Matter of Morales v. Velez

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Matter of Morales v. Velez

2017 NY Slip Op 1278, 147 A.D.3d 559, 46 N.Y.S.3d 795

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 16, 2017

Docket3119 101312/14

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 1278 (Matter of Morales v. Velez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Matter of Morales v. Velez, 2017 NY Slip Op 1278, 147 A.D.3d 559, 46 N.Y.S.3d 795 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

Determination of respondent Office of Children and Family Services, dated July 10, 2014, which, after a fair hearing, found that petitioner maltreated the subject child, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of Supreme Court, New York County [Alexander W. Hunter, Jr., J.], entered July 15, 2015), dismissed, without costs.

The determination that a fair determination of the evidence showed that petitioner maltreated her foster child, is supported by substantial evidence (see e.g. Matter of Valentine v New York State Cent. Register of Child Abusers & Maltreatment, 37 AD3d 249 [1st Dept 2007]), including petitioner’s admission that she struck the child, and a report from an examining therapist who found that the child had belt-shaped welts on her body (see e.g. Matter of Castilloux v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 16 AD3d 1061 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 702 [2005]; Matter of Vincent KK. v State of N.Y. Off. of Chil *560 dren & Family Servs., 284 AD2d 777 [3d Dept 2001]). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) also properly found that the child, a foster child with a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, had a special vulnerability, and that petitioner was barred from using corporal punishment against her (see 18 NYCRR 441.9 [c]). Due to the child’s special vulnerability, petitioner’s use of a belt to whip the child physically injured her and put her at risk of emotional and physical impairment. Furthermore, petitioner showed no remorse, denying that she used a belt on the child. There exists no basis to disturb the ALJ’s conclusion that petitioner likely would exercise the same poor judgment if faced with similar circumstances in the future.

We have considered petitioner’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Mazzarelli, Andrias, Feinman and Gesmer, JJ.

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Determination of respondent Office of Children and Family Services, dated July 10, 2014, which, after a fair hearing, found that petitioner maltreated the subject child, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied, and the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of Supreme Court, New York County [Alexander W. Hunter, Jr., J.], entered July 15, 2015), dismissed, without costs.

The determination that a fair determination of the evidence showed that petitioner maltreated her foster child, is supported by substantial evidence (see e.g. Matter of Valentine v New York State Cent. Register of Child Abusers & Maltreatment, 37 AD3d 249 [1st Dept 2007]), including petitioner’s admission that she struck the child, and a report from an examining therapist who found that the child had belt-shaped welts on her body (see e.g. Matter of Castilloux v New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., 16 AD3d 1061 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 702 [2005]; Matter of Vincent KK. v State of N.Y. Off. of Chil *560 dren & Family Servs., 284 AD2d 777 [3d Dept 2001]). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) also properly found that the child, a foster child with a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, had a special vulnerability, and that petitioner was barred from using corporal punishment against her (see 18 NYCRR 441.9 [c]). Due to the child’s special vulnerability, petitioner’s use of a belt to whip the child physically injured her and put her at risk of emotional and physical impairment. Furthermore, petitioner showed no remorse, denying that she used a belt on the child. There exists no basis to disturb the ALJ’s conclusion that petitioner likely would exercise the same poor judgment if faced with similar circumstances in the future.

We have considered petitioner’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Mazzarelli, Andrias, Feinman and Gesmer, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 1278, 147 A.D.3d 559, 46 N.Y.S.3d 795, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-morales-v-velez-nyappdiv-2017.

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