Matter of Nidiver

217 B.R. 581, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1049, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 261, 1998 WL 111815
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedFebruary 2, 1998
Docket19-80185
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 217 B.R. 581 (Matter of Nidiver) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Nidiver, 217 B.R. 581, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1049, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 261, 1998 WL 111815 (Neb. 1998).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

JOHN C. MINAHAN, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

This Chapter 7 case is before the court to consider approval of the debtors’ reaffirmation of their obligation to pay bankruptcy counsel for legal services rendered before the bankruptcy case was filed. Such a reaffirmation agreement serves the laudatory purpose of permitting a cash poor debtor to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case on credit, and to avoid the often suspected scenario in which counsel place the cash poor debtor in a Chapter 13 case, so that legal fees can be paid over time.

The reaffirmation of pre-petition debt for bankruptcy related legal services raises three issues:

First, is debtors’ counsel disqualified from representing the debtors in connection with the bankruptcy case because, as a pre-petition creditor, counsel does not qualify as a “disinterested” person under sections 327 and 328 of the Bankruptcy Code?

Second, as a condition to enforceability, is the bankruptcy court required to approve the reaffirmation agreement and, in connection therewith, is the bankruptcy court required to have a hearing which is attended by the debtors?

Finally, on the merits, should the bankruptcy court approve reaffirmation of an unsecured, pre-petition obligation to pay bankruptcy related attorney fees?

I conclude that bankruptcy counsel is not disqualified from further representation of the debtors, that court approval of the reaffirmation agreement is required after a hearing attended by the debtor, and that in this case the reaffirmation agreement is approved.

Disinterested Requirement

It is well established that an attorney who holds a claim against the bankruptcy estate may not be employed as a professional person to represent a Chapter 11 debtor in possession, or the creditors’ committee in Chapter 11. As a creditor of the estate, counsel is not disinterested and may not be employed by or compensated from the bank *583 ruptey estate. See §§ 327 and 328, see also In re Pierce, 809 F.2d 1356 (8th Cir.1987), In re Patterson, 53 B.R. 366 (Bankr.D.Neb.1985). The Eighth Circuit recently concluded that an attorney holding a trust deed on a bankruptcy debtor’s real estate was not disinterested and not entitled to receive compensation from estate assets for post-petition legal services rendered to the debtor. See In re Mahendra, 131 F.3d 750 (8th Cir.1997).

However, these cases are not controlling on the issues before the court. This is a Chapter 7 case, and the bankruptcy estate will be administered by a standing trustee. The standing trustee may retain counsel as a “professional person,” with approval of the court. Trustee’s counsel must be “disinterested,” and trustee’s counsel may be compensated from the bankruptcy estate. Debtors’ counsel will not represent the bankruptcy estate, will not have a fiduciary duty to creditors, and will not be employed as a “professional person” to render services to be compensated from the bankruptcy estate. The section 327 and 328 requirement of disinterest is simply not applicable to the debtors’ counsel in a Chapter 7 case.

Debtors’ counsel is, of course, subject to ethical restraints but the existence of a client’s obligation to pay reasonable, undisputed attorney fees, does not disqualify a lawyer from further representation of the client. There is no legal or ethical basis for concluding that debtors’ counsel may not continue to represent the debtors in connection with this bankruptcy ease, notwithstanding the fact that counsel is owed money by his clients for bankruptcy related legal services rendered before the bankruptcy case was filed.

Court Approval and Hearing Requirements

Reaffirmation of a dischargeable debt may impair a bankruptcy debtor’s fresh start. Under the Bankruptcy Act, debtors could inadvertently reaffirm debts by conduct, or become obliged to pay a discharged debt upon entry of a default judgment. Because of these considerations, § 524 of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 enjoins enforcement of discharged debts, voids judgments on discharged debts, and subjects reaffirmation agreements to close regulation. See 4 Lawrence P. King, Collier On Bankruptcy ¶ 524.04 (15th ed.1997).

In relevant part, section 524(c)(6), provides that a reaffirmation agreement is enforceable only if:

(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating an agreement under this subsection, the court approves such agreement as—
(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor.

This section makes explicit that court approval of the reaffirmation agreement is required in this case because the debtors were not represented by an attorney in the course of negotiating the agreement. Debtors’ counsel obviously is in an adverse position to his clients respecting negotiation of the terms of the reaffirmation of counsel’s fees. Counsel should, as was done in this case, make clear to the client and the court, that counsel does not represent the debtor respecting the reaffirmation agreement. And counsel obviously cannot, and did not, file the affidavit contemplated by § 524(e)(3).

The quoted language of § 524(c)(6) also requires the court to make particular findings of fact, which suggests, at minimum, that the court must have an evidentiary basis for making such findings. Reaffirmation agreements negotiated without the assistance of counsel are not enforceable unless approved by the court.

The next question is whether the court must hold a reaffirmation hearing. I conclude that a hearing is required by § 524(d). However, § 524(d) is not without difficulties, as it is not well drafted and can be read as applicable only to reaffirmation agreements entered into after a discharge order is entered.

Section 524(d) of the Bankruptcy Code reads, in part:

.... If a discharge has been granted and if the debtor desires to make an agree *584 ment of the kind specified in subsection (c) of this section and was not represented by an attorney during the course of negotiating such agreement, then the court shall hold a hearing at which the debtor shall appear in person and at such hearing the court shall____

This language can be read as permitting approval of reaffirmation agreements entered into after a discharge order is entered. Such a literal reading of § 524(d), however, is inconsistent with the requirement of § 524(c)(1) which unambiguously requires that reaffirmation agreements be made before entry of a discharge order.

Subsections 524(c) and (d) should be read consistently with each other with deference to the statutory cross-reference by § 524(d) to § 524(c). Read consistently and in context, subsection (d) refers only to “agreements of the kind specified in subsection (c),” and in subsection (e), reaffirmation agreements must be entered into before the entry of a discharge order.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
217 B.R. 581, 39 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1049, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 261, 1998 WL 111815, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-nidiver-nebraskab-1998.