Matter of Sullivan (Commr. of Labor)

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Matter of Sullivan (Commr. of Labor)

123 A.D.3d 1273, 999 N.Y.S.2d 230

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 11, 2014

Docket518609

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 123 A.D.3d 1273 (Matter of Sullivan (Commr. of Labor)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Matter of Sullivan (Commr. of Labor), 123 A.D.3d 1273, 999 N.Y.S.2d 230 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2014).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed January 3, 2014, which ruled that claimant was entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits.

Claimant worked for almost seven years as a senior speech language pathologist for the employer until she was terminated in May 2013. The termination resulted from her running afoul of the employer’s written policy prohibiting employees from posting on social media “during work hours, unless for specific and approved business purposes.” The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board thereafter determined that claimant was entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits because, in its view, she had not lost her job due to disqualifying misconduct. The employer now appeals.

The question of whether a claimant engaged in actions sufficient to disqualify him or her from receiving unemployment insurance benefits is a factual one for the Board to resolve, “and its determination will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence” (Matter of Jaiyesimi [ISS Action Inc.— Commissioner of Labor], 114 AD3d 983, 983 [2014]; see Matter of Morris [Lenox Hill Neighborhood House Inc. —Commissioner of Labor], 110 AD3d 1333, 1334 [2013]). Not every discharge for cause rises to the level of misconduct, which is defined as “a willful and wanton disregard of the employer’s interest” (Mat *1274 ter of Rahaman [New York Convention Ctr. Operating Corp.— Commissioner of Labor], 101 AD3d 1206, 1207 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Claimant did not dispute that she was aware of the employer’s policy on social media usage and that she nevertheless posted an item during work hours. The record also reflects, however, that it was an isolated incident and that claimant had a clean disciplinary record prior to her termination. Substantial evidence thus supports the determination of the Board that claimant’s behavior, while reflective of a momentary lapse in judgment, did not rise to the level of disqualifying misconduct (see Matter of Nangreave [United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc. —Commissioner of Labor], 107 AD3d 1211, 1212 [2013]; Matter of McKoy [LB&B Assoc., Inc. —Commissioner of Labor], 27 AD3d 922, 923 [2006]).

Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Rose, Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, filed January 3, 2014, which ruled that claimant was entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits.

Claimant worked for almost seven years as a senior speech language pathologist for the employer until she was terminated in May 2013. The termination resulted from her running afoul of the employer’s written policy prohibiting employees from posting on social media “during work hours, unless for specific and approved business purposes.” The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board thereafter determined that claimant was entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits because, in its view, she had not lost her job due to disqualifying misconduct. The employer now appeals.

The question of whether a claimant engaged in actions sufficient to disqualify him or her from receiving unemployment insurance benefits is a factual one for the Board to resolve, “and its determination will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence” (Matter of Jaiyesimi [ISS Action Inc.— Commissioner of Labor], 114 AD3d 983, 983 [2014]; see Matter of Morris [Lenox Hill Neighborhood House Inc. —Commissioner of Labor], 110 AD3d 1333, 1334 [2013]). Not every discharge for cause rises to the level of misconduct, which is defined as “a willful and wanton disregard of the employer’s interest” (Mat *1274 ter of Rahaman [New York Convention Ctr. Operating Corp.— Commissioner of Labor], 101 AD3d 1206, 1207 [2012] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Claimant did not dispute that she was aware of the employer’s policy on social media usage and that she nevertheless posted an item during work hours. The record also reflects, however, that it was an isolated incident and that claimant had a clean disciplinary record prior to her termination. Substantial evidence thus supports the determination of the Board that claimant’s behavior, while reflective of a momentary lapse in judgment, did not rise to the level of disqualifying misconduct (see Matter of Nangreave [United Health Servs. Hosps., Inc. —Commissioner of Labor], 107 AD3d 1211, 1212 [2013]; Matter of McKoy [LB&B Assoc., Inc. —Commissioner of Labor], 27 AD3d 922, 923 [2006]).

Lahtinen, J.P., McCarthy, Rose, Lynch and Clark, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

123 A.D.3d 1273, 999 N.Y.S.2d 230, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-sullivan-commr-of-labor-nyappdiv-2014.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack