Matter of Schneider
This text of 2022 NY Slip Op 00012 (Matter of Schneider) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
| Matter of Schneider |
| 2022 NY Slip Op 00012 |
| Decided on January 04, 2022 |
| Appellate Division, First Department |
| Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
| This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
Decided and Entered: January 04, 2022 SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION First Judicial Department
Dianne T. Renwick,J.P.,
Barbara R. Kapnick
Ellen Gesmer
Saliann Scarpulla
John R. Higgitt, JJ.
Motion No. 2021-03585 Case No. 2021-02356
Disciplinary proceedings instituted by the Attorney Grievance Committee for the First Judicial Department. Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York at a Term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial Department on May 5, 1993.
Jorge Dopico, Chief Attorney, Attorney Grievance Committee, New York
(Orlando Reyes, Esq., of counsel), for petitioner.
Randall T. Tesser, Esq., for respondent.
Per Curiam
Respondent Edward A. Schneider was admitted to the practice of law in the State of New York by the Second Judicial Department on May 5, 1993, under the name Edward Alan Schneider. At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent maintained a law office within the First Judicial Department.
In June 2021, the Attorney Grievance Committee (AGC) served respondent with a
notice and petition of charges alleging professional misconduct in connection with his handling of a client's two civil actions. The parties now jointly move under the Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.8(a)(5) for discipline by consent and ask this Court to suspend respondent for a period of three months. The motion is supported, inter alia, by respondent's affidavit acknowledging his admission to the stipulated facts, his consent to the agreed upon discipline, which he has freely and voluntarily given, and his full awareness of the consequences of such consent (22 NYCRR 1240.8[a][5][i] and [iii]).
The relevant facts stipulated to are as follows. In or about February 2014, an incarcerated individual (Client) retained respondent to represent him in connection with claims of medical malpractice and false imprisonment. On or about February 3, 2015, respondent commenced an action in Supreme Court, Nassau County on the Client's behalf alleging medical malpractice against several defendants, including the Nassau County Correctional Center. On or about May 18, 2015, respondent commenced a second action on the Client's behalf in Supreme Court, Nassau County alleging false imprisonment against Nassau County, the Nassau County Police Department, and the Nassau County District Attorney's Office.
Respondent concluded that both cases were unlikely to be meritorious. He recalls communicating his intent to discontinue them to the Client, which the Client denies. However, respondent did not discontinue the actions, did nothing to advance his Client's claims, did not respond to his Client's inquiries about the two actions, and did not deliver to him any papers relating to the actions before on or about November 3, 2020.
On or about November 4, 2015, respondent signed a "Stipulation of Discontinuance with Prejudice" pertaining to every defendant in the medical malpractice action without the Client's written authorization. Although respondent claimed that the Client orally authorized him to discontinue the action, the Client denies that and, in any event, he did not obtain a written authorization. He also did not take the proper steps to effectuate the discontinuance, with the result that the court continued to designate the medical malpractice action as "active."
Respondent did not take any steps to advance the false imprisonment action, but never formally moved to withdraw from the matter, even though 22 NYCRR 700.4(f)(3) requires that an attorney seeking to [*2]withdraw from an action in Supreme Court, Nassau County must have permission of the court to do so. In or about May 2019, the court marked the action "disposed."
By letter dated June 4, 2019, the AGC issued respondent an Admonition for neglecting the Client's two actions in violation of rule 1.3(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200.0). The Admonition stated that the AGC "expect[ed]" that respondent would either resume representing the Client in his lawsuits or "withdraw promptly" and formally from them. Respondent did not resume representing the Client in the actions and he did not apply to withdraw from the medical malpractice action until more than 17 months later, on or about November 19, 2020, when he filed a "Withdrawal of Attorney," which was signed by him and by the Client.
Respondent admits that his actions violated New York's Rules of Professional Conduct as cited in the petition of charges: neglect of a legal matter (rule 1.3[b]); termination of representation without taking steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to his client (rule 1.16[e]); withdrawing from employment in a matter before a tribunal without permission (rule 1.16[d]); failing to promptly comply with a client's reasonable requests for information (rule 1.4[a][4]); failure to comply with the AGC's June 4, 2019 Admonition and thus engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (rule 8.4[d]); and engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness as a lawyer (rule 8.4[h]).
The parties have stipulated to aggravating factors, including that, in addition to the Admonition issued in connection with the Client's matters, the AGC has issued respondent Admonitions for neglecting other legal matters in January 2011 and November 2020; the Client was particularly vulnerable to the misconduct at issue, since he was incarcerated during most of respondent's representation of him; and respondent had substantial experience in the practice of law when the instant misconduct occurred.
The parties have also stipulated to mitigating factors, including that respondent has acknowledged the wrongfulness of his conduct and expressed remorse; respondent was undergoing several personal difficulties at the time, including the sudden and unexpected loss of his wife; undergoing cancer treatment and suffering from other medical issues; respondent has since implemented safeguards in his solo practice to ensure that the misconduct at issue will not reoccur; and respondent, who is 76, is winding down his law practice with only three active cases at this time.
The Court agrees with the parties, that, in light of respondent's admitted misconduct, the aggravating and mitigating factors presented, and the relevant case law, a three-month suspension is the appropriate sanction under the circumstances (see Matter of Alford, 166 AD3d 80 [1st Dept 2018]; Matter of Peralta-Millan, 141 AD3d 87 [1st Dept 2016]; Matter of Sorote, 110 AD3d 259 [1st Dept 2013]; Matter of [*3]Militello, 76 AD3d 364 [1st Dept 2010]).
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
2022 NY Slip Op 00012, 203 A.D.3d 34, 159 N.Y.S.3d 52, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-schneider-nyappdiv-2022.