Matter of R.T.C., YINC

2025 MT 301N

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Decided: December 29, 2025
• Docket: DA 25-0243
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

12/29/2025

DA 25-0243

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2025 MT 301N

IN THE MATTER OF:

R.T.C. and R.J.C.,

Youths in Need of Care.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, In and For the County of Toole, Cause Nos. DN-23-09 and DN-24-07 Honorable Gregory L. Bonilla, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant Father:

Robin Meguire, Attorney at Law, Great Falls, Montana

For Appellant Mother:

Daniel Eakin, 406 Law, Sidney, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Brad Fjeldheim, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Merle Raph, Toole County Attorney, Shelby, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: October 15, 2025

Decided: December 29, 2025

Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2 Mother and Father both appeal from the orders issued by the Ninth Judicial District

Court, Toole County, terminating their rights to R.T.C. and R.J.C. under § 41-3-609(1)(f),

MCA. Both Mother and Father assert there was no probable cause at the show cause stage

to determine the children to be in immediate or apparent danger such that removal was

necessary. Father additionally asserts his treatment plan was not appropriate, his counsel

was ineffective when counsel did not participate on his behalf at R.T.C.’s termination

hearing, he was denied due process when he was permitted to represent himself, and the

District Court should have considered guardianship as an alternative to termination.

¶3 Mother presented to Benefis Hospital on March 16, 2023, to deliver R.T.C. Prior

to this date, an earlier report to the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child

and Family Services Division (the Department), indicated Mother had, on January 11,

2023, tested positive for amphetamines, marijuana, benzodiazepines, and oxycodone.

Because of this prior positive test, hospital policy required collection of a urine sample

from Mother. Father advised Mother not to give consent to a urine sample. Mother,

however, desired an epidural. In response, nursing staff advised her such would require

2 lab work. Reportedly, Father then became aggressive requiring security to remove him

from the hospital. Upon insertion of a catheter for the epidural, a urine sample was

collected from Mother which again tested positive for amphetamines, marijuana,

benzodiazepines, and unprescribed pills. Upon birth, R.T.C. exhibited respiratory issues

requiring treatment in the NICU. Usual testing attendant to R.T.C.’s birth and treatment

of the respiratory issues indicated drug exposure to meconium in the womb resulting in

withdrawal symptoms.

¶4 R.T.C. was removed shortly after birth based on the presence of illicit drugs in his

system. At the show cause hearing on May 4, 2023, while neither parent offered any

evidence to rebut the Department’s allegations, they asserted R.T.C. was not in immediate

danger of abuse or neglect and thus no probable cause existed for his removal or emergency

protective services. This argument was rejected by the District Court.

¶5 On July 27, 2023, although he did not dispute any facts, Father contested

adjudication, again asserting his prior legal argument that R.T.C. was not in immediate

danger of abuse or neglect such that no probable cause existed for his removal or for

emergency protective services. Mother did not admit any particular allegations but did not

contest adjudication. The District Court adjudicated R.T.C. as a youth in need of care

(YINC).

¶6 The Department prepared treatment plans for both Mother and Father. At a hearing

where both parents were represented by counsel, Mother did not object to her proposed

treatment plan and Father only objected to the provision prohibiting him from alcohol

3 consumption. Before approving the treatment plans, the District Court specifically asked

the parents if there were any further objections to either treatment plan. The parties

affirmatively responded there were not. The District Court then approved Mother’s plan

without modification and approved Father’s plan, but struck the prohibition on alcohol

consumption.

¶7 On May 31, 2024, the Department filed its petition seeking termination of both

parents’ parental rights to R.T.C. based on their failure to complete their treatment plans.

Later, at a hearing on July 11, 2024, despite his prior stipulation to the tasks ordered in his

treatment plan, Father objected to his treatment plan asserting drug testing was not

appropriate because nothing suggested he had a drug problem. The Department argued

that R.T.C. was born with drugs in his system and that Mother and Father were residing in

the same home and, to potentially return R.T.C., drug testing was important in assuring

R.T.C.’s safety. The District Court determined Father’s drug testing requirement to have

been appropriate when the plan was originally approved and remained appropriate.

¶8 On August 1, 2024, Mother presented to the Cut Bank Hospital to deliver R.J.C. A

drug screen indicated mother was again positive for illicit drugs, including amphetamines,

methamphetamines, benzodiazepines, and marijuana. Mother was transferred to Benefis

Hospital where R.J.C. was born. At Benefis, Mother refused any urine or blood testing of

herself. Like R.T.C., R.J.C. exhibited respiratory problems requiring placement in the

NICU. R.J.C. developed what was believed to be withdrawal symptoms and the hospital

sought testing which Father refused. R.J.C. was removed from the parents’ care and the

4 Department consented to the hospital’s requested tests. Testing of R.J.C.’s urine and blood

was positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, benzodiazepine, and THC. At the EPS

hearing on August 8, 2024, both parents challenged the Department’s reliance on R.J.C.’s

drug test results. The District Court found probable cause even without the drug test

evidence based on the parents’ general denial for medical care and testing of R.J.C. when

he was exhibiting respiratory issues and testing was requested by medical professionals to

determine how best to address his respiratory issues—thus placing R.J.C. in danger.

¶9 On December 31, 2024, Mother filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that she had

refused drug testing which had been conducted at both hospitals despite her refusal of

consent for such. She asserted her positive drug tests should not be able to be used against

her and sought their exclusion. The District Court held her motion in abeyance but did find

the Department had met its show cause burden.

¶10 Father sought a representation hearing which was held on January 9, 2025. At that

hearing Father discussed his complaints about his attorney with the District Court and

ultimately agreed to continue with his appointed counsel, Harris, representing him. With

regard to R.T.C., the court held a termination hearing on January 15, 2025. Neither parent

appeared for the hearing. Mother’s counsel advised that counsel lacked evidence to counter

the Department’s termination petition. Father’s counsel advised that since Father was not

present, he could not ethically forward any argument. The District Court then entered an

oral order terminating both parents’ parental rights to R.T.C. and issued its written order

on March 5, 2025.

5 ¶11 The Department then sought adjudication of R.J.C. as a YINC, a determination that

reunification efforts were not required as to R.J.C., and termination of both parents’

parental rights to R.J.C. The Department based its request on the termination of both

parents’ parental rights to R.T.C. which had occurred the week before.

¶12 On April 9, 2025, in response to Father seeking a second representation hearing,

another hearing was held to discuss Father’s complaints regarding his counsel. Again, the

District Court engaged in a lengthy discussion with Father about his complaints regarding

his counsel, following which Father was permitted to represent himself as he requested.

The court also granted Father a continuance of the termination hearing. On May 2, 2025,

in regard to R.J.C., a hearing was held on the Department’s request for adjudication, request

to not be required to provide reunification services, and its request for termination of both

parents’ parental rights. At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Court orally

adjudicated R.J.C. as a YINC and granted the Department’s petition in its entirety. The

District Court issued its subsequent written order on May 5, 2025.

¶13 We review a termination of parental rights for an abuse of discretion and underlying

findings for clear error. In re A.B., 2020 MT 64, ¶ 23, 399 Mont. 219, 460 P.3d 405;

In re D.F., 2007 MT 147, ¶ 21, 337 Mont. 461, 161 P.3d 825. We view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prevailing party. In re A.M.G., 2022 MT 175, ¶ 18,

410 Mont. 25, 517 P.3d 149. Termination under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, is controlled by

settled law.

6 ¶14 Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims are mixed questions of fact and law

that are reviewed de novo. State v. Ward, 2020 MT 36, ¶ 15, 399 Mont. 16, 457 P.3d 955.

“The Due Process of Clause of the Montana Constitution (Article II, Section 17) provides

a parent in a termination of parental rights proceeding with the right to the effective

assistance of counsel.” In re A.D.B., 2013 MT 167, ¶ 64, 370 Mont. 422, 305 P.3d 739.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in dependent neglect proceedings cannot

succeed if the parent is unable to demonstrate prejudice as a result of the ineffective

assistance. In re A.D.B., ¶ 64.

¶15 From our review of the record, we find no error by the District Court in terminating

both parents’ parental rights to R.T.C. and R.J.C. Although Mother combines facts

surrounding her drug testing at both Benefis and the Cut Bank hospitals together, neither

parent raised the request to exclude her test results until R.J.C.’s EPS hearing, by which

time R.T.C. had been adjudicated a YINC and both parents’ treatment plans had been

approved and ordered as discussed above. Even were we to accept Mother’s argument to

exclude Mother’s drug tests taken at the time of the children’s births, the evidence remains

that Mother had a positive drug test during her pregnancy with R.T.C. Further, both R.T.C.

and R.J.C. exhibited symptoms of drug withdrawal at their respective births requiring

NICU care. This, along with Father’s denial of consent to testing so medical professionals

could learn the basis of R.T.C.’s respiratory issues and how to treat them, was sufficient

evidence for the District Court to conclude there was probable cause to believe R.T.C. was

abused or neglected and in need of emergency protection. By the time R.J.C. was born, as

7 part of their ordered treatment plans both parents had undergone substance use evaluation

with Father admitting to drug use and both Mother and Father failing to follow through

with drug testing or substance use treatment recommendations. Given the parents’ refusal

to provide consent to learn the basis of R.J.C.’s respiratory issues and how to treat them,

the history of R.T.C. experiencing similar respiratory issues related to drug withdrawal,

and Mother and Father’s failure to participate with drug testing or substance use treatment,

there was sufficient evidence for the District Court to conclude there was probable cause

to believe R.J.C. was abused or neglected and in need of emergency protection.

¶16 Neither parent seriously disputes that they failed to complete their court-ordered

treatment plans, but if they did, the record is replete with evidence that each parent failed

to complete nearly every treatment plan task required of them. They were inconsistent in

visits, refused drug testing, failed to implement skills learned in parenting classes, failed to

obtain mental health evaluations, and failed to stay in consistent contact with the

Department. Although Father did file a motion regarding visitation, the District Court

noted Father did not abide by terms and conditions set by the contracting entity providing

supervision of visits such that any lack of visitation was occasioned by Father’s conduct.

¶17 Although the parents stipulated to the treatment plans as ordered, both now assert

their treatment plans were not appropriate. Mother asserts her plan was inappropriate as it

failed to account for domestic violence concerns. We are not persuaded by this assertion.

Domestic violence issues did not arise for more than a year after the treatment plans were

ordered, throughout which time Mother had failed to complete treatment plan tasks and

8 had failed to demonstrate any meaningful improvement in her ability to parent. From this

it would be reasonable for the District Court to believe that adding additional domestic

violence tasks would be futile.

¶18 Father asserts his stipulation to his ordered treatment plan was based on complaints

about his original counsel. We find this argument unavailing. The record amply

demonstrates Father appeared at the treatment plan hearing, actively participated, and

through efforts of his counsel, the District Court modified Father’s treatment plan

sustaining his objection to a preclusion on alcohol consumption and ordering that task be

stricken. Father was given full opportunity to raise any other objections and failed to do

so. The District Court even went so far as to consider the treatment plan anew at a

subsequent hearing requested by Father at which he was represented by different counsel.

From review of the record, it is evident that drug use in the parents’ home created

substantial risk to R.T.C. and R.J.C. and their treatment plans were appropriately designed

to address this issue.

¶19 Next, Father asserts his third counsel was ineffective for failing to object to his

treatment plan and in not advocating against termination when Father failed to appear at

the termination hearing respecting R.T.C. The record does not evidence Father’s counsel

to be ineffective. Throughout these combined proceedings, Father was represented by

three different counsel. Father’s original counsel secured modification of his treatment

plan as requested by Father. Father’s second counsel raised objection to his treatment plan

and the District Court considered it anew, concluding the plan appropriate when originally

9 ordered and upon new review. Given this, Father’s third counsel had no basis to again

raise objection to the appropriateness of his treatment plan.

¶20 Father also faults his third counsel for Father’s absence from R.T.C.’s termination

hearing. The District Court considered this argument but found Father had notice of the

hearing and any failure to be present was occasioned by him, not his counsel. When Father

failed to appear at the termination hearing, his counsel understandably was unsure as to

how to proceed in Father’s absence. Father has not demonstrated any evidence or

opposition to the evidence presented by the Department that counsel could reasonably have

made without him there.1

¶21 Father next asserts that despite him requesting to be able to represent himself pro se

in regard to the termination hearing involving R.T.C., the District Court erred in letting

him do so. In essence, he asserts his waiver of counsel was not knowingly, voluntarily,

and intelligently made. This assertion ignores the fact that the District Court held two

representation hearings in which it discussed Father’s complaints regarding counsel.

1 At the second representation hearing, Father advanced the idea that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present his theory of medical negligence that the presence of illicit drugs in his children’s systems at birth was the result of the hospital delivery staff not making sure his children did not ingest any meconium. The District Court thoroughly discussed that in order to do so Father would have needed to have an expert testify as to the standard of care and a breach of the standard of care and Father acknowledged he had no such expert. Regardless, the reality of the situation is that, even if hospital staff could have prevented such, it ignores the primary concern that the children were exposed to illicit drugs by Mother while in the womb and the parents actively tried to conceal this when the hospital requested testing to help medical professionals determine the basis for the children’s symptoms and how to treat such—indicating the parents were more willing to protect themselves from discovery than they were to care for their newborns’ medical needs. Father’s assertion of counsel’s ineffectiveness in this regard is not supported as whether a hospital could have protected the children from ingesting meconium does not alleviate the concern of drug use in the parents’ home or eliminate the existence of probable cause as discussed above. 10 Although Father asserts the District Court failed to sufficiently advise him of the danger,

risks, and disadvantages of self-representation and make sufficient inquiry in the face of

his request to represent himself, upon review of those hearings such is not an accurate

perception. At the April 10, 2025 hearing, Father’s counsel explains in Father’s presence

that Father is ill-equipped to represent himself, that he does not understand the law or

requirements for presentation of evidence nor what is relevant to the issues in the case. He

explains that Father is stubborn and does not want to follow his advice. He also explains

that despite this, Father has a constitutional right to represent himself should he desire to

do so. The District Court reiterates to Father that it is ill-advised to represent himself and

to do so is a “fool’s errand.” Despite hearing the dangers and pitfalls of self-representation

and in particular his self-representation, Father adamantly represented he desired to

represent himself. On the record before us, although we may have made a different

decision and generally caution against permitting parents to engage in self-representation,

it was not error for the District Court to permit Father to represent himself.

¶22 Finally, Father asserts the District Court erred in failing to consider a guardianship

in lieu of termination. As the issue is framed on appeal, the District Court did not abuse

its discretion in not considering a guardianship. Father failed to raise this issue below. We

have consistently held that we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.

In re T.E., 2002 MT 195, ¶ 20, 311 Mont. 148, 54 P.3d 38 (collecting cases). Similar to

here, in In re D.H., 2001 MT 200, 306 Mont. 278, 33 P.3d 616, the appellant parents argued

for the first time on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering a less

11 restrictive alternative to termination. As this argument was not presented to the district

court, we declined, as we do here, to address the matter on appeal. In re D.H., ¶ 41.

¶23 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review.

¶24 Affirmed.

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ KATHERINE M BIDEGARAY /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE