UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA AT BECKLEY
MATTHEW ALWARD,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-cv-00034
DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, and DIRECTOR of VA, and BENEFIT ENROLLMENTS, and EVIDENCE COLLECTION TEAM,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is Plaintiff Matthew Alward’s pro se Emergency Objection [ECF 8], filed February 24, 2026, to the Proposed Findings and Recommendation (“PF&R”) entered by the Honorable Omar J. Aboulhosn, United States Magistrate Judge, on February 4, 2026. [ECF 7].
I.
This action was previously referred to Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn, for submission of a PF&R. Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn filed his PF&R [ECF 7] on February 4, 2026, recommending the Court deny Mr. Alward’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, dismiss his Complaints without prejudice, and remove this matter from the docket. [ECF 7 at 7-8]. Mr. Alward timely objected to the PF&R on February 24, 2026.
II.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), “a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). A district judge is required “to make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In particular, “a general objection ... is insufficient to avoid waiver.” Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining “other circuits have held that the failure to raise an objection sufficiently
specific to focus the district court's attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute waives any appellate review”) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508–09 (6th Cir. 1991); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1988). “Moreover, a general objection to a magistrate judge's findings is not sufficient [to trigger de novo review]— ‘a party must object to the [magistrate's] finding or recommendation ... with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection.’” United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 626, 621–22 (4th Cir. 2007)). In consideration of pro se objections, a court must “liberally construe [the] objections while maintaining constitutional limitations on a
magistrate's authority.” Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2023).
III.
Mr. Alward objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that he be denied in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA”) three-strike rule given his failure to satisfy the imminent danger exception. [ECF 8; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)]. Mr. Alward asserts “new events,” namely, a February 4, 2026, inmate altercation where he was “viciously and brutally beaten within inches of his life” demonstrate he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury, warranting application of the three-strike rule exception. [ECF 8]. Mr. Alward’s objection is misplaced. “Ordinarily, a federal litigant who is too poor to pay court fees may proceed in forma pauperis[,]” permitting the litigant to file suit without prepaying the applicable filing fees. Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 534 (2015). Nevertheless, the PLRA establishes a “three- strike rule” for incarcerated litigants:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA AT BECKLEY
MATTHEW ALWARD,
Plaintiff,
v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-cv-00034
DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS, and DIRECTOR of VA, and BENEFIT ENROLLMENTS, and EVIDENCE COLLECTION TEAM,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is Plaintiff Matthew Alward’s pro se Emergency Objection [ECF 8], filed February 24, 2026, to the Proposed Findings and Recommendation (“PF&R”) entered by the Honorable Omar J. Aboulhosn, United States Magistrate Judge, on February 4, 2026. [ECF 7].
I.
This action was previously referred to Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn, for submission of a PF&R. Magistrate Judge Aboulhosn filed his PF&R [ECF 7] on February 4, 2026, recommending the Court deny Mr. Alward’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, dismiss his Complaints without prejudice, and remove this matter from the docket. [ECF 7 at 7-8]. Mr. Alward timely objected to the PF&R on February 24, 2026.
II.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), “a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). A district judge is required “to make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). In particular, “a general objection ... is insufficient to avoid waiver.” Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411, 416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining “other circuits have held that the failure to raise an objection sufficiently
specific to focus the district court's attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute waives any appellate review”) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508–09 (6th Cir. 1991); Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1988). “Moreover, a general objection to a magistrate judge's findings is not sufficient [to trigger de novo review]— ‘a party must object to the [magistrate's] finding or recommendation ... with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court of the true ground for the objection.’” United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 626, 621–22 (4th Cir. 2007)). In consideration of pro se objections, a court must “liberally construe [the] objections while maintaining constitutional limitations on a
magistrate's authority.” Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 461 (4th Cir. 2023).
III.
Mr. Alward objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that he be denied in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (“PLRA”) three-strike rule given his failure to satisfy the imminent danger exception. [ECF 8; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)]. Mr. Alward asserts “new events,” namely, a February 4, 2026, inmate altercation where he was “viciously and brutally beaten within inches of his life” demonstrate he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury, warranting application of the three-strike rule exception. [ECF 8]. Mr. Alward’s objection is misplaced. “Ordinarily, a federal litigant who is too poor to pay court fees may proceed in forma pauperis[,]” permitting the litigant to file suit without prepaying the applicable filing fees. Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532, 534 (2015). Nevertheless, the PLRA establishes a “three- strike rule” for incarcerated litigants:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (emphasis added); Burrell v. Shirley, 142 F.4th 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2025). The “imminent danger” exception applies “only if the incarcerated person alleges sufficient and specific facts establishing that he or she is in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing.” Hall v. United States, 44 F.4th 218, 224 (4th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added); see also Holley v. Combs, 134 F.4th 142, 145 (4th Cir. 2025). Indeed, a “plain reading of [§ 1915(g)] requires that the ‘imminent danger’ exist contemporaneously when the action is filed.” Hall, 44 F.4th at 224. Furthermore, application of the exception requires “a nexus between the claims presented and the imminent danger alleged.” Id. at 230. Simply put, “because the ‘imminent danger’ exception to the PLRA was intended to be a ‘safety valve’ to the three strikes provision, petitioner’s must sufficiently allege a connection between the ‘imminent danger’ they are facing and the claims in their complaint to allow the district court to grant IFP status.” Id. at 231. As thoroughly explained by the Magistrate Judge, it is evident Mr. Alward has had at least three prior actions dismissed for qualifying grounds under § 1915(g), thus triggering the three-strike bar. See, e.g., Alward v. Rieck, No. 2:25-cv-10222, 2025 WL 2023002 (E.D. Mich. July 18, 2025); Alward v. Rieck, No. 1:4-cv-1228, 2025 WL 1342739 (W.D. Mich. May 8, 2025); Alward v. Noon, No. 3:24-CV-00983, 2024 WL 4584030 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2024); Alward v. FBOP, No. 3:24-cv-1773, 2024 WL 4536454 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2024); Alward v. Greene, No. 3:24-cv-1204, 2024 WL 4270367 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 2024); Alward v. Newell, No. 4:24-CV-0935, 2024 WL 3849913 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2024). Accordingly, his IFP status hinges on the existence of an imminent danger. Though the Court is sympathetic to Mr. Alward’s recent injuries, the February 4, 2026, altercation he describes in his objection fails to satisfy the imminent danger exception inasmuch as it (1) occurred after his Complaint was filed, and (2) lacks the requisite nexus to his alleged claims. Indeed, Mr. Alward instituted this action in January 2026, alleging the improper denial of veteran benefits, while the recent altercation between him and other inmates purportedly occurred “over nothing but a ‘cook job.’” [ECF 8 at 1]. No conceivable connection exists between the asserted danger and Mr. Alward’s claims. There is thus no actionable error present. IV. Based on the foregoing discussion, the Court OVERRULES Mr. Alward’s Emergency Objection [ECF 8], ADOPTS the PF&R [ECF 7], DENIES Mr. Alward’s Motion Seeking Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [ECF 4], DISSMISSES without prejudice Mr. Alward’s Complaints [ECF Nos. 1, 6], and REMOVES this matter from the docket. ! The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this written opinion and order to counsel of record and to any unrepresented party.
ENTER: August 17, 2026 Feel a “Treo Chief United States District Judge
' Considering these rulings, Mr. Alward’s Motion for Leave to Request Subpoena [ECF 9] is DENIED AS MOOT.