Matter of Richards v. Allied Universal Sec.
Opinion
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Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter
Matter of Richards v Allied Universal Sec.
2026 NY Slip Op 04772
July 29, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
In the Matter of Alroy Richards, appellant,
v
Allied Universal Security, et al., respondents.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on July 29, 2026
2023-02075, (Index No. 717730/18)
Hector D. Lasalle, P.J.
Helen Voutsinas
Laurence L. Love
Phillip Hom, JJ.
Alroy Richards, Valley Stream, NY, appellant pro se.
Martenson, Hasbrouch & Simon LLP, New York, NY (David C. Hamilton and Makenna E. Tucker of counsel), for respondent Allied Universal Security.
Eustace, Prezioso and Yapchanyk, New York, NY (Michelle L. Vizzi of counsel), for respondent Hillside Manor Rehabilitation (and Extended Care Facility).
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298 to review a determination of the New York State Division of Human Rights dated September 26, 2018, dismissing the petitioner's administrative complaint, the petitioner appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Ulysses B. Leverett, J.), entered January 4, 2023. The order and judgment granted the motion of Allied Universal Security, in effect, to dismiss the petition insofar as asserted against it, granted the motion of Hillside Manor Rehabilitation (and Extended Care Facility) pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the petition insofar as asserted against it, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding.
ORDERED that the order and judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs.
On March 15, 2018, the petitioner filed an administrative complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights (hereinafter the DHR) alleging that Allied Universal Security (hereinafter Allied), the petitioner's employer, unlawfully discriminated against him. In a determination and order after investigation dated September 26, 2018, the DHR found no probable cause to believe that Allied had engaged or was engaging in the unlawful discriminatory practices complained of and dismissed the administrative complaint.
The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to Executive Law § 298 to review the DHR's determination, naming the DHR, Allied, and Hillside Manor Rehabilitation (and Extended Care Facility) (hereinafter Hillside) as respondents. Allied moved, in effect, to dismiss the petition insofar as asserted against it, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner failed to show that the DHR's determination was arbitrary and capricious. Hillside moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (7) to dismiss the petition insofar as asserted against it, among other things, on the ground that Hillside had not been a party to the administrative proceeding.
In an order and judgment entered January 4, 2023, the Supreme Court granted the motions of Allied and Hillside, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding on the grounds that [*2]Hillside had not been party to the administrative proceeding and that the DHR's determination was not arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.
"A proceeding to review a determination of the [DHR] 'shall be commenced by the filing of a notice of petition and petition naming as respondents the [DHR] and all other parties appearing in the proceeding before the [DHR]'" (Matter of Warden v Southampton Town Newspapers, Inc., 171 AD3d 1194, 1195, quoting 22 NYCRR 202.57[a]; see Executive Law § 298). Since Hillside did not appear as a party in the administrative proceeding, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition insofar as asserted against Hillside.
Executive Law § 297(2)(a) provides that after the filing of any administrative complaint, the DHR shall "make prompt investigation in connection therewith. Within one hundred eighty days after a complaint is filed, the [DHR] shall determine whether it has jurisdiction and, if so, whether there is probable cause to believe that the . . . respondent, has engaged or is engaging in an unlawful discriminatory practice. If it finds with respect to any respondent that it lacks jurisdiction or that probable cause does not exist, the commissioner shall issue and cause to be served on the complainant an order dismissing such allegations of the said complaint as to such respondent."
"The DHR has broad discretion in conducting its investigations" (Matter of Sahni v Foster, 145 AD3d 733, 734; see Matter of Cappuccia v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 140 AD3d 750, 751). Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the record demonstrates that the DHR conducted an adequate investigation of the petitioner's administrative complaint. That investigation was neither abbreviated nor one-sided, and the petitioner was afforded a full and fair opportunity to present his claim and rebut Allied's submissions in opposition to the petitioner's administrative complaint (see Matter of Ackerman v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 197 AD3d 1110, 1111; Matter of Meyer v Foster, 187 AD3d 918, 919).
The 180-day time provision set forth in Executive Law § 297(2)(a) is "merely 'directory,' rather than mandatory" (Matter of Murphy v Kirkland, 88 AD3d 267, 273, quoting Union Free School Dist. No. 6 of Towns of Islip & Smithtown v New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 35 NY2d 371, 380; see Matter of Yu Zhang v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 70 AD3d 1414, 1415). Here, the petitioner failed to show that the DHR's delay of 15 days beyond the 180-day period to issue its determination was substantially prejudicial to him (see Matter of Corning Glass Works v Ovsanik, 84 NY2d 619, 624; Matter of Yu Zhang v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 70 AD3d at 1415; Matter of Comor v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 231 AD2d 715, 716).
"'Where, as here, the DHR renders a determination of no probable cause without holding a hearing, the appropriate standard of review is whether the probable cause determination was arbitrary and capricious or lacking a rational basis'" (Matter of Pastor v Partnership for Children's Rights, 159 AD3d 910, 911, quoting Matter of Sahni v Foster, 145 AD3d at 734). "The Division's determination is 'entitled to considerable deference due to its expertise in evaluating discrimination claims'" (Matter of Steinberg-Fisher v North Shore Towers Apts., Inc., 149 AD3d 848, 850, quoting Matter of Camp v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 300 AD2d 481, 482).
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