Matter of Plouffe

157 B.R. 198, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 925, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1166, 1993 WL 322087
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedAugust 18, 1993
Docket19-50176
StatusPublished
Cited by47 cases

This text of 157 B.R. 198 (Matter of Plouffe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Plouffe, 157 B.R. 198, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 925, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1166, 1993 WL 322087 (Conn. 1993).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON OBJECTION TO CONFIRMATION OF A CHAPTER 13 PLAN

ROBERT L. KRECHEVSKY, Chief Judge.

I.

ISSUE

The United States Supreme Court in Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2106, 124 L.Ed.2d 228 (1993) decided that Bankruptcy Code “§ 1322(b)(2) 1 prohibits a Chapter 13 debt- or from relying on § 506(a) 2 to reduce an undersecured homestead mortgage to the fair market value of the mortgaged residence.” Nobelman, 508 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2108, 124 L.Ed.2d at 233. The question presented in this proceeding is whether § 1322(b)(2) also prohibits the debtor from relying on § 506(a) to reduce a wholly unsecured second mortgage on such premises to a value of zero as a secured claim and thereafter to treat the entire debt in the plan as an unsecured claim.

The parties have submitted the matter upon briefs, there being no dispute on the facts.

*199 ii.

BACKGROUND

Raymond A. Plouffe and Cherilyn R. Plouffe, the debtors, filed a joint Chapter 13 petition on March 16, 1993. The court, after notice and hearing, pursuant to Fed. R.Bankr.P. 3012 3 entered an order which determined that the value of the debtors’ principal residence was $136,000.00; that the residence was subject to a first mortgage in the unpaid balance of $136,000.00 payable to Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. (Citi-corp), and subject to a second mortgage in the unpaid balance of $28,444.17 payable to The Norwich Savings Society (Norwich). The court order found the Norwich mortgage “to be secured in the amount of $0.00 and unsecured in the amount of $28,-444.17.”

The debtors thereafter sought confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan which provides that the Norwich claim be treated as an unsecured claim pursuant to § 506(a). Under the plan, unsecured claims, except for a claim of the State of Connecticut Office of Adult probation, receive nothing. The plan requires the debtors to pay $599.00 monthly to the Chapter 13 trustee for sixty months, with the major portion of such funds to go to the curing of a mortgage arrearage due Citicorp.

Norwich objects to confirmation, contending “under section 1322(b)(2) of the Code, as interpreted by Nobelman, that its rights cannot be modified, and making Norwich an unsecured creditor is an impermissible modification of its rights.” Norwich Memorandum at 4. The debtors argue that a wholly unsecured second mortgage debt may be dealt with in a Chapter 13 plan other than by full payment according to the mortgage contract terms.

III.

DISCUSSION

The resolution of the issue presented depends upon the proper analysis of the Nobelman ruling. Norwich emphasizes that Justice Thomas, for the unanimous Supreme Court, noted that § 1322(b)(2) “does not state that a plan may modify ‘claims’ or that the plan may not modify ‘a claim secured only by’ a home mortgage. Rather, it focuses on the modification of the ‘rights of holders’ of such claims.” Nobelman, 508 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2109, 124 L.Ed.2d at 234. From this statement, Norwich posits that as it holds a mortgage on the homestead, the protection of the rights of a mortgagee afforded by § 1322(b)(2) does not depend on whether there is any equity in the homestead available to Norwich. Norwich asserts its state-law rights, including the right to retain its lien until the debt is paid off, remain enforceable, and the debtors’ plan may not be confirmed. The Chapter 13 trustee supports Norwich’s argument.

The debtors draw a contrary conclusion from Nobelman. They point out that No-belman recognizes that Chapter 13 debtors can properly “look[ ] to § 506(a) for a judicial valuation of the collateral to determine the status of the bank’s secured claim”, and that “[i]t was permissible for [debtors] to seek a valuation in proposing their Chapter 13 plan, since § 506(a) states that ‘[s]uch value shall be determined ... in conjunction with any hearing ... on a plan affecting such creditor’s interest.’ ” Nobelman, 508 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2110, 124 L.Ed.2d at 234-35. Relying on these statements, the debtors assert that Nobelman requires that the mortgage holder have some equity in the homestead to be entitled to the status of a secured claim holder, with nonmodifiable rights. In this proceeding, Norwich has judicially been determined under § 506(a) to hold no secured claim because the value of its “interest in the estate’s interest in such property” is zero. Norwich, accordingly, holds only an unsecured claim. Section 1322(b)(2) authorizes the debtors’ plan to “modify the rights ... of holders of unse *200 cured claims.” See § 1322(b)(2), supra note 1.

I conclude that the debtor’s argument as to the teachings of Nobelman is the more persuasive. I find it evident from the Nobelman ruling that for a homestead mortgagee to claim the protection against modification granted by § 1322(b)(2), the mortgagee must qualify as the holder of a secured claim to some extent as determined by § 506(a). 4 There is neither a logical nor rational basis for a creditor holding a completely unsecured claim to be protected from claim modification in a bankruptcy case simply because the creditor had obtained a lien on the homestead prepetition. “[Treatment under the Code turns on whether a claim is secured or unsecured, not whether a creditor is secured or unsecured.” In re Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir.1992). Cf. LaPointe v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc., (In re LaPointe), 150 B.R. 92, 95 (Bankr.Conn.1993) (section 522(f)(1) does not permit creditor’s wholly unsecured judicial lien to remain on debtor’s residence because contrary to fresh-start principle of bankruptcy).

Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Nobelman, wrote that the Court’s “literal reading of the text of the statute is faithful to the intent of Congress.” Nobelman, 508 U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2112, 124 L.Ed.2d at 237. The intent to which Justice Stevens referred was “favorable treatment of residential mortgagees ... to encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market.” Id. There are no such concerns when dealing with the second mortgage market. See generally Yeryl Victoria Miles, The Bifurcation of Un-dersecured Residential Mortgages Under § 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code: The Final Resolution, 67 Am.Bank.L.J. 207, 285 (1993) (junior lienholders who may take mortgages against oversecured property do not merit creditor protection by Congress). Further, a literal reading of § 1322(b)(2) does exclude a mortgagee whose secured interest in the homestead is zero.

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Bluebook (online)
157 B.R. 198, 29 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 925, 1993 Bankr. LEXIS 1166, 1993 WL 322087, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-plouffe-ctb-1993.