Matter of Triantis v. Kaye

Opinion

Matter of Triantis v Kaye

2026 NY Slip Op 04952

August 12, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

In the Matter of Harry M. Triantis, respondent,

v

Lana Kaye, appellant. (Proceeding No. 1)

In the Matter of Lana Kaye, appellant,

v

Harry M. Triantis, respondent. (Proceeding No. 2)

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 12, 2026

2024-10549, (Docket Nos. F-12457-21/21A, F-12458-21/21A, F-12458-21/22B)

Lara J. Genovesi, J.P.

Cheryl E. Chambers

Linda Christopher

Phillip Hom, JJ.

Chinyere U. Eze-Nliam, Jamaica, NY, for appellant.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In related proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 4, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Lisa J. Friederwitzer, J.), dated September 17, 2024. The order, inter alia, denied the mother's objections to (1) an order of the same court (Serena Rosario, S.M.) dated May 1, 2024, which, after a hearing and upon findings of fact also dated May 1, 2024, dismissed the mother's petition for a downward modification of her child support obligation, and (2) an order of the same court (Serena Rosario, S.M.) dated May 10, 2024, which, after a hearing and upon findings of fact dated May 9, 2024, among other things, determined that the mother wilfully violated an order of support dated November 4, 2019, and directed the entry of a money judgment in favor of the father and against the mother in the principal sum of $247,373.17.

ORDERED that the order dated September 17, 2024, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The parties were divorced in April 2010 and have two children, a son born in 2000 and another son born in 2002. The children resided with the father after the parties' divorce. An order of support dated November 4, 2019, required the mother to pay the father child support in the sum of $3,255 per month (hereinafter the order of support).

In November 2020, the father commenced a proceeding alleging that the mother was in violation of the order of support. In July 2021, the mother commenced a proceeding for a downward modification of her child support obligation. In an order dated May 1, 2024, after a hearing and upon findings of fact also dated May 1, 2024, a Support Magistrate dismissed the mother's petition for a downward modification. In an order dated May 10, 2024, after a hearing and upon a findings of fact dated May 9, 2024, the Support Magistrate, inter alia, determined that the mother willfully violated the order of support and directed the entry of a money judgment in favor of the father and against the mother in the principal sum of $247,373.17.

In June 2024, the mother filed objections, among other things, to the orders dated [*2]May 1, 2024, and May 10, 2024. In an order dated September 17, 2024, the Family Court denied the mother's objections. The mother appeals.

A parent seeking a modification of his or her child support obligation has the burden of establishing the existence of a substantial change in circumstances warranting the modification (see Family Ct Act § 451[3][a]; Matter of Gerety v Gerety, 203 AD3d 827, 828). A parent's loss of employment may constitute a substantial change in circumstances only where the parent's employment was terminated involuntarily and the parent made diligent attempts to secure employment commensurate with the parent's education, abilities, and experience (see Meier v Chevalier, 247 AD3d 1039, 1040; Matter of Cato v Cato, 134 AD3d 821, 822). The proper amount of support to be paid is not determined by the parent's current economic situation but by the parent's past income, future earning capacity, assets, and educational background (see Meier v Chevalier, 247 AD3d at 1040; Matter of Rubenstein v Rubenstein, 114 AD3d 798, 798).

Here, the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing a substantial change in circumstances warranting a downward modification of her child support obligation (see Matter of Alsamhouri v Samhoury, 220 AD3d 699, 700). Contrary to the mother's contention, she was not entitled to an automatic reduction in her child support obligation upon the older child reaching the age of 21. When child support has been ordered for more than one child in an unallocated order, the emancipation of the oldest child does not automatically reduce the amount of support owed under that order (see Matter of Wrighton v Wrighton, 61 AD3d 988, 989). Accordingly, the Family Court properly denied the mother's objections to the Support Magistrate's order dismissing her petition for a downward modification of her child support obligation.

A determination by a support magistrate that a person is in willful violation of a support order and recommending commitment has no force and effect until confirmed by a Judge of the Family Court (see Family Ct Act § 439[a]; Matter of Evans v Pudding, 184 AD3d 638, 638). "'Such a determination by a support magistrate does not constitute a final order to which a party may file written objections'" (Matter of Evans v Pudding, 184 AD3d at 638, quoting Matter of Flanagan v Flanagan, 109 AD3d 470, 471; see Family Ct Act § 439[a], [e]). Here, despite denying the mother's written objections, the order appealed from dated September 17, 2024, did not confirm the Support Magistrate's determination that the mother willfully violated the order of support. The mother failed to pursue her sole remedy, which was to appeal from an order of commitment, also dated September 17, 2024, entered upon confirmation of the Support Magistrate's determination (see Family Ct Act § 439[e]; Matter of Evans v Pudding, 184 AD3d at 639). Accordingly, the Family Court properly denied as procedurally improper the mother's objections to the Support Magistrate's determination that she wilfully violated the order of support (see Matter of Evans v Pudding, 184 AD3d at 639).

The mother's remaining contentions are either improperly raised for the first time on appeal, not properly before this Court, or without merit.

GENOVESI, J.P., CHAMBERS, CHRISTOPHER and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court