COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00378-CR
Matthew Christopher Clark § From County Criminal Court No. 1
§ of Denton County
§ (CR-2010-01679-A) v. § March 14, 2013
§ Opinion by Justice Dauphinot
The State of Texas § (nfp)
JUDGMENT
This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that
there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
By_________________________________ Justice Lee Ann Dauphinot COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
MATTHEW CHRISTOPHER CLARK APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 1 OF DENTON COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Appellant Matthew Christopher Clark appeals the trial court’s revocation of
his misdemeanor community supervision for assault of a family member in
violation of Texas Penal Code section 22.01(a)(1). In two issues, he argues that
the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision based
on the State’s improper argument and that he was not afforded due process of
law. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Appellant’s
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2 community supervision and because he was afforded the due process to which
he was entitled, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The underlying offense for which Appellant was placed on community
supervision was committed in Denton County. Because Appellant was a resident
of Tarrant County, his community supervision was transferred to Tarrant County.
Typically, Appellant was ordered to participate in several programs and
evaluations and was ordered to pay all the fees involved with the various
programs and evaluations, as well as community supervision fees, a Crime
Stoppers fee, a family violence shelter fee, and court costs, while being required
to support his family and complete eighty hours of community supervision. The
purported purpose of all these fees, evaluations, meetings, programs, and panels
was to rehabilitate Appellant. Appellant initially reported to the Denton County
community supervision office on September 3, 2010. He was arrested for a new
offense involving alcohol in December 2010.
The transfer to Tarrant County did not go smoothly. Denton County
community supervision officer Rhett Wallace testified at the revocation hearing
that he was not even sure whether Appellant had ever met with his Tarrant
County community supervision officer because it often takes Tarrant County two
to three months to complete the transfer process. Wallace also testified that
Appellant knew he had an affirmative duty to provide proof of completion of the
various evaluations, panels, programs, and community service obligations and
that Wallace had received no such proof.
2 In his first issue, Appellant contends that the State improperly elicited
testimony about his alcohol-related arrest, a revocation allegation that the State
abandoned before trial. Although the State dismisses Appellant’s argument as
bordering on specious, we do not find it to be so. We consider the issue of
legitimate concern.
We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of
discretion.2 The trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision falls “outside
the zone of reasonable disagreement.”3
Appellant points out that a defendant in a criminal case may not be
simultaneously tried for a collateral crime.4 Appellant is correct under normal
circumstances. In a community supervision revocation case, however,
commission of a new offense, or even an allegation of the commission of a new
offense, may become relevant if it relates to the violation of a condition of
community supervision, such as to commit no new offense, to avoid persons or
places of disreputable or harmful character, or to use no alcohol.
The State had abandoned the allegation that Appellant had committed a
new offense in its live petition to adjudicate. But the State offered evidence of
the new arrest because it involved alcohol, and Appellant had not yet completed
2 Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 128 (2011). 3 Id. (citation omitted). 4 See Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
3 the required drug and alcohol evaluation. Under the facts of this case, the issue
of alcohol abuse was both relevant and of concern to the trial court in
determining the appropriate disposition of the case. As we understand the
record, the trial court heard the evidence not as evidence of a collateral offense,
but in relation to the negative impact of alcohol on Appellant’s life and the
importance of the alcohol and drug evaluation. We therefore hold that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Appellant’s objection to the
evidence. To the extent that Appellant complains of the prosecutor’s referencing
the alleged new offense in closing argument, we note that Appellant’s objection
to the prosecutor’s argument was sustained. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that he was denied due process
because he did not receive sufficient guidance and supervision from the
community supervision officers. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently
explained,
Revocation involves the loss of liberty and therefore implicates due process. The central issue to be determined in reviewing a trial court’s exercise of discretion in a community supervision revocation case is whether the defendant was afforded due process of law.5
Wallace admitted that Tarrant County did not even offer the Victim Impact
Panel that Appellant had been ordered to attend. Wallace also admitted that
Appellant might not have yet met the community supervision officer in Tarrant
5 Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citations omitted).
4 County after the September meeting in Denton County. Wallace also admitted
that the mere fact that the Denton County Community Supervision office does not
have a record of completion of a community supervision requirement does not
mean that it has not been completed. Appellant argues that “[i]n addition
to . . . receiving no supervision and no guidance, he also had no idea of who to
send proof that he was doing what he was supposed to be doing.” Appellant
argues that because he did not receive the guidance he needed, the trial court
violated his right to due process by revoking his community supervision.
Ideally, every community supervision department would have adequate
staff and funding to operate at maximum efficiency. Ideally, every person placed
on community supervision could be personally guided through the process.
Unfortunately, we do not live in that ideal world. Probationers often need the
continued advice and guidance of their attorneys in traveling the winding and
treacherous road of community supervision. But the record shows that Appellant
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COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00378-CR
Matthew Christopher Clark § From County Criminal Court No. 1
§ of Denton County
§ (CR-2010-01679-A) v. § March 14, 2013
§ Opinion by Justice Dauphinot
The State of Texas § (nfp)
JUDGMENT
This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that
there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
By_________________________________ Justice Lee Ann Dauphinot COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
MATTHEW CHRISTOPHER CLARK APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
----------
FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 1 OF DENTON COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Appellant Matthew Christopher Clark appeals the trial court’s revocation of
his misdemeanor community supervision for assault of a family member in
violation of Texas Penal Code section 22.01(a)(1). In two issues, he argues that
the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community supervision based
on the State’s improper argument and that he was not afforded due process of
law. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Appellant’s
1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2 community supervision and because he was afforded the due process to which
he was entitled, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The underlying offense for which Appellant was placed on community
supervision was committed in Denton County. Because Appellant was a resident
of Tarrant County, his community supervision was transferred to Tarrant County.
Typically, Appellant was ordered to participate in several programs and
evaluations and was ordered to pay all the fees involved with the various
programs and evaluations, as well as community supervision fees, a Crime
Stoppers fee, a family violence shelter fee, and court costs, while being required
to support his family and complete eighty hours of community supervision. The
purported purpose of all these fees, evaluations, meetings, programs, and panels
was to rehabilitate Appellant. Appellant initially reported to the Denton County
community supervision office on September 3, 2010. He was arrested for a new
offense involving alcohol in December 2010.
The transfer to Tarrant County did not go smoothly. Denton County
community supervision officer Rhett Wallace testified at the revocation hearing
that he was not even sure whether Appellant had ever met with his Tarrant
County community supervision officer because it often takes Tarrant County two
to three months to complete the transfer process. Wallace also testified that
Appellant knew he had an affirmative duty to provide proof of completion of the
various evaluations, panels, programs, and community service obligations and
that Wallace had received no such proof.
2 In his first issue, Appellant contends that the State improperly elicited
testimony about his alcohol-related arrest, a revocation allegation that the State
abandoned before trial. Although the State dismisses Appellant’s argument as
bordering on specious, we do not find it to be so. We consider the issue of
legitimate concern.
We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of
discretion.2 The trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision falls “outside
the zone of reasonable disagreement.”3
Appellant points out that a defendant in a criminal case may not be
simultaneously tried for a collateral crime.4 Appellant is correct under normal
circumstances. In a community supervision revocation case, however,
commission of a new offense, or even an allegation of the commission of a new
offense, may become relevant if it relates to the violation of a condition of
community supervision, such as to commit no new offense, to avoid persons or
places of disreputable or harmful character, or to use no alcohol.
The State had abandoned the allegation that Appellant had committed a
new offense in its live petition to adjudicate. But the State offered evidence of
the new arrest because it involved alcohol, and Appellant had not yet completed
2 Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 128 (2011). 3 Id. (citation omitted). 4 See Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
3 the required drug and alcohol evaluation. Under the facts of this case, the issue
of alcohol abuse was both relevant and of concern to the trial court in
determining the appropriate disposition of the case. As we understand the
record, the trial court heard the evidence not as evidence of a collateral offense,
but in relation to the negative impact of alcohol on Appellant’s life and the
importance of the alcohol and drug evaluation. We therefore hold that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Appellant’s objection to the
evidence. To the extent that Appellant complains of the prosecutor’s referencing
the alleged new offense in closing argument, we note that Appellant’s objection
to the prosecutor’s argument was sustained. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that he was denied due process
because he did not receive sufficient guidance and supervision from the
community supervision officers. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently
explained,
Revocation involves the loss of liberty and therefore implicates due process. The central issue to be determined in reviewing a trial court’s exercise of discretion in a community supervision revocation case is whether the defendant was afforded due process of law.5
Wallace admitted that Tarrant County did not even offer the Victim Impact
Panel that Appellant had been ordered to attend. Wallace also admitted that
Appellant might not have yet met the community supervision officer in Tarrant
5 Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citations omitted).
4 County after the September meeting in Denton County. Wallace also admitted
that the mere fact that the Denton County Community Supervision office does not
have a record of completion of a community supervision requirement does not
mean that it has not been completed. Appellant argues that “[i]n addition
to . . . receiving no supervision and no guidance, he also had no idea of who to
send proof that he was doing what he was supposed to be doing.” Appellant
argues that because he did not receive the guidance he needed, the trial court
violated his right to due process by revoking his community supervision.
Ideally, every community supervision department would have adequate
staff and funding to operate at maximum efficiency. Ideally, every person placed
on community supervision could be personally guided through the process.
Unfortunately, we do not live in that ideal world. Probationers often need the
continued advice and guidance of their attorneys in traveling the winding and
treacherous road of community supervision. But the record shows that Appellant
knew that he was obligated to pay his fees, and he also knew that he could mail
those fees to the Denton County Community Supervision Department. He did
not do so; he offered no suggestion that he was unable to pay. The record
shows that Appellant knew how to contact the Denton County Community
Supervision Department to ask questions about when and where to report to his
community supervision officer as well as for evaluations, panels, counseling, and
all the other myriad conditions of community supervision. While a stated goal of
5 community supervision is rehabilitation,6 it may often appear to be an
exceedingly difficult obstacle course that the probationer is expected to
negotiate. In the case now before this court, however, the State proved that
Appellant violated at least one condition of community supervision for which he
had no excuse or justification. Proof of a single violation is sufficient to support
revocation.7 We cannot say that the trial court violated Appellant’s right to due
process by revoking his community supervision based on his unjustified failure to
pay the assorted fees. We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
Having overruled Appellant’s two issues on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
LEE ANN DAUPHINOT JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GARDNER, JJ.
LIVINGSTON, C.J., concurs without opinion.
DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: March 14, 2013
6 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591 (2001). 7 Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).