Matthew A. Cornell v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 24, 2016
• Docket: 79A05-1510-CR-1649
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), May 24 2016, 8:38 am this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK Indiana Supreme Court court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals and Tax Court

the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Timothy P. Broden Gregory F. Zoeller State of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Tyler G. Banks Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Matthew A. Cornell, May 24, 2016 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 79A05-1510-CR-1649 v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Randy J. Williams, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D01-1504-F5-24

Najam, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1510-CR-1649 | May 24, 2016 Page 1 of 6 Statement of the Case [1] Matthew Cornell appeals his sentence following his conviction for failure to

register as a sex offender, as a Level 5 felony, and his adjudication as a habitual

offender pursuant to a guilty plea. He presents two issues for our review, but

because his first issue is moot,1 we address a single issue, namely, whether his

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History [2] In 2000, Cornell was convicted of two counts of sexual misconduct with a

minor, as Class B felonies. After serving his sentence for those convictions,

Cornell was required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Indiana Code

Section 11-8-8-19. From January 12, 2015, to March 31, 2015, Cornell

registered with the Tippecanoe County Sheriff’s Department as homeless,

when, in fact, he was residing with Billie Jo Martin in Lafayette. Accordingly,

on April 9, Cornell was arrested, and, on April 15, the State charged Cornell

with two counts of failure to register as a sex offender and with being a habitual

offender.

1 Cornell also contends that the trial court erred when it revoked his bond prior to trial. The State responds, and we agree, that, now that Cornell has been convicted and sentenced, that issue is moot. See, e.g., Partlow v. State, 453 N.E.2d 259, 274 (Ind. 1983). Cornell does not assert on appeal that any exception to the mootness doctrine applies here.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1510-CR-1649 | May 24, 2016 Page 2 of 6 [3] At an initial hearing, the trial court set Cornell’s bond in the amount of $15,000

surety and $1,500 cash. Cornell did not post bond. While he was in jail on

April 26, he made two phone calls to Martin in violation of a no-contact order.

Accordingly, the State charged Cornell with invasion of privacy and filed a

petition to revoke Cornell’s bond. The trial court granted the motion to revoke

the bond. On August 12, Cornell pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex

offender, as a Level 5 felony,2 and he admitted to being a habitual offender.

The trial court entered judgment accordingly and sentenced Cornell to six years

for failure to register as a sex offender, as a Level 5 felony, and an additional

two years for being a habitual offender, for an aggregate term of eight years.3

This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision [4] Cornell contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the

offense and his character. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana

Constitution “authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a

sentence imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2007) (alteration original). This appellate authority is implemented

through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Rule

2 In the guilty plea order, the trial court stated that the second count, failure to register as a sex offender, as a Level 6 felony, “merged” with the Level 5 count. Appellant’s App. at 15-16. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment only on the Level 5 count. 3 The trial court ordered that Cornell “shall execute seven (7) years at the Indiana Department of Correction” and serve the remaining one year in community corrections on house arrest. Appellant’s App. at 9.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1510-CR-1649 | May 24, 2016 Page 3 of 6 7(B) requires the appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate in

light of the nature of his offenses and his character. See Ind. Appellate Rule

7(B); Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We assess

the trial court’s recognition or non-recognition of aggravators and mitigators as

an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was

inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

However, “a defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her

sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush, 875

N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original).

[5] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate

sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should

receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222, 1224

(Ind. 2008). The principal role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the

outliers.” Id. at 1225. Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the

end of the day turns on “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the

severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other facts that

come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.

[6] Cornell first contends that the nature of the offense does not support an

enhanced sentence. Cornell states that he “had not absconded, [and] he

regularly registered with the Sheriff’s Department[,] albeit as ‘homeless’ and not

at the address where he was staying.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. Further, Cornell

asserts that “it is unclear that [his] status as a sex offender would have

precluded his registering” at Martin’s address. Id. But, as the State correctly

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1510-CR-1649 | May 24, 2016 Page 4 of 6 points out, the sex offender registry “‘serves a valid regulatory function by

providing the public with information related to community safety.’”

Appellee’s Br. at 13 (quoting Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312, 318 (Ind. 2013)).

Because Cornell was dishonest with law enforcement about his residence for

more than two months, he thwarted this important goal of the sex offender

registry law. We cannot say that Cornell’s sentence is inappropriate in light of

the nature of the offense.

[7] Next, Cornell contends that his character warrants a revised sentence. In

particular, while Cornell acknowledges his “significant criminal history and

that the instant offense is repetitive in nature—this being [his] fourth conviction

for the offense of failure to register,” he maintains that “these aggravating

factors are somewhat subsumed in the habitual offender enhancement[.]”

Appellant’s Br. at 8. Cornell also points out that he pleaded guilty without the

benefit of a plea agreement. And Cornell states that he was “essentially

abandoned by his parents in his early teens and placed in a group home until

the age of eighteen” and suffers from depression. Id. at 9.

[8] However, the State points out that, over the course of twenty years, Cornell

“has at least five prior felony convictions, four misdemeanor convictions, and

[he] previously had five petitions to revoke his probation filed—three of which

were granted.” Appellee’s Br. at 14. Further, as Cornell acknowledges, he has

repeatedly failed to comply with the sex offender registry statute. The length

and substance of Cornell’s criminal history reflect a poor character. While we

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1510-CR-1649 | May 24, 2016 Page 5 of 6 acknowledge the hardships that Cornell has faced in his life, we cannot say that

his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.

[9] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A05-1510-CR-1649 | May 24, 2016 Page 6 of 6