HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge.
In this habeas corpus proceeding, Warden Michael Sheets appeals the district court’s order vacating petitioner Matthew Hill’s sentence and directing that Hill either be resentenced or released as a remedy for the violation of his constitutional rights under
Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). We DISMISS the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We accept the state appellate court’s summary of the case:
On February 2, 2004, Appellant entered the residence of Danny Thornhill. An altercation occurred between Appellant and Thornhill. During this altercation, Thornhill was struck repeatedly with a handgun. Thornhill fled the residence, followed by Appellant who fired at least two shots at Thornhill. By the time police arrived, Appellant had fled from the scene.
On February 11, 2004, the Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on the following charges: one count of Aggravated Robbery with a gun specification, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2911.01(A)(1) and 2941.145, a felony of the first degree; one count of Aggravated Burglary with a gun specification, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2911.11(A)(2) and 2941.145, a felony of the first degree; two counts of Felonious Assault with a gun specification, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2903.11(A)(2) and 2941.145, a felony of the second degree; one count of Theft of a Firearm, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2913.02(A)(1) and 2941.145, a felony of the fourth degree; and one count of Aggravated Burglary with a gun specification, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2911.11(A)(1) and 2941.145, a felony of the first degree.
On February 18, 2004, appellant appeared for arraignment and pled “not guilty” to all counts set forth in the Indictment.
On August 3, 2004, a jury heard the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict of “guilty” on the two counts of Felonious Assault with a gun specification, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2903.11(A)(2) and 2941.145, both felonies of the second degree. The [j]ury found Appellant “not guilty” on all other counts.
Appellant was sentenced on September 20, 2004. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard the report of the presentence investigator and the arguments of counsel for the respective parties before pronouncing sentence. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a prison sentence of eight years on each count of Felonious Assault and three years on each gun specification, all sentences to be served consecutive to one another for a total sentence of 22 years. This sentence is the maximum sentence that Appellant could have received for the crimes for which he was convicted. [
]
Although the remaining procedural history in state court is complex, resolution of
this
appeal
does not require that we describe it in detail. It is sufficient to note that Hill challenged his conviction in both direct-appeal and post-conviction proceedings, raising several grounds including that his sentence violated
Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).
See also State v. Foster,
109 Ohio St.3d 1, 845 N.E.2d 470 (2006).
In June 2007 Hill,
pro se,
filed a federal habeas petition in the district court. He raised two claims: 1) that his sentence was unconstitutional because the trial judge decided sentencing factors instead of the jury, and 2) that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a double-jeopardy claim on direct appeal. The Warden argued that Hill’s claims were procedurally defaulted and meritless.
In July 2008, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, finding that Hill had procedurally defaulted his claims in state court, but that the ineffective assistance of Hill’s appellate counsel in failing to raise a
Blakely
claim provided cause and prejudice excusing the default. The magistrate judge concluded that Hill’s
Blakely
claim had merit (and that his double-jeopardy claim did not) and recommended conditionally granting the petition on the
Blakely
claim. Over the Warden’s objections, the district court adopted the report and recommendation. The court’s November 4, 2008, order vacated Hill’s sentence and directed that he “be released from incarceration unless the state resentences him within sixty (60) days.” The Warden appealed.
Two days after filing his notice of appeal, the Warden moved for a stay of final judgment pending appeal, which the district court granted. By that time, Hill had filed
pro se
motions in state court to begin the resentencing process.
Hill was resentenced in state court on December 29, 2008, by a different sentencing judge, to the same 22-year sentence.
On appeal, Hill filed a motion for counsel, which was granted, as were the parties’ motions to take judicial notice of Hill’s resentencing.
DISCUSSION
First and foremost, this appeal presents a jurisdictional issue. As this court has explained,
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution authorizes the federal judiciary only to hear cases or controversies, and therefore federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction when the controversy has been mooted, that is to say, when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.
Gentry v. Deuth,
456 F.3d 687, 693 (6th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In
Gentry,
this court held that a prisoner’s release did not moot her habeas petition where her status as a convicted felon would cause her to face “collateral consequences,” such as not being able vote or hold public office, and being subject to federal criminal laws and restrictions that apply only to felons.
Id.
at 694-95. The
Gentry
court distinguished the petitioner’s habeas claim, which challenged her conviction, from those of individuals who had challenged only their sentences, or conditions of confinement, and received full relief from any constitutional error once they were released.
Id.
at 694;
see also James v. Singletary,
995 F.2d 187, 188-89 (11th Cir.1993) (federal habeas petition challenging sentencing mooted when state courts resentenced petitioner).
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HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge.
In this habeas corpus proceeding, Warden Michael Sheets appeals the district court’s order vacating petitioner Matthew Hill’s sentence and directing that Hill either be resentenced or released as a remedy for the violation of his constitutional rights under
Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). We DISMISS the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We accept the state appellate court’s summary of the case:
On February 2, 2004, Appellant entered the residence of Danny Thornhill. An altercation occurred between Appellant and Thornhill. During this altercation, Thornhill was struck repeatedly with a handgun. Thornhill fled the residence, followed by Appellant who fired at least two shots at Thornhill. By the time police arrived, Appellant had fled from the scene.
On February 11, 2004, the Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on the following charges: one count of Aggravated Robbery with a gun specification, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2911.01(A)(1) and 2941.145, a felony of the first degree; one count of Aggravated Burglary with a gun specification, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2911.11(A)(2) and 2941.145, a felony of the first degree; two counts of Felonious Assault with a gun specification, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2903.11(A)(2) and 2941.145, a felony of the second degree; one count of Theft of a Firearm, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2913.02(A)(1) and 2941.145, a felony of the fourth degree; and one count of Aggravated Burglary with a gun specification, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2911.11(A)(1) and 2941.145, a felony of the first degree.
On February 18, 2004, appellant appeared for arraignment and pled “not guilty” to all counts set forth in the Indictment.
On August 3, 2004, a jury heard the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict of “guilty” on the two counts of Felonious Assault with a gun specification, in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2903.11(A)(2) and 2941.145, both felonies of the second degree. The [j]ury found Appellant “not guilty” on all other counts.
Appellant was sentenced on September 20, 2004. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard the report of the presentence investigator and the arguments of counsel for the respective parties before pronouncing sentence. Ultimately, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a prison sentence of eight years on each count of Felonious Assault and three years on each gun specification, all sentences to be served consecutive to one another for a total sentence of 22 years. This sentence is the maximum sentence that Appellant could have received for the crimes for which he was convicted. [
]
Although the remaining procedural history in state court is complex, resolution of
this
appeal
does not require that we describe it in detail. It is sufficient to note that Hill challenged his conviction in both direct-appeal and post-conviction proceedings, raising several grounds including that his sentence violated
Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004).
See also State v. Foster,
109 Ohio St.3d 1, 845 N.E.2d 470 (2006).
In June 2007 Hill,
pro se,
filed a federal habeas petition in the district court. He raised two claims: 1) that his sentence was unconstitutional because the trial judge decided sentencing factors instead of the jury, and 2) that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a double-jeopardy claim on direct appeal. The Warden argued that Hill’s claims were procedurally defaulted and meritless.
In July 2008, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation, finding that Hill had procedurally defaulted his claims in state court, but that the ineffective assistance of Hill’s appellate counsel in failing to raise a
Blakely
claim provided cause and prejudice excusing the default. The magistrate judge concluded that Hill’s
Blakely
claim had merit (and that his double-jeopardy claim did not) and recommended conditionally granting the petition on the
Blakely
claim. Over the Warden’s objections, the district court adopted the report and recommendation. The court’s November 4, 2008, order vacated Hill’s sentence and directed that he “be released from incarceration unless the state resentences him within sixty (60) days.” The Warden appealed.
Two days after filing his notice of appeal, the Warden moved for a stay of final judgment pending appeal, which the district court granted. By that time, Hill had filed
pro se
motions in state court to begin the resentencing process.
Hill was resentenced in state court on December 29, 2008, by a different sentencing judge, to the same 22-year sentence.
On appeal, Hill filed a motion for counsel, which was granted, as were the parties’ motions to take judicial notice of Hill’s resentencing.
DISCUSSION
First and foremost, this appeal presents a jurisdictional issue. As this court has explained,
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution authorizes the federal judiciary only to hear cases or controversies, and therefore federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction when the controversy has been mooted, that is to say, when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.
Gentry v. Deuth,
456 F.3d 687, 693 (6th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In
Gentry,
this court held that a prisoner’s release did not moot her habeas petition where her status as a convicted felon would cause her to face “collateral consequences,” such as not being able vote or hold public office, and being subject to federal criminal laws and restrictions that apply only to felons.
Id.
at 694-95. The
Gentry
court distinguished the petitioner’s habeas claim, which challenged her conviction, from those of individuals who had challenged only their sentences, or conditions of confinement, and received full relief from any constitutional error once they were released.
Id.
at 694;
see also James v. Singletary,
995 F.2d 187, 188-89 (11th Cir.1993) (federal habeas petition challenging sentencing mooted when state courts resentenced petitioner).
The district court’s order conditionally granting Hill’s petition vacated his sentence and directed that he “be released from incarceration unless the state resentences him within sixty (60) days.” Because the state resentenced Hill, he has obtained one of the two individually sufficient options for relief ordered by the district court. Further, because Hill obtained habeas relief with regard to his sentencing claim alone, he does not have a cognizable
interest in avoiding the collateral consequences of his conviction. As the Warden himself noted in his motion for stay, “[t]o resentence Hill would effectively moot this litigation.” We agree. The appeal before us is moot.
In their briefs, both parties assert that Hill’s resentencing was “void” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2251(b). That statute states in relevant part:
§ 2251 Stay of State court proceedings (a) In general.—
(1) Pending matters. — A justice or judge of the United States before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending, may, before final judgment or after final judgment of discharge, or pending appeal, stay any proceeding against the person detained in any State court or by or under the authority of any State for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding.
(b) No further proceedings. — After the granting of such a stay, any such proceeding in any State court or by or under the authority of any State shall be void. If no stay is granted, any such proceeding shall be as valid as if no habeas corpus proceedings or appeal were pending.
28 U.S.C. § 2251 (bold removed).
Despite the parties’ concessions, it does not appear that 28 U.S.C. § 2251(b) applies here. The stay provision allows federal courts to stay
state-court proceedings. See
§ 2251(a)(1) (a federal judge “may ... stay any proceeding against the person detained in any State court”); 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, & VIKRAM DAVID AMAR, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 4268.4 (referring to § 2251, stating “[bjoth before and after judgment the district court has authority to stay all state-court proceedings that have the effect of defeating or impairing the federal court’s jurisdiction.”);
McFarland v. Scott,
512 U.S. 849, 857, 114 S.Ct. 2568, 129 L.Ed.2d 666 (1994) (“The federal habeas corpus statute grants any federal judge ‘before whom a habeas corpus proceeding is pending' power to stay a state-court action ‘for any matter involved in the habeas corpus proceeding.’”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2251, emphasis removed). Despite the parties’ assertions to the contrary, it is plain that the district court’s order did not stay any state-court proceeding; rather, the court stayed its own judgment.
See
Opinion and Order, R.30 at 1 (“On November 4, 2008 final judgment was entered.... This matter now is before the Court on respondent’s request for a stay of final judgment .... respondent’s request for a stay [ ] is granted.”). Thus, Hill’s resentencing is not void under 28 U.S.C. § 2251(b).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is moot. We DISMISS for lack of jurisdiction.