In passing, Knight suggests that his conviction for reckless homicide and his firearm enhancement would violate his double jeopardy rights had he not pleaded guilty, which, in turn, makes his sentence inappropriate. But Knight did plead guilty, and, as our supreme court has repeatedly said, “[d]efendants who plead guilty to achieve favorable outcomes give up a plethora of substantive claims and procedural rights, such as challenges to convictions that would otherwise constitute double jeopardy.” Crider v. State, 984 N.E.2d 618, 623 (Ind. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). And, regardless, Knight’s passing statement is not an argument supported by cogent reasoning. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). 2 Knight also “urges that the Court of Appeals should revise his sentence” because “[t]he maximum sentence for reckless homicide, a Class C felony[,] is ten (10) years, yet Knight was sentenced to eleven years.” Tr. at 8. But Knight’s assertion ignores the fact that he was sentenced to six years for reckless homicide, and the court separately enhanced his sentence by five years on the firearm enhancement. Thus, this argument is not supported by cogent reasoning, and we do not consider it. App. R. 8(A)(8)(a). 2 On March 30, the State charged Knight with two counts: (I) Murder, a felony; and
(II) Criminal Gang Activity, a Class D felony. On October 23, 2013, the State entered
into an open plea agreement with Knight. Under the agreement, the State agreed to
amend the charging information by adding two additional counts: (III) reckless
homicide, a Class C felony; and (IV) use of a firearm in the commission of an offense, a
five-year sentence enhancement. In exchange for Knight’s guilty pleas to Counts III and
IV, the State agreed to dismiss Counts I and II. Knight pleaded guilty that same day, and
the trial court conducted a plea colloquy. The court took the plea under advisement,
ordered a presentence investigation report, and set the matter for a sentencing hearing.
Following a sentencing hearing on December 17, the court accepted Knight’s plea
and, before sentencing, identified aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court
recognized Knight’s young age and his acceptance of responsibility by way of plea as
mitigators, but it also found as aggravators that Knight had a lengthy juvenile criminal
history and was on probation for a prior offense when he shot Mims. The court
concluded that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators. The court then sentenced
Knight to six years for reckless homicide and enhanced that sentence by five years for
use of a firearm, which resulted in an aggregate term of eleven years executed. This
appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Knight contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.3 Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana
3 Knight divides his argument and addresses his six-year sentence for reckless homicide and the five-year enhancement individually. However, we “focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather 3 Constitution “authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence
imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(alteration in original). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Rule 7(B) requires the appellant
to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and
his character. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007). We assess the trial court’s recognition or non-recognition of aggravators
and mitigators as an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was
inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, “a
defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e]
inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush, 875 N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original).
Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate
sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should receive
considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225.
Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense
of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others,
and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.
Here, Knight contends that his eleven-year sentence is inappropriate because the
“facts reflect a scenario which is generally anticipated by our legislature when defining
the offense of reckless homicide.” Appellant Br. at 6. Therefore, he reasons, “the
than the trees . . . .” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)). 4 advisory term of four years coincides with the nature of the offense, rather than the six
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Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before Sep 15 2014, 9:56 am any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
MARCE GONZALEZ, JR. GREGORY F. ZOELLER Dyer, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
ANGELA N. SANCHEZ Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MATTHEW J. KNIGHT, ) ) Appellant-Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 45A03-1401-CR-31 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE LAKE SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable Thomas P. Stefaniak, Jr., Judge Cause No. 45G04-1303-MR-6
September 15, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NAJAM, Judge STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Matthew J. Knight appeals his eleven-year sentence after he pleaded guilty to
reckless homicide, a Class C felony, and to the use of a firearm in the commission of an
offense, a sentencing enhancement. He presents one issue1 for our review, namely,
whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his
character.2
We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on March 27, 2013, sixteen-year-old Knight and three
others drove a vehicle through the 7500 block of Marshall Street in Merrillville. One of
the four members of the vehicle fired six rounds from a .45 caliber handgun into a home
on Marshall Street. Knight had purchased that handgun earlier that day. A bullet passed
through a window frame of the home and struck fourteen-year-old Depree Mims in the
head. Eight other members of Mims’ family, including several small children, were also
in the room when the bullet struck Mims. Mims subsequently died as a result of the
gunshot wound. Neither Mims nor any member of his family knew Knight.
1 In passing, Knight suggests that his conviction for reckless homicide and his firearm enhancement would violate his double jeopardy rights had he not pleaded guilty, which, in turn, makes his sentence inappropriate. But Knight did plead guilty, and, as our supreme court has repeatedly said, “[d]efendants who plead guilty to achieve favorable outcomes give up a plethora of substantive claims and procedural rights, such as challenges to convictions that would otherwise constitute double jeopardy.” Crider v. State, 984 N.E.2d 618, 623 (Ind. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). And, regardless, Knight’s passing statement is not an argument supported by cogent reasoning. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). 2 Knight also “urges that the Court of Appeals should revise his sentence” because “[t]he maximum sentence for reckless homicide, a Class C felony[,] is ten (10) years, yet Knight was sentenced to eleven years.” Tr. at 8. But Knight’s assertion ignores the fact that he was sentenced to six years for reckless homicide, and the court separately enhanced his sentence by five years on the firearm enhancement. Thus, this argument is not supported by cogent reasoning, and we do not consider it. App. R. 8(A)(8)(a). 2 On March 30, the State charged Knight with two counts: (I) Murder, a felony; and
(II) Criminal Gang Activity, a Class D felony. On October 23, 2013, the State entered
into an open plea agreement with Knight. Under the agreement, the State agreed to
amend the charging information by adding two additional counts: (III) reckless
homicide, a Class C felony; and (IV) use of a firearm in the commission of an offense, a
five-year sentence enhancement. In exchange for Knight’s guilty pleas to Counts III and
IV, the State agreed to dismiss Counts I and II. Knight pleaded guilty that same day, and
the trial court conducted a plea colloquy. The court took the plea under advisement,
ordered a presentence investigation report, and set the matter for a sentencing hearing.
Following a sentencing hearing on December 17, the court accepted Knight’s plea
and, before sentencing, identified aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court
recognized Knight’s young age and his acceptance of responsibility by way of plea as
mitigators, but it also found as aggravators that Knight had a lengthy juvenile criminal
history and was on probation for a prior offense when he shot Mims. The court
concluded that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators. The court then sentenced
Knight to six years for reckless homicide and enhanced that sentence by five years for
use of a firearm, which resulted in an aggregate term of eleven years executed. This
appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Knight contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.3 Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana
3 Knight divides his argument and addresses his six-year sentence for reckless homicide and the five-year enhancement individually. However, we “focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather 3 Constitution “authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence
imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(alteration in original). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Rule 7(B) requires the appellant
to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and
his character. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007). We assess the trial court’s recognition or non-recognition of aggravators
and mitigators as an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was
inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). However, “a
defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence has met th[e]
inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush, 875 N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original).
Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate
sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should receive
considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225.
Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense
of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others,
and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.
Here, Knight contends that his eleven-year sentence is inappropriate because the
“facts reflect a scenario which is generally anticipated by our legislature when defining
the offense of reckless homicide.” Appellant Br. at 6. Therefore, he reasons, “the
than the trees . . . .” Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008)). 4 advisory term of four years coincides with the nature of the offense, rather than the six
years imposed.” We are not persuaded.
First, at sentencing, Knight’s defense counsel requested his six-year sentence for
reckless homicide. Tr. at 110 (“I would ask the Court to consider sentencing Matthew to
six years on the Reckless Homicide count.”). Thus, to the extent that Knight argues that
his six-year sentence, in particular, is inappropriate, he invited any error, which precludes
relief. See Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 975 (Ind. 2014).
Second, Knight’s aggregate sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense. After Knight purchased a handgun earlier in the day, he and three of his
friends fired six bullets into a home at 8:30 p.m. on a weekday. Foreseeably, a bullet
struck an occupant of that home, a fourteen-year-old child, while members of his family
gathered. Mims’ family, including children as young as five years old, watched him lose
consciousness as a result of the fatal wound. The trial court heard evidence that Mims’
siblings4 now fear both loud noises and sitting by windows and doors, and some of them
have required therapy. This was a random, senseless act of violence. We cannot say that
Knight’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense.
Last, Knight also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his
character. In support of that contention, Knight emphasizes his youth and his guilty plea.
But, while Knight accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct by entering a guilty
plea, the trial court considered his plea as a mitigating factor, and Knight benefitted by
the dismissal of two other counts, including murder. Moreover, as the trial court found,
4 Mims was the second oldest of eight children. 5 Knight has a significant criminal history at his young age. In November 2012, the
juvenile court adjudicated Knight delinquent for possession of marijuana and dangerous
possession of a firearm, which had been stolen, and Knight was on probation for these
offenses when he shot Mims. Knight also admitted in a letter to a detective that, on the
day after the Mims shooting, he robbed his drug dealer with the same firearm used to kill
Mims. Knight also lied to the police to deliberately mislead the investigation of Mims’
death, something he laughed about later. Finally, while in jail for the current offense,
Knight committed several disciplinary violations.
Therefore, considering the nature of the offense and Knight’s character, we cannot
say that Knight’s sentence is inappropriate or is an outlier. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 940
N.E.2d 1210, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming a thirteen-year aggregate sentence for
reckless homicide with the five-year sentencing enhancement over an Appellate Rule
7(B) challenge). We affirm his sentence.
Affirmed.
BAILEY, J., and PYLE, J., concur.