Matter of Wichmann

77 B.R. 718, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 1383
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedJuly 10, 1987
Docket19-80238
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 77 B.R. 718 (Matter of Wichmann) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Wichmann, 77 B.R. 718, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 1383 (Neb. 1987).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

TIMOTHY J. MAHONEY, Bankruptcy Judge.

A confirmation hearing on this Chapter 12 case was held in Lincoln, Nebraska, on July 7, 1987. Appearing on behalf of the debtors was Eric Wood of Dwyer, Pohren, Wood, Heavey & Grimm, Omaha, Nebraska. Appearing on behalf of creditor Business Men’s Assurance Company of America was Tom Briese of Luebs, Dowding, Beltzer, Leininger, Smith & Busick, Grand Island, Nebraska. Richard K. Lydick of Croker, Huck & McReynolds, Omaha, Nebraska, appeared as trustee.

By Journal Entry a number of issues concerning the objection filed by BMA to the debtors’ Chapter 12 Plan have been ruled upon. However, there remains the issue of the appropriate interest rate that the debtors should be required to pay on the allowed claim of BMA which is secured by real estate. At the hearing, the Court informed counsel for the parties that the appropriate interest or discount rate on the allowed secured claim would be that rate which was equal to the treasury bond yield with remaining maturity matched to the average amount outstanding during the repayment period of the allowed claim. The purpose of this Memorandum opinion is to more fully explain the Court’s reasoning and the meaning of the appropriate interest rate as defined above.

Debtors are family farmers as that term is defined under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code. On or about May 26, 1987, debtors filed this Chapter 12 case. On the date of filing, debtors owed Business Men’s Assurance Company of America a principal amount of $87,750 plus interest accrued through April 21, 1986, of $32,763.57 plus interest accruing thereafter to date of the petition at the rate of $29.36 per day, for a total in excess of $120,500. The Court, by separate Journal Entry, has determined that the allowed secured claim of BMA is $117,000. Debtors have proposed to pay such claim over thirty years at the rate of 10% interest, with annual payments including interest to be made on the allowed secured claim.

; Evidence was presented concerning the market rate of interest for a loan of this type. As has been this Court’s experience in several Chapter 12 cases which have been litigated on the issue of interest rates, witnesses for the creditor first tell the Court that a loan on the terms proposed by the debtor would not be made even if a high interest rate were allowed. They suggest that this loan does not meet any of the qualifications necessary for the particular lending agencies to enter into such a loan agreement. For example, they claim that the debtor does not meet any of the necessary ratios concerning debt to equity, cash flow, etc. However, they then testify that if they were forced to make such a loan, it would be at a rate significantly higher than the rate proposed by the debtor and, in addition, it would not be a fixed rate of interest. Each of the witnesses, both in this case' and in the other cases in which the issue was raised, claim that long-term mortgage loans are not made with fixed *720 rates of interest. The very best situation the creditor can conjure up for the Court is a rate of interest that can be adjusted after a certain number of years or a loan which can be reviewed by the creditor both for interest rate and other matters after five or ten years.

11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B) provides that a court shall confirm a plan over the objection of a secured creditor if the creditor will retain the lien securing its claim and will receive value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the allowed amount of the creditor’s claim. This means that the creditor is to receive the present value of its collateral to be distributed under the plan. In effect, the court is to determine an interest rate to be paid on the allowed secured claim which will result in the creditor receiving in payments over time the amount that such creditor would receive if the collateral were liquidated on the date of confirmation; this assumes that a dollar received in the future is worth less than a dollar received today, which requires a payment of interest to make the payment in the future equal in value to a payment today.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled for the purposes of determining the appropriate discount rate or interest rate in cases under Chapter 11 that the court must determine the “market rate”. The court, in giving guidance to the Bankruptcy Court in this area, has stated:

“The appropriate discount rate must be determined on the basis of the rate of interest which is reasonable in light of the risks involved. Thus, in determining the discount rate, the court must consider the prevailing market rate for a loan of a term equal to the payout period, with due consideration for the quality of the security and the risk of subsequent default.”
In re Monnier Bros., 755 F.2d 1336, 1339 (8th Cir.1985). See also United States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir.1986).

This Court believes that the appropriate “market rate” for a loan of a term equal to the payout period, with due consideration for the quality of the security and the risk of subsequent default, is not necessarily, nor even usually, the rate at which some lender would, if coerced, loan money to a debtor in bankruptcy. If that were the standard, the Court would probably be required to find that no lender would make a loan of this type to any debtor in bankruptcy and, therefore, no interest rate would be appropriate and it would then follow that the plan could not be confirmed because the creditor would not receive the allowed amount of its secured claim through payments over time.

However, that analysis is only one reason why the hypothetical rate at which a hypothetical lender would make such a hypothetical loan is rejected. The other reason is that such a determination requires expert testimony in every case. This Court believes that allowing the discount rate to vary depending upon the quantity and the quality of expert proof simply creates additional problems both for the debtors, the creditor and the Court by eliminating certainty and introducing additional delay and cost into the confirmation process. This Court agrees that a preferable approach is to choose a market rate which accurately reflects the peculiar situation of a bankruptcy reorganization and can be easily found and readily available in financial publications. See Carbiener, Present Value in Bankruptcy: a Search for an Appropriate Cramdown Discount Rate, 32 S.D.L.Rev. 42, at 59 and 60.

The Bankruptcy Court in Kansas has previously determined, in the context of a Chapter 13 case which has exactly the same statutory requirement as a Chapter 12 case, that the appropriate discount rate is comprised of a “riskless” rate, which is usually the equivalent of a rate of interest paid on government bonds and bills which are generally not considered subject to default plus the addition of a risk component. In re Fisher, 29 B.R. 542, 543 (Bankr.D.Kan.1983).

In a recent case, In re Doud, 74 B.R.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Matter of Woerner
214 B.R. 208 (D. Nebraska, 1997)
In Re Grandfather Mountain Ltd. Partnership
207 B.R. 475 (M.D. North Carolina, 1996)
In Re Computer Optics, Inc.
126 B.R. 664 (D. New Hampshire, 1991)
Matter of Cooper
124 B.R. 797 (D. Nebraska, 1990)
In Re E.I. Parks No. 1 Ltd. Partnership
122 B.R. 549 (W.D. Arkansas, 1990)
Matter of Bantam
120 B.R. 530 (D. Nebraska, 1990)
Abbott Bank-Thedford v. Hanna (In re Hanna)
912 F.2d 945 (Eighth Circuit, 1990)
In Re Hanna
912 F.2d 945 (Eighth Circuit, 1990)
In Re Shannon
100 B.R. 913 (S.D. Ohio, 1989)
In Re Batchelor
97 B.R. 993 (E.D. Arkansas, 1988)
In Re Neff
89 B.R. 672 (S.D. Ohio, 1988)
Matter of Underwood
87 B.R. 594 (D. Nebraska, 1988)
Matter of Milleson
83 B.R. 696 (D. Nebraska, 1988)
In Re Snider Farms, Inc.
83 B.R. 977 (N.D. Indiana, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
77 B.R. 718, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 1383, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-wichmann-nebraskab-1987.