Matter of Salvatore v. South Country Cent. Sch. Dist.

Opinion

Matter of Salvatore v South Country Cent. Sch. Dist.

2026 NY Slip Op 05311

September 16, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

In the Matter of Kelly Salvatore, appellant,

v

South Country Central School District, et al., respondents.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on September 16, 2026

2024-04566, (Index No. 611213/22)

Hector D. Lasalle, P.J.

Cheryl E. Chambers

Paul Wooten

Helen Voutsinas, JJ.

Steven G. Legum, Mineola, NY, for appellant.

Guercio & Guercio, LLP, Farmingdale, NY (John P. Sheahan of counsel), for respondents.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate a determination of a hearing officer made pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a dated June 6, 2022, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Frank A. Tinari, J.), dated January 8, 2024. The order denied the petition.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The petitioner was a tenured teaching assistant employed by the respondent South Country Central School District (hereinafter the District). On November 11, 2020, the petitioner posted a racially inflammatory message on Facebook. In January 2021, the District charged the petitioner with misconduct and insubordination. Following a hearing pursuant to Education Law § 3020-a, a hearing officer issued a determination dated June 6, 2022, which sustained the charges and found that the appropriate penalty was termination of the petitioner's employment. The hearing officer found that the petitioner's conduct had "a divisive and harmful effect in the workplace" and called into question "whether she is treating minority students equally," and that "[h]er ability to work effectively and cooperatively with . . . other teaching personnel, parents and the community has been seriously damaged."

The petitioner subsequently commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the hearing officer's determination. In an order dated January 8, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the petition. The petitioner appeals.

In the order dated January 8, 2024, the Supreme Court incorrectly cited to CPLR article 78 instead of CPLR article 75, which is the standard of review mandated by Education Law § 3020-a(5)(a) (see Matter of Simpson v Poughkeepsie City Sch. Dist., 206 AD3d 741, 742). Nevertheless, applying the proper standard, which was briefed by the parties, we affirm.

Where, as here, the obligation to arbitrate arises through statutory mandate (see Education Law § 3020-a), the arbitrator's determination is subject to closer judicial scrutiny than it would receive had the arbitration been conducted voluntarily (see Matter of Harvey v Board of Educ. of the Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 221 AD3d 899, 899); Matter of Saunders v Rockland Bd. [*2]of Coop. Educ. Servs., 62 AD3d 1012, 1013). "'An award in a compulsory arbitration proceeding must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious'" (Matter of Johnson v Riverhead Cent. Sch. Dist., 166 AD3d 880, 881, quoting Matter of Saunders v Rockland Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 62 AD3d at 1013).

"'In addition, article 75 review questions whether the decision was rational or had a plausible basis'" (Matter of Harvey v Board of Educ. of the Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 221 AD3d at 900, quoting Matter of Johnson v Riverhead Cent. Sch. Dist., 166 AD3d at 881). If the evidence submitted may be interpreted in more than one way, "this Court must 'accept the arbitrator['s] credibility determinations, even where there is conflicting evidence and room for choice exists'" (Matter of O'Brien v Yonkers City Sch. Dist., 217 AD3d 675, 676-677, quoting Matter of Saunders v Rockland Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 62 AD3d at 1013).

Here, the hearing officer's determination has evidentiary support and was not arbitrary and capricious (see City School Dist. of the City of N.Y. v McGraham, 17 NY3d 917, 919; Matter of Powell v New York City Dept. of Educ., 144 AD3d 920, 921). The hearing officer appropriately credited the testimony of the different witnesses, and there is no cause to disturb the hearing officer's credibility determinations without improperly substituting judgment (see Matter of O'Brien v Yonkers City Sch. Dist., 217 AD3d at 676-677; Matter of Saunders v Rockland Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 62 AD3d at 1013).

Furthermore, contrary to the petitioner's contention, she was provided with adequate notice of the charges in this administrative proceeding, as the notice was reasonably specific, in light of all the relevant circumstances, to apprise the party whose rights were being determined of the charges against that party and to allow for the preparation of an adequate defense (see Matter of Block v Ambach, 73 NY2d 323, 333; Matter of Forman v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 110 AD3d 1075, 1076).

A court may set aside an administrative penalty only if "it is so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness" (Matter of Waldren v Town of Islip, 6 NY3d 735, 736 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Anderson v Board of Educ. of the Oyster Bay-E. Norwich Cent. Sch. Dist., 186 AD3d 597, 598). "'That reasonable minds might disagree over what the proper penalty should have been does not provide a basis for . . . refashioning the penalty'" (Matter of Bolt v New York City Dept. of Educ., 30 NY3d 1065, 1068, quoting City School Dist. of the City of N.Y. v McGraham, 17 NY3d at 920). The question of whether the penalty is so disproportionate to the misconduct as to shock the conscience requires a case-by-case factual analysis (see id. at 1071, 1074 [Rivera, J., concurring]; Matter of Featherstone v Franco, 95 NY2d 550, 555). Here, in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the adverse impact of the racially charged posting on the school and the community, the penalty of termination of employment is not irrational and does not shock the conscience (see Matter of Bolt v New York City Dept. of Educ., 30 NY3d at 1071, 1074 [Rivera, J., concurring]; Matter of Anderson v Board of Educ. of the Oyster Bay-E. Norwich Cent. Sch. Dist., 186 AD3d at 599).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition.

LASALLE, P.J., CHAMBERS, WOOTEN and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court