Matter of Quiles v. Ledbetter

Opinion

Matter of Quiles v Ledbetter

2026 NY Slip Op 04801

July 30, 2026

Appellate Division, Third Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

In the Matter of Christopher Quiles, Appellant,

v

Priscilla Ledbetter, as Director of Temporary Release Programs, Respondent.

Decided and Entered:July 30, 2026

CV-25-0501

Calendar Date: May 29, 2026

Before: Clark, J.P., Aarons, Ceresia, Mcshan And Powers, JJ.

Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, Buffalo (Kristina Hill of counsel), for appellant.

Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Sean P. Mix of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

McShan, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (David Weinstein, J.), entered February 18, 2025 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent revoking petitioner's participation in the work release program.

In 2022, petitioner was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and sentenced to a prison term of five years, to be followed by two years of postrelease supervision. Based upon his positive institutional record and successful completion of phase 1 of the comprehensive alcohol and substance abuse treatment (hereinafter CASAT) program, petitioner was transferred to the temporary work release program under parole supervision. Thereafter, petitioner was ordered to return to the correctional facility and was referred to the Temporary Release Committee based on allegations that he violated the conditions that he work 35 hours per week, attend requisite CASAT outpatient appointments and obtain approval prior to commencing employment. Following a hearing, the Committee recommended that petitioner's participation in the work release program be revoked, which recommendation was approved by the superintendent of the correctional facility. Upon administrative appeal, the Central Office Temporary Release affirmed, finding that petitioner's removal from the program was an appropriate consequence for failing to satisfy the known program requirements of not missing appointments with his CASAT treatment provider.

Petitioner thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding, contending that the Committee failed to make a proper electronic record of the hearing, violated his due process right to present documentary evidence, failed to provide a written statement setting forth its decision and evidence relied upon and imposed an excessive penalty of removal from the work release program. Following the filing of respondent's answer, petitioner asserted that the uncertified copy of the hearing transcript included in the answer violated CPLR 7804 (e) and contained omissions that precluded meaningful judicial review, and submitted a digital audio recording of the hearing that he obtained under the Freedom of Information Law, along with an excerpt of the hearing that his counsel transcribed from the audio recording. Supreme Court rejected petitioner's contentions and dismissed the petition.^FN1 Petitioner appeals.

Initially, respondent contends that this proceeding has been rendered moot by petitioner's recent release to parole supervision. We disagree that the entirety of petitioner's contentions have been rendered moot by that occurrence, as he is entitled to challenge the disciplinary findings that resulted in his removal from the temporary work release program, which will remain on his institutional record (see Matter of Pena v Goord, 263 AD2d 690, 691 [3d Dept 1999]; see also Matter of McBride v Ledbetter, 238 AD3d 1423, 1423[*2][3d Dept 2025]; Matter of Palczewski v Annucci, 149 AD3d 1450, 1450 [3d Dept 2017]). Nevertheless, any challenge to the alleged severity of removal from the program is indeed moot, and the exception to the mootness doctrine is not implicated (see Matter of Kagan v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 117 AD3d 1215, 1215-1216 [3d Dept 2014]; Matter of Chandler v Coughlin, 126 AD2d 886, 886-887 [3d Dept 1987]; see also Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714 [1980]).

Turning to petitioner's remaining contentions, respondent's failure to file a certified transcript of the hearing as required by CPLR 7804 (e) was properly disregarded (see CPLR 2001; Matter of Cliff v Kingsley, 293 AD2d 954, 955 [3d Dept 2002]), as petitioner had access to the audio recording of the hearing itself and, in turn, he has failed to show any prejudice resulting therefrom (see Matter of Pledger v Coughlin, 205 AD2d 832, 832 [3d Dept 1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 810 [1994]). Further, although there are inaudible gaps in the audio recording and omissions in the hearing transcripts, we are unpersuaded that such gaps and omissions are so significant as to preclude meaningful judicial review of the procedural challenges advanced by petitioner (see Matter of Edwards v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 244 AD3d 1364, 1365 [3d Dept 2025]; Matter of Shearer v Annucci, 155 AD3d 1277, 1278 [3d Dept 2017]).

Petitioner next contends that he was deprived of his due process right to present documentary evidence at the hearing; specifically, he sought to produce certain emails from his parole officer. However, when asked whether he had any evidence to produce at the onset of the hearing, petitioner indicated that he did not have the emails in his possession but made no request for additional time to obtain the emails and failed to offer any explanation as to their relevance. The Committee chair informed petitioner that a determination regarding the relevance of the emails would be made later in the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, when the Committee chair asked petitioner if he had anything else he would like to add, petitioner did not object or pursue his request to produce the documentary evidence. Under these circumstances, petitioner's contention is unpreserved (see Matter of Lightner v Venettozzi, 197 AD3d 1448, 1449 [3d Dept 2021]; Matter of Rodriguez v Lee, 162 AD3d 1453, 1454 [3d Dept 2018]; Matter of Wilson v Annucci, 148 AD3d 1281, 1282-1283 [3d Dept 2017]) and we lack authority to review such issue in the interest of justice (see Matter of Khan v New York State Dept. of Health, 96 NY2d 879, 880 [2001]).

Finally, petitioner contends that the Committee failed to provide a statement of evidence relied upon to support its decision (see 7 NYCRR 1904.2 [h] [7]). In recommending that petitioner be removed from the temporary work release program, the Committee set forth its finding that on nine specified dates petitioner failed to [*3]attend CASAT out-patient appointments, which was a condition of his presumptive work release. Although the Committee did not specifically set forth the evidence it relied upon in making that determination, petitioner was the only witness to testify at the hearing, during which he did not dispute that he missed numerous CASAT appointments, acknowledged that he "messed up," apologized for doing so but took "full responsibility" and asked for a second chance. We are satisfied that the evidentiary basis for the Committee's recommendation that petitioner's participation in the temporary release program be revoked is apparent from petitioner's admissions at the hearing and that the information set forth in its written statement was sufficient to meet the requirements of due process (see generally Matter of Munson v Stanford, 181 AD3d 1111, 1113 [3d Dept 2020]; People ex rel. Hacker v New York State Div. of Parole, 228 AD2d 849, 850-851 [3d Dept 1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 809 [1996]).

Clark, J.P., Aarons, Ceresia and Powers, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

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Footnotes

Footnote 1

Supreme Court noted in its decision that respondent, with permission, submitted a surreply verifying that the administrative record, hearing transcript and all documents considered by the agency had been provided in accordance with CPLR 7804 (e). On these bases, the court determined that petitioner failed to demonstrate any prejudice regarding the transcript, particularly given his submission of the audio recording. Such surreply, however, does not appear in the record on appeal.