Matter of Rousseau v. Palazzo

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Matter of Rousseau v. Palazzo

124 A.D.3d 901, 998 N.Y.S.2d 908

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 28, 2015

Docket2014-00404

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 124 A.D.3d 901 (Matter of Rousseau v. Palazzo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Matter of Rousseau v. Palazzo, 124 A.D.3d 901, 998 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeals from (1) an order of the Family Court, Dutchess County (Denise M. Watson, J.), dated December 13, 2013, and (2) an order of protection of that court entered December 13, 2013. The order dated December 13, 2013, after a hearing, found that the appellant had committed certain family offenses. The order of protection entered December 13, 2013, inter alia, directed the appellant to stay away from the marital residence until and including December 9, 2014.

Ordered that the order dated December 13, 2013, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

Ordered that the appeal from the order of protection is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements, as the order of protection expired by its own terms.

The Family Court failed to specify the particular family offenses under Family Court Act § 812 (1) that the appellant committed. However, remittal is not necessary because the record is sufficient for this Court to conduct an independent review of the evidence (see Matter of McCauley v Galante, 106 AD3d 1089, 1089 [2013]; Matter of Stewart v Lassiter, 103 AD3d 734, 734 [2013]). As relevant here, “[a] person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person . . . He or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to physical contact, or attempts or *902 threatens to do the same” (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]). Contrary to the appellant’s contention, a fair preponderance of the evidence adduced at the hearing established that he committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree (see Penal Law § 240.26 [1]; Family Ct Act §§ 812, 832; Matter of Miloslau v Miloslau, 112 AD3d 632, 632 [2013]; Matter of Santiago v Friedman, 35 AD3d 482, 482 [2006]).

Skelos, J.R, Austin, Roman and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Appeals from (1) an order of the Family Court, Dutchess County (Denise M. Watson, J.), dated December 13, 2013, and (2) an order of protection of that court entered December 13, 2013. The order dated December 13, 2013, after a hearing, found that the appellant had committed certain family offenses. The order of protection entered December 13, 2013, inter alia, directed the appellant to stay away from the marital residence until and including December 9, 2014.

Ordered that the order dated December 13, 2013, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,

Ordered that the appeal from the order of protection is dismissed as academic, without costs or disbursements, as the order of protection expired by its own terms.

The Family Court failed to specify the particular family offenses under Family Court Act § 812 (1) that the appellant committed. However, remittal is not necessary because the record is sufficient for this Court to conduct an independent review of the evidence (see Matter of McCauley v Galante, 106 AD3d 1089, 1089 [2013]; Matter of Stewart v Lassiter, 103 AD3d 734, 734 [2013]). As relevant here, “[a] person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person . . . He or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to physical contact, or attempts or *902 threatens to do the same” (Penal Law § 240.26 [1]). Contrary to the appellant’s contention, a fair preponderance of the evidence adduced at the hearing established that he committed the family offense of harassment in the second degree (see Penal Law § 240.26 [1]; Family Ct Act §§ 812, 832; Matter of Miloslau v Miloslau, 112 AD3d 632, 632 [2013]; Matter of Santiago v Friedman, 35 AD3d 482, 482 [2006]).

Skelos, J.R, Austin, Roman and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

124 A.D.3d 901, 998 N.Y.S.2d 908, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-rousseau-v-palazzo-nyappdiv-2015.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack