COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges AtLee, Friedman and Callins UNPUBLISHED
Argued by videoconference
MATTHEW GEORGE POLLOCK MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0096-25-3 JUDGE FRANK K. FRIEDMAN MARCH 3, 2026 CHRISTY NICOLE POLLOCK
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY Bruce D. Albertson, Judge
Heather Larson Behrmann (Kyle J. Burcham; Pedersen Law, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.
J. Thompson Cravens (Cravens & Noll PC, on brief), for appellee.
This case is a divorce matter involving Christy Pollock’s (Wife) attempt to file a military
retired pay division order (MRPDO) after entry of the final decree of divorce by the Circuit
Court of Rockingham County. Matthew Pollock (Husband) contends that Wife’s attempts to
reconcile the circuit court’s final decree with the MRPDO result in the improper indemnification
of Wife and a re-writing of the parties’ Property Agreement. We agree and reverse the circuit
court’s amended MRPDO.
BACKGROUND
Wife and Husband were married on June 25, 1994 in Granite Falls, North Carolina. Wife
and Husband separated on August 13, 2021; there were no minor children born to the parties. The
parties entered into a Property Settlement Agreement on September 7, 2021. Wife filed a complaint
for divorce on February 15, 2022.
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). Included in the Property Agreement is the division of Husband’s military pension.
Paragraph 7 addresses Husband’s military pension:
Retirement Plans: Husband has a DFAS Military Retirement Plan. Wife is to receive 50% of the marital share, based on gross pay, of this retirement plan by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, or its military equivalent, after a final decree of divorce is entered by the Court.
Wife shall retain 100% of her Vanguard IRA.
Nothing contained herein shall be a waiver of either party’s right to make any claim for social security benefits based on the other party’s social security benefits.
Other portions of the Agreement reference Husband’s “gross retirement benefits” and Husband’s
“gross retirement” in calculating Husband’s spousal support to Wife. These provisions were agreed
to by the parties and the agreement was drafted by Wife.
The circuit court entered a final decree of divorce on May 25, 2022. The Agreement was
affirmed, ratified and incorporated, but not merged into, the final decree. Husband failed to pay
wife any portion of the pension or support agreed to in the Property Agreement after they signed the
Agreement on September 7, 2021.
After not receiving her agreed-to payments, Wife prepared and attempted to have the
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) approve a draft MRPDO after entry of the final
decree. Wife’s proposed MRPDO was rejected by DFAS twice. On April 25, 2024, Wife filed a
“Motion to Amend the Final Decree to Effectuate Property Settlement Agreement,” and
subsequently amended that motion on November 22, 2024. The motions requested that the circuit
court amend the final decree to comply with the DFAS requirements, or, in the alternative, to enter
an order of withholding.
The court held a hearing on December 5, 2024 to hear argument on Wife’s “Amended
Motion to Amend Final Decree to Effectuate Property Settlement Agreement.” The court decided
-2- the case on the Property Agreement, argument of counsel, and Wife’s proposed MRPDO—it took
no evidence at the hearing. No changes were made to the final decree by the court, and the court
subsequently entered the amended MRPDO on December 17, 2024. The court did determine that
the language in the Property Agreement and amended MRPDO were in conflict with one another,
noting that the amended MRPDO contains an indemnification clause that was not included in the
Property Agreement. The court noted that the purpose of the indemnification clause “is to force
[Husband] into making retirement payments to [Wife] regardless of whether DFAS ever approves
of a MRPDO.”
The court also noted that “[n]o MRPDO had been entered by the Court prior to entry of the
Amended MRPDO on December 17, 2024.” The court did not make a finding or determine
whether the language in the Property Agreement was ambiguous, nor whether the parties entered
into the Property Agreement based on either a unilateral or mutual mistake. The court did, however,
override the language contained in the Property Agreement when it deemed that language to be in
conflict with the amended MRPDO.1 This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review.
“Property settlement agreements are contracts; therefore, we must apply the same rules of
interpretation applicable to contracts generally.” Bazzle v. Bazzle, 37 Va. App. 737, 745 (2002)
1 It appears the circuit court made a clerical error in calling the order “Amended” as there were no prior MRPDOs entered. The circuit court can address this issue on remand. See Code § 8.01-428(B). “This code section provides the trial court with the authority only to correct ‘clerical mistakes’ in its decree or errors in the record so as to cause the acts and proceedings to be set forth correctly.” Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va. App. 126, 133 (2002) (citing Myers v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 544, 548 (1998)). Furthermore, “[t]he authority to correct a clerical mistake in a decree or the record may be exercised at any time, based on any competent evidence, ‘when the justice and truth of the case requires it.’” Id. (quoting Netzer v. Reynolds, 231 Va. 444, 449 (1986)). -3- (quoting Tiffany v. Tiffany, 1 Va. App. 11, 15 (1985)). “The interpretation of a contract is a
question of law that this court reviews de novo.” Bolton v. McKinney, 299 Va. 550, 554 (2021).
II. The Circuit Court Improperly Added an Indemnification Clause in the Amended MRPDO, Modifying the Agreement Without the Husband’s Consent
On appeal, Husband argues that Paragraph 11 of the amended MRPDO adds an
indemnification clause which was not included in the Property Agreement. Paragraph 11 states:
11. Member Payments to [Wife]: If DFAS does not pay to [Wife] any portion of [Husband]’s benefit that is covered by the MRPDO (e.g., if there are multiple court orders and, combined they exceed the direct payment limits in 10 USC Section 1408(e)), [Husband] shall pay that portion directly to [Wife] within 7 days after the date [Wife] otherwise would have received it. Such payment(s) to [Wife] shall be net of any income and similar taxes [Husband] incurs with respect to that portion of Plan benefits.2
Wife argues that Paragraph 11 does not require indemnification, but that instead the paragraph is
“shifting” the method of payment. Wife further asserts that “Husband is not out any more
money by directly paying [her] than if DFAS took the money and directly paid [her].” We
disagree.
Federal law bars a state court from ordering a former spouse to reimburse or indemnify
the other former spouse for a reduction in disposable retired pay unless the parties mutually
agree to an indemnification provision. Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214, 222 (2017) (“Regardless
of their form, such reimbursement and indemnification orders displace the federal rule and stand
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the purposes and objectives of Congress.
All such orders are thus preempted.”); Yourko v. Yourko, 302 Va. 149, 161 (2023), cert. denied,
145 S. Ct. 137 (2024) (finding that Howell is not implicated “when parties contractually agree to
divide military retirement benefits and include an indemnification provision[,]” but is implicated
2 Also of note, included in Paragraph 9 of the Property Agreement is the following sentence: “Husband agrees to facilitate the direct payment of spousal support through DFAS.” -4- when a court unilaterally “seeks to circumvent the USFSPA [Uniformed Services Former
Spouses’ Protection Act] by ordering indemnification” for one of the spouses). The Supreme
Court of Virginia, in Yourko, held that “with regard to the division of military retirement
benefits, ‘federal law does not prevent a husband and wife from entering into an agreement to
provide a set level of payments, the amount of which is determined by considering disability
benefits as well as retirement benefits.’” 302 Va. at 162 (emphasis added) (quoting Owen v.
Owen, 14 Va. App. 623, 628 (1992)). The distinct facts in Yourko led to the Court’s result,
which overturned the Court of Appeals opinion and held that “federal law does not bar courts
from upholding such agreements or from enforcing indemnification provisions that may be
included to ensure that payments are maintained as intended by the parties.” Id. (emphasis
added).
In Yourko, the parties divided Husband’s military pay as part of a property settlement
agreement which did include an indemnification provision. Id. at 158-59. The Court, reflecting
on the United States Supreme Court precedent in Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989), noted
that the case “simply proscribes state courts from ‘treating military retirement pay that had been
waived to receive disability benefits as community property.’” Yourko, 302 Va. at 158-59
(quoting Mansell, 490 U.S. at 586). “Howell, on the other hand, only makes clear that state
courts cannot order a veteran who elects to waive retirement pay for disability pay to indemnify a
former spouse.” Id. at 159 (quoting Howell, 581 U.S. at 222). Important to Virginia’s Supreme
Court in Yourko was “that neither Mansell nor Howell involved a property settlement agreement
that contained an indemnification provision.” Id. at 158. Here, the Agreement at issue contains
no indemnification provisions either.
Wife argues that Paragraph 9 of the Agreement includes an implied indemnification
provision through its language ensuring Husband would facilitate direct payment of spousal
-5- support through DFAS. Paragraph 9 states that “Husband agrees to facilitate the direct payment
of spousal support through DFAS.” Paragraph 9’s language, however, is a far cry from the
language included in the amended MRPDO, which clearly requires Husband to directly pay Wife
any portion not paid by DFAS within seven days. This indemnification provision unilaterally
implemented by the circuit court simply was not agreed to by Husband.3 Thus, the order must be
reversed with direction to implement an order consistent with the parties’ Agreement.
In rejecting the unilateral change, we are not finding that Wife is completely without
recourse. The facts of this case are such that Husband plainly is not meeting the obligations
contemplated by the parties when they entered the Property Agreement. We are simply noting
3 The dissent challenges whether the unilateral indemnification clause is in contravention of Yourko, 302 Va. 449, suggesting that Yourko’s prohibition on indemnification only applies where there has been a waiver of retirement pay, or a corresponding award of disability pay. This misses the point that this new indemnification term, which Husband never agreed to, is broad enough to cover such events should they occur—and the provision was added without any additional evidence taken on the question of disability pay. But see R. 382 (exhibits from prior hearing indicating Husband was receiving significant disability pay). Even if the dissent were correct that indemnification can be made in this context, and if there were evidence that Husband is not on disability and did not waive retirement benefits (no new evidence was taken), Virginia law still would not permit Wife to rewrite an agreement to add indemnification terms that clearly were not involved in the original Agreement (which she drafted). See Yourko, 302 Va. at 162; see also Tm Delmarva Power v. Ncp of Va., 263 Va. 116, 119 (2002) (“Contracts between parties are subject to basic rules of interpretation. Contracts are construed as written, without adding terms that were not included by the parties.” (citing Wilson v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187 (1984))). The dissent also argues that allowing an indemnification provision would effectuate the original Agreement. This cannot, however, be true because Husband explicitly agreed to an Agreement without an indemnification provision. Instead, allowing the circuit court to circumvent the Property Agreement and unilaterally impose an indemnification provision would have the opposite effect and effectuate a provision which did not exist at the time the original Property Agreement went into effect. What the circuit court did in this case essentially invalidated the original Agreement by adding its own terms, which is explicitly prohibited under Virginia law. Tm Delmarva Power, 263 Va. at 119; see also Jones v. Harrison, 250 Va. 64, 68 (1995) (noting that courts “do not rewrite contracts to insert provisions that have been omitted by the parties[]” (citing Westbury Coal Mining P’ship v. J. S. & K. Coal Corp., 233 Va. 226, 229 (1987))). -6- that the circuit court’s attempts at equity through imposing a unilateral indemnification provision
never agreed to by Husband were made in error.4
III. The Circuit Court Further Erred by Improperly Modifying and Substituting the Term “Gross Pay” with the Term “Disposable Retired Pay” in the Amended MRPDO
Husband also argues on appeal that Paragraph 3 of the amended MRPDO modifies and
substitutes the term “gross pay” with the term “disposable retired pay.” Paragraph 3 of the amended
MRPDO states:
3. Benefit Assignment: This Order assigns to [Wife] the following portion of [Husband’s] “Disposable Retired Pay,” as defined in 10 USC Section 1408(a)(4):
A. Amount: This Order assigns to [Wife] 50% of the Marital Share of [Husband’s] Disposable Retired Pay; It shall increase with the cost of living (COLA) adjustments for [Husband]. Based upon final retired pay of [Husband] including raises and good increases. Wife shall receive 50% of the marital share which shall be determined by a faction [sic] made upon 325 months of marital pension service divided by the total months of [H]usband’s military service, 332. Example: []50% X (325 months of marital pension service/332 Husband’s total military service).
B. High-3/Creditable Service: For purposes of calculating [Wife’s] benefit assignment the parties’ divorce occurred on May 25, 2022, when [Husband’s] military retirement pay base (high-3) was $7,993.00 per month and the member had 332-months of creditable military service.
4 In reaching this conclusion, we note that Wife pointedly argues that Husband’s stubborn rejection of all offered changes has the effect of blocking payments of military benefits by DFAS to Wife. For the moment, Wife has not sought to establish that the original agreement contains mutual mistakes which have resulted in non-payment; nor has she argued that there is a change in conditions since the original agreement was entered, or that Husband’s tactics demonstrate that certain clauses are “impossible” to accomplish or inoperable, thereby triggering the original agreement’s severability clause. She has not argued that Husband has breached the Property Agreement by acting to prevent DFAS payments. Instead, to date, she has argued that the agreement should be altered unilaterally by inserting Wife’s indemnification language into the deal for the sake of fairness, without Husband’s consent and despite the existence of different terms in the original agreement. While we sympathize with Wife’s situation, she still requires a legal predicate for the relief she seeks. -7- Under the USFSPA, “disposable retired pay” is defined as all retired pay to which a service
member is entitled, subject to a series of exceptions. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A). The Supreme
Court of the United States, in Mansell, addressed the definition of “disposable retired pay” under the
USFSPA and the mechanism by which a spouse may get direct payments from the federal
government. 490 U.S. at 589. The Court noted that “[t]he Act also creates a payments mechanism
under which the Federal Government will make direct payments to a former spouse who presents,
to the Secretary of the relevant military service, a state-court order granting her a portion of the
military retiree’s disposable retired or retainer pay.” Id. The direct payments are limited in two
ways. The first is that “only a former spouse who was married to a military member ‘for a period of
10 years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of service creditable in
determining the member’s eligibility for retired or retainer pay’ . . . is eligible to receive direct
community property payments.” Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d)(2)). The second limitation is that
“the Federal Government will not make community property payments that exceed 50 percent of
disposable retired or retainer pay.” Id. (quoting 10 U.S.C. § 1408(e)(1)).
Here, the parties used the term “gross pay” throughout their entire Property Agreement. The
court unilaterally modified that term by replacing it with “disposable retired pay” in Paragraph 3 of
the MRPDO. Thus, looking to the plain language used in the Agreement, the parties agreed that
Wife’s award of Husband’s military retirement would be determined on his “gross pay.” See
Schuiling v. Harris, 286 Va. 187, 192 (1986) (finding that where there is no ambiguity in the terms
of the contract, the circuit court must construe the contract as written). Thus, the circuit court’s
modification of “gross pay” to “‘Disposable Retired Pay’ as defined in 10 USC Section 1408(a)(4)”
changes the meaning and effect of the parties’ Agreement, transforming the subject payment from
the total amount, exclusive of any deductions, to a post-deduction net amount. Again, this
-8- significant change to the Agreement was made without Husband’s consent.5 The circuit court
therefore erred in this change as well, and the amended MRPDO should be vacated, the circuit
court’s decision reversed and remanded.
Again, this does not mean that the circuit court is powerless in future proceedings to craft
relief—upon a proper theory—to address the fact that Husband has failed, over a period of several
years, to make payments the parties clearly contemplated under the original Agreement. See supra
note 4.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is reversed and remanded for a
decision consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and Remanded.
5 We note that although Husband challenges the unilateral alteration of the agreement, the substitution of “disposable retired pay” for “gross pay” would likely benefit Husband because “disposable retired pay” is defined as “gross pay” minus exclusions. Thus, Husband would be responsible for paying less money than if the change had not been made by the amended MRPDO. Again, Wife suggests Husband refuses even changes favorable to him—because, under the status quo, DFAS is not making payments. In future proceedings, if the parties do not reach an orderly settlement, Wife is free to contend that Husband has failed to “facilitate the direct payment of spousal support through DFAS” and, thereby, breached the agreement’s terms. -9- Callins, J., dissenting.
I agree with my colleagues that the military retired pay division order (MRPDO) contains
an indemnification clause not found in the Property Settlement Agreement (PSA). But I would
place more emphasis on the nuances of the rule announced in Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581
(1989), perfected in Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214 (2017), and recognized in Yourko v. Yourko,
302 Va. 149 (2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 137 (2024): that “federal law completely preempts
the States from treating waived military retirement pay as divisible community property.”
Howell, 581 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added) (discussing Mansell); see Yourko, 302 Va. at 160-62.
Because I would hold that, as a matter of effectuating the intent of the Pollocks’ PSA, the
MRPDO did not impose an indemnification provision barred by these precedents, I dissent.
Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA) as
a response to prior precedent barring the equitable distribution of military retired pay. See
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), superseded by statute in part, USFSPA, Pub. L. No.
97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (1982), as recognized in Howell, 581 U.S. at 217. The USFSPA authorizes
state courts to “treat disposable retired pay payable to a member . . . either as property solely of
the member or as property of the member and his spouse” as determined under state law.6 10
U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1). “Disposable retired pay” refers to the gross monthly retirement pay to
which a servicemember is entitled, less amounts (i) owed by the servicemember to the United
States for overpayments or recoupments, (ii) deducted due to forfeitures ordered by court-martial
or waivers to receive compensation, including disability pay, (iii) which are protected
entitlements related to the servicemembers disability status, and (iv) deducted to provide an
annuity to a spouse or former spouse. Id. § 1408(a)(4)(A). As the majority notes, former
6 Under Virginia law, retirement pay is considered marital property if it is “acquired by either spouse during the marriage, and before the last separation of the parties.” Code § 20-107.3(A)(2). - 10 - spouses of servicemembers married to the servicemember for ten years of the servicemember’s
service are entitled to receive direct payments from the Defense Finance Accounting Service
(DFAS) of amounts distributed under state court divorce decrees. Id. § 1408(d)(1), (2). But
DFAS may not pay more than 50% of a servicemember’s disposable retirement pay to a former
spouse. Id. § 1408(e)(1).
Although the USFSPA narrowed the scope of federal restrictions on the equitable
distribution of military retired pay, Congress continues to preempt the distribution of pay waived
for the receipt of disability pay. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594-95. In Mansell, a husband and wife
entered into a PSA providing that husband would pay wife 50% of his total military retirement
pay, including portions waived so he could receive disability benefits. Id. at 586. When the
husband moved to modify the divorce decree to dissolve the PSA’s requirement that his total
retirement pay be shared with wife, lower courts declined to do so. Id. at 586-87. They reasoned
that the USFSPA comprehensively lifted federal preemption on the division of military
retirement pay. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the lower courts, holding
that under the USFSPA “state courts have been granted the authority to treat disposable retired
pay as [marital] property; they have not been granted the authority to treat total retired pay as
[marital] property.” Id. at 589 (emphasis added). By excluding amounts waived to receive
disability pay from its definition of “disposable retired pay,” the USFSPA preempts state courts
from the equitable distribution of retired pay “waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits.”
Id. at 589, 595.
The Court more recently expanded the Mansell rule, holding that state courts may not
order a servicemember to indemnify a former spouse for portions of their gross retirement pay
waived to receive disability benefits long after divorce. Howell, 581 U.S. at 216. In Howell, a
husband and wife divorced while husband was still in active service, and wife was awarded 50%
- 11 - of husband’s military retirement pay. Id. at 218-19. Thirteen years after their divorce, husband
opted to waive a portion of his retirement pay, decreasing the total amount received by wife. Id.
at 219. Arizona courts held that, under the terms of the original decree, wife was entitled to her
full 50% interest without regard to husband’s disability waiver and ordered husband to indemnify
wife for her lost interest. Id. at 219-20. The Court reversed the Arizona courts, holding they
lacked the power to order indemnification. Id. at 221. The Court reasoned that the reduction in
wife’s portion of husband’s retirement pay was a future contingency that always existed,
meaning that “the value of [wife’s] share of military retirement pay was possibly worth less . . .
at the time of the divorce” than wife may have thought. Id. Yet the Court limited its holding
solely to the question of whether state courts could order indemnification as a matter of
interpreting their prior orders. Id. at 223.
Among others, Howell left open the question of whether parties to a divorce may agree to
indemnification provisions in a PSA. Our Supreme Court addressed this question in Yourko v.
Yourko, 302 Va. 149 (2023), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 137 (2024). There, a husband and wife
entered into a PSA entitling wife to 30%, or $1,202.70 monthly, of husband’s disposable military
retirement pay, and the parties’ agreement was memorialized in an MRPDO. Yourko, 302 Va. at
153-54. The PSA and MRPDO provided that if husband took any action reducing wife’s
entitlement, husband was required to indemnify wife by paying her directly for any amount lost.
Id. at 154. DFAS later determined that a greater portion than anticipated of husband’s retirement
pay was deemed disability pay, reducing wife’s share to only $253.20 monthly. Id. Our
Supreme Court held that Howell did not prevent parties from voluntarily contracting to
indemnify former spouses in the event military retirement pay is reduced. Id. at 156. To the
contrary, the Court held that the USFSPA does not “bar courts from upholding [PSAs] or from
- 12 - enforcing indemnification provisions that may be included to ensure that payments are
maintained as intended by the parties.” Id. at 162.
Because the prohibition announced in Howell “is only implicated when a [court] seeks to
circumvent the USFSPA by ordering indemnification,” I would conclude that Mansell, Howell,
and Yourko are inapposite to this case. Yourko, 302 Va. at 161 (emphases added). Here, the trial
court did not compel Husband to distribute his total retired pay in contravention of the USFSPA,
as in Mansell. Neither did it order indemnification as a back door to distributing portions of
Husband’s retired pay waived to receive disability benefits, as in Howell. Nor did the parties
agree to indemnify Wife for waived pay, as in Yourko. Indeed, the indemnification clause in the
MRPDO in no way acts to “circumvent the USFSPA.” Yourko, 302 Va. at 161. Nor could it.
The parties agreed to distribute Husband’s military retired pay “based on gross pay.” The record
includes no indication that Husband (i) is indebted to the United States for overpayments or
recoupments, (ii) is subject to a court-martial-ordered forfeiture or has waived retired pay to
receive disability benefits, (iii) has been declared disabled, or (iv) has elected to provide an
annuity to a spouse or former spouse. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A). Absent evidence that the trial
court ordered indemnification to account for retired pay reduced under the USFSPA for these
purposes, its indemnification provision is not barred by the USFSPA. In other words, the trial
court imposed the indemnification clause as a means of enforcing the terms of the PSA and not
in an effort to circumvent the USFSPA.7 And, for that matter, its use of the term “disposable
7 Notably, this is consistent with the interpretations of Howell employed in some of our sister jurisdictions. See, e.g., Gross v. Wilson, 424 P.3d 390, 401 (Alaska 2018) (“Under Howell a state court may not circumvent Mansell by ordering a service member to ‘indemnify’ a former spouse for retirement benefits waived to receive disability pay. But Howell does not hold that a state court cannot enforce a property division by ordering a service member who unilaterally stops making payments the service member was legally obligated to make to resume those payments and pay arrearages.”); Martin v. Martin, 520 P.3d 813, 818 (Nev. 2022) (recognizing that Howell and Mansell stand for the proposition that “state courts lack the authority to treat disability pay as community property and to divide it in a divorce disposition”). - 13 - retired pay” is innocuous, since Husband’s disposable retired pay would be his gross retired pay
absent these deductions.
Amusingly, my colleagues claim that I have “misse[d] the point,” supra note 3, insofar as
they read the trial court’s indemnification clause as “broad enough” to encompass the
circumstances barred by Mansell, Howell, and Yourko. To the contrary, I contend it is my
colleagues who miss the point, considering issues not actually before the Court. Even conceding
that this indemnification clause could encompass retired pay protected under the USFSPA,
Husband made no argument below that any of the carve outs from disposable retired pay apply to
him. Absent arguments to this effect and facts to support these arguments, the issues raised by
the majority are not ripe for review.8
Were that not enough, I would otherwise interpret the PSA to effectuate the Pollocks’
intent. In construing the PSA, we must give effect to the Pollocks’ intention as expressed “by
them in the words they have used,” and we are “bound to say that the parties intended what the
written instrument plainly declares.” Allen v. Allen, 66 Va. App. 586, 596 (2016) (quoting Wilson
v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187 (1984)). We also presume the trial court made all necessary
factual findings and reached all requisite conclusions of law in entering the amended MRPDO.
Highlander v. Va. Dep’t of Wildlife Res., 84 Va. App. 404, 421 (2025) (highlighting presumption
the trial court complied with governing legal principles); Ingram v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App.
8 As stated by our Supreme Court:
Whereas mootness addresses a once viable claim that has lost its viability, the concept of ripeness applies to claims that, while potentially viable at some point in the future, have yet to mature into a justiciable controversy—that is, an actual controversy between the parties that is not based solely on speculation or purely hypothetical scenarios that may (or may not) occur at some undefined point in the future.
Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors, 302 Va. 114, 131 (2023). - 14 - 59, 69 (2021) (noting that we presume trial courts make all necessary factual findings in absence
of specific ones). By its plain terms, the PSA entitles Wife to (1) “50% of the marital share,
based on gross pay, of” Husband’s military retired pay, and (2) “12% of Husband’s gross
retirement benefits per month for 200 months,” decreasing to 5% thereafter. (Emphasis added).
Husband agreed, by the PSA, to facilitate the payment of these portions of his military retirement
pay by “Qualified Domestic Relations Order” and by “direct payment . . . through DFAS.” The
Pollocks’ intent is clear: they intended the equitable distribution of Husband’s military retired
pay, granting half to Wife as a retirement asset, and granting a smaller percentage to her as
spousal support. We can only give effect to these provisions, therefore, if we interpret them as
speaking in terms of disposable retired pay—by law, the maximum amount subject to equitable
distribution by the court—and as providing for direct payment of spousal support. Presuming
the trial court did the same, I would conclude the trial court did not err in entering the amended
MRPDO to effectuate the Pollocks’ clearly expressed intentions.9
As a result, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s judgment and, because I
would conclude Wife is the prevailing party on appeal, I would award her attorney fees, the
amount of which to be determined upon remand.
9 That is not to say, however, that the parties may not still encounter resistance from DFAS in accepting an MRPDO that includes an indemnification clause to the extent it does not comply with order terms DFAS will accept. I would hold only that the trial court is not precluded by Mansell and Howell from imposing such a requirement under the circumstances presented here. - 15 -