Matter of Moore v. Town of Colonie

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Matter of Moore v. Town of Colonie

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 9, 2026

DocketCV-25-0721

StatusPublished

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Matter of Moore v Town of Colonie - 2026 NY Slip Op 04353

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Law Reporting
Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter

Matter of Moore v Town of Colonie

2026 NY Slip Op 04353

July 9, 2026

Appellate Division, Third Department

Mackey, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

In the Matter of T. Padric Moore et al., Respondents,

v

Town of Colonie et al., Appellants.

Decided and Entered:July 9, 2026

CV-25-0721

Calendar Date: May 26, 2026

Before: Ceresia, J.P., Mcshan, Mackey And Ryba, JJ.

Tabner, Ryan & Keniry, LLP, Albany (William F. Ryan Jr. of counsel), for appellants.

Bosman Law, LLC, Blossvale (A.J. Bosman of counsel), for respondents.

[*1]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Kimberly O'Connor, J.), entered March 21, 2025 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted petitioners' request for counsel fees.

In March 2024, petitioners attempted to file summary eviction proceedings at respondent Colonie Town Justice Court but were rejected by respondent Clerk of the Colonie Town Justice Court without explanation. Petitioners thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding against respondents seeking, among other things, a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to accept petitioners' legal filings. Respondents did not dispute the rejection of petitioners' legal filings but replied that they were ethically prohibited from accepting the same based upon an advisory opinion from the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. Respondents also filed a motion to seal the advisory opinion, which motion petitioners opposed and Supreme Court ultimately denied. Following a hearing, Supreme Court found that the Clerk failed to perform her mandatory duty and, accordingly, granted the petition to compel respondents to accept petitioners' filings.

Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (see CPLR article 86 [hereinafter the EAJA]) to recover related counsel fees and expenses. Respondents opposed the motion arguing that the EAJA was inapplicable because the Clerk was not an officer of the state within the meaning of the statute and that, in any event, the Clerk's actions were proper and petitioners' counsel fees were unreasonable. Supreme Court disagreed and found that the EAJA was applicable and, further, that the clerk's actions were not substantially justified. Accordingly, and as petitioners' counsel fees were deemed to be reasonable, the court awarded counsel fees and expenses to petitioners. Respondents appeal.^FN1

At the outset, we reject respondents' contention that a town court clerk is, by definition, not an agent of the state within the meaning of the EAJA (see CPLR 8602 [g]). Initially, we are unpersuaded by respondents' argument that the EAJA is inapplicable to town justice courts because of their limited jurisdiction and the fact that their employees are not employed by the state, as the State Constitution includes town courts within the unified court system (see NY Const, art VI, § 1 [a]). Turning to the language of the statute itself, the term "[s]tate" is defined under the EAJA as "the state or any of its agencies or any of its officials acting in his or her official capacity" (CPLR 8602 [g]). "Local officials and administrators may be deemed agents of the state" in the context of the EAJA, and "[s]uch a determination is made on a case-by-case basis upon examination of the applicable statutory authority and nature of the entity" (Matter of Brown v City of Schenectady, 209 AD3d 128, 132 [3d Dept 2022]). To this end, given the EAJA's remedial purpose, it "should be liberally construed to carry out the reforms [*2]intended and to promote justice, and interpreted broadly to accomplish its goals" and, thus, "we may not read into it any limitations that are not clearly expressed" (Matter of Markey v Tietz, 244 AD3d 78, 86 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Pertinent here, a determination as to whether a clerk is a state or local official rests upon "the nature of the act which is the subject of the suit," as a clerk may be determined to be a state officer when performing "acts that are in themselves a part of the judicial system" (National Westminster Bank, USA v State of New York, 76 NY2d 507, 509 [1990] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see J. Ellrott Excavating Contrs. v State of New York, 247 AD2d 705, 705-706 [3d Dept 1998]). Here, the underlying action is premised upon the Clerk's refusal of petitioners' legal filings. Given that petitioners' filings in a summary eviction proceeding are unquestionably "part of the judicial process" (National Westminster Bank, USA v State of New York, 76 NY2d at 509), Supreme Court did not err in concluding that the Clerk acted as a state official and, thus, in applying the EAJA in this proceeding.

We similarly find unavailing respondents' challenge to Supreme Court's award of counsel fees. As is pertinent here, the EAJA provides that "a court shall award to a prevailing party, other than the state, fees and other expenses incurred by such party in any civil action brought against the state, unless the court finds that the position of the state was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust" (CPLR 8601 [a] [emphasis added]; see Matter of Markey v Tietz, 244 AD3d at 80). The determinative inquiry is whether the challenged actions are "justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person, or hav[e] a reasonable basis both in law and fact" (Matter of New York State Clinical Lab. Assn. v Kaladjian, 85 NY2d 346, 356 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Brown v City of Schenectady, 209 AD3d at 133). A finding as to whether the state's position was substantially justified is "committed to the sound discretion of the court of first instance and is reviewable as an exercise of judicial discretion" (Matter of Vapor Tech. Assn. v. Cuomo, 203 AD3d 1516, 1517 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv dismissed 39 NY3d 960 [2022]; accord Matter of Walker v Martuscello, 248 AD3d 1619, 1621 [3d Dept 2026]).

It is uncontested that the Clerk rejected petitioners' legal filings. Respondents nevertheless assert that the Clerk was substantially justified in doing so because she was under the direction of her superiors. Significantly, however, "[a] clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose except where specifically directed to do so by statute or rules promulgated by the chief administrator of the courts, or order of the court" — the record here indicates that [*3]the Clerk merely received a verbal directive (CPLR 2102 [c] [emphasis added]).

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Matter of Moore v Town of Colonie - 2026 NY Slip Op 04353

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Law Reporting
Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter

Matter of Moore v Town of Colonie

2026 NY Slip Op 04353

July 9, 2026

Appellate Division, Third Department

Mackey, J.

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

In the Matter of T. Padric Moore et al., Respondents,

v

Town of Colonie et al., Appellants.

Decided and Entered:July 9, 2026

CV-25-0721

Calendar Date: May 26, 2026

Before: Ceresia, J.P., Mcshan, Mackey And Ryba, JJ.

Tabner, Ryan & Keniry, LLP, Albany (William F. Ryan Jr. of counsel), for appellants.

Bosman Law, LLC, Blossvale (A.J. Bosman of counsel), for respondents.

[*1]

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Kimberly O'Connor, J.), entered March 21, 2025 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted petitioners' request for counsel fees.

In March 2024, petitioners attempted to file summary eviction proceedings at respondent Colonie Town Justice Court but were rejected by respondent Clerk of the Colonie Town Justice Court without explanation. Petitioners thereafter commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding against respondents seeking, among other things, a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to accept petitioners' legal filings. Respondents did not dispute the rejection of petitioners' legal filings but replied that they were ethically prohibited from accepting the same based upon an advisory opinion from the State Commission on Judicial Conduct. Respondents also filed a motion to seal the advisory opinion, which motion petitioners opposed and Supreme Court ultimately denied. Following a hearing, Supreme Court found that the Clerk failed to perform her mandatory duty and, accordingly, granted the petition to compel respondents to accept petitioners' filings.

Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (see CPLR article 86 [hereinafter the EAJA]) to recover related counsel fees and expenses. Respondents opposed the motion arguing that the EAJA was inapplicable because the Clerk was not an officer of the state within the meaning of the statute and that, in any event, the Clerk's actions were proper and petitioners' counsel fees were unreasonable. Supreme Court disagreed and found that the EAJA was applicable and, further, that the clerk's actions were not substantially justified. Accordingly, and as petitioners' counsel fees were deemed to be reasonable, the court awarded counsel fees and expenses to petitioners. Respondents appeal.^FN1

At the outset, we reject respondents' contention that a town court clerk is, by definition, not an agent of the state within the meaning of the EAJA (see CPLR 8602 [g]). Initially, we are unpersuaded by respondents' argument that the EAJA is inapplicable to town justice courts because of their limited jurisdiction and the fact that their employees are not employed by the state, as the State Constitution includes town courts within the unified court system (see NY Const, art VI, § 1 [a]). Turning to the language of the statute itself, the term "[s]tate" is defined under the EAJA as "the state or any of its agencies or any of its officials acting in his or her official capacity" (CPLR 8602 [g]). "Local officials and administrators may be deemed agents of the state" in the context of the EAJA, and "[s]uch a determination is made on a case-by-case basis upon examination of the applicable statutory authority and nature of the entity" (Matter of Brown v City of Schenectady, 209 AD3d 128, 132 [3d Dept 2022]). To this end, given the EAJA's remedial purpose, it "should be liberally construed to carry out the reforms [*2]intended and to promote justice, and interpreted broadly to accomplish its goals" and, thus, "we may not read into it any limitations that are not clearly expressed" (Matter of Markey v Tietz, 244 AD3d 78, 86 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Pertinent here, a determination as to whether a clerk is a state or local official rests upon "the nature of the act which is the subject of the suit," as a clerk may be determined to be a state officer when performing "acts that are in themselves a part of the judicial system" (National Westminster Bank, USA v State of New York, 76 NY2d 507, 509 [1990] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see J. Ellrott Excavating Contrs. v State of New York, 247 AD2d 705, 705-706 [3d Dept 1998]). Here, the underlying action is premised upon the Clerk's refusal of petitioners' legal filings. Given that petitioners' filings in a summary eviction proceeding are unquestionably "part of the judicial process" (National Westminster Bank, USA v State of New York, 76 NY2d at 509), Supreme Court did not err in concluding that the Clerk acted as a state official and, thus, in applying the EAJA in this proceeding.

We similarly find unavailing respondents' challenge to Supreme Court's award of counsel fees. As is pertinent here, the EAJA provides that "a court shall award to a prevailing party, other than the state, fees and other expenses incurred by such party in any civil action brought against the state, unless the court finds that the position of the state was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust" (CPLR 8601 [a] [emphasis added]; see Matter of Markey v Tietz, 244 AD3d at 80). The determinative inquiry is whether the challenged actions are "justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person, or hav[e] a reasonable basis both in law and fact" (Matter of New York State Clinical Lab. Assn. v Kaladjian, 85 NY2d 346, 356 [1995] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Brown v City of Schenectady, 209 AD3d at 133). A finding as to whether the state's position was substantially justified is "committed to the sound discretion of the court of first instance and is reviewable as an exercise of judicial discretion" (Matter of Vapor Tech. Assn. v. Cuomo, 203 AD3d 1516, 1517 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv dismissed 39 NY3d 960 [2022]; accord Matter of Walker v Martuscello, 248 AD3d 1619, 1621 [3d Dept 2026]).

It is uncontested that the Clerk rejected petitioners' legal filings. Respondents nevertheless assert that the Clerk was substantially justified in doing so because she was under the direction of her superiors. Significantly, however, "[a] clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose except where specifically directed to do so by statute or rules promulgated by the chief administrator of the courts, or order of the court" — the record here indicates that [*3]the Clerk merely received a verbal directive (CPLR 2102 [c] [emphasis added]). Upon this basis, we agree that the Clerk's refusal to accept petitioners' filings was not substantially justified inasmuch as she failed to perform her duty as clerk of the court without proper justification (see CPLR 2102 [c]; 8601 [a]). Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court's award of counsel fees and expenses to petitioners (see Matter of Walker v Martuscello, 248 AD3d at 1623; Matter of Brown v City of Schenectady, 209 AD3d at 135; Matter of Serio v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 215 AD2d 835, 836 [3d Dept 1995]). To the extent that respondents contend that special circumstances otherwise exist so as to render an award of counsel fees unjust based upon the Clerk's apparent good faith basis in refusing to accept petitioners' filings (see CPLR 8601 [a]), we reject this reasoning as it runs counter to both the remedial purpose of the EAJA and the court clerk's statutorily mandated duties (see CPLR 2102 [c]; Matter of Walker v Martuscello, 248 AD3d at 1624).

Finally, we find no error in Supreme Court's determination of counsel fees and expenses. Pursuant to CPLR 8601, "[a] party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall . . . submit . . . (1) the facts supporting the claim that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this section, (2) the amount sought, and (3) an itemized statement from every attorney or expert witness for whom fees or expenses are sought stating the actual time expended and the rate at which such fees and other expenses are claimed" (CPLR 8601 [b]). "The determination of what constitutes a reasonable [counsel] fee is a matter within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court. The attorney bears the burden of establishing the reasonable value of the services rendered, based upon a showing of the hours reasonably expended and the prevailing hourly rate for similar legal work in the community" (Matter of American Tr. Ins. Co. v Bay Ridge Surgi-Center, LLC, 243 AD3d 558, 559-560 [2d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). Petitioners' application and related submissions established that they were the prevailing parties and thus eligible to receive an award, identified the amount sought and provided an itemized statement, which tracked the services provided by two attorneys and a paralegal. Petitioners' proffered attorney affirmation further averred that the requested counsel fees were reasonable within the community, emphasizing that similar fee rates in other recent unrelated matters had been awarded. Upon this record, we conclude that Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in determining that the counsel fees and expenses sought were reasonable (see Klein v Wiley, 241 AD3d 808, 810 [2d Dept 2025]; Gertler v Davidoff Hutcher & Citron, LLP, 233 AD3d 846, 847-848 [2d Dept 2024]). Respondents' remaining contentions, to the extent not expressly [*4]addressed herein, have been considered and found to be without merit.

Ceresia, J.P., McShan and Ryba, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Footnotes

Footnote 1

We reject petitioners' arguments on the issue of appealability. Although no appeal lies as of right from a nonfinal order in a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see CPLR 5701 [b] [1]; Matter of Boyd v Cumbo, 210 AD3d 762, 762 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 905 [2023]), a final judgment is appealable as of right (see CPLR 5701 [a] [1]; see generally Matter of Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v Autorama Enters., Inc., 205 AD3d 1116, 1117 [3d Dept 2022]).

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