Matter of Malewicki

142 B.R. 353, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1094, 1992 WL 143761
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedMarch 31, 1992
Docket17-40450
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 142 B.R. 353 (Matter of Malewicki) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Malewicki, 142 B.R. 353, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1094, 1992 WL 143761 (Neb. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

JOHN C. MINAHAN, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

In this Chapter 13 case, debtor’s counsel, Mr. Clay Statmore, requests allowance of $1,750.00 in compensation under a flat fee agreement. The application is denied because the compensation sought is unreasonable.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Bankruptcy Code §§ 329 and 330, and Fed.R.Bankr.P. 2016(a), govern fee applications of attorneys. Under § 330, attorneys are to be allowed:

reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered ... based on the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, the time spent on such services, and the cost of comparable services other than in a case under this title....

Several federal circuit courts of appeal have applied a “lodestar analysis” in determining “reasonable compensation” under § 330. See In re Boddy, 950 F.2d 334, 338 (6th Cir.1991); In re Manoa Finance Co., Inc., 853 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir.1988); In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 785 F.2d 1249, 1257 (5th Cir.1986); Harman v. Levin, 772 F.2d 1150, 1153 (4th Cir.1985). I conclude that the lodestar analysis is appropriately applied in determining reasonable compensation of counsel under Code §§ 329, 330.

Under a lodestar analysis, the starting point for considering a fee application is to determine a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable amount of time expended. By multiplying the reasonable hourly rate by the time expended, one arrives at the lodestar sum. The twelve factors enumerated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974), may be considered in determining reasonable compensation. See In re McCombs, 751 F.2d 286 (8th Cir.1984); Bess v. Bess, 929 F.2d 1332, 1335 n. 6 (8th Cir.1991). The factors enumerated in Johnson are as follows:

1. The time and labor required;
2. The novelty and difficulty of the questions;
3. The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
4. The preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case;
5. The customary fee;
6. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
7. Time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
8. The amount involved and the results obtained;
9. The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys;
10. The “undesirability” of the case;
11. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and
12. Awards in similar cases.

Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.

In determining reasonable compensation under § 330, the court must calculate the lodestar amount and use it as a centerpiece for evaluation in light of the factors enumerated in the Johnson decision. There is some conceptual problem in application of the Johnson factors. Arguably the trial court should consider the factors in calculating the lodestar amount. Under this method, the lodestar amount is, by definition, reasonable compensation. Alternatively, the Johnson factors can be applied in evaluating whether compensation in the amount of the lodestar is reasonable. It really makes no difference whether the Johnson factors are applied in arriving at the lodestar amount or applied after *356 a lodestar amount is calculated. However, the Johnson factors should, obviously, only be applied once. For clarity, I will analyze fee applications by calculating a general lodestar using a reasonable hourly rate multiplied by actual time expended. I will then apply the Johnson factors to determine reasonable compensation under § 330.

Four additional points should be made about compensation under § 330. First, attorney fee applications in Chapter 13 cases are subject to the same statutory and regulatory requirements as are applications in other cases. Although there are some unique aspects of Chapter 13 cases, there is no basis in the Bankruptcy Code or the Bankruptcy Rules for suggesting that the standards for allowance of fees under § 330 are different in Chapter 13 than in other cases. Code § 330 applies in Chapter 7, 11, 12 and 13 with equal force. See § 103(a), In re Paul, 100 B.R. 38 (Bkrtcy.D.Colo.1989), Cf. In re Reed, 890 F.2d 104, 105 (8th Cir.1989) (court found no merit to suggestion that a distinction be drawn between fee applications in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases.)

Second, attorney fees paid from the bankruptcy estate should be allowed only to the extent that the estate is benefit-ted. If legal services benefit only the debt- or, the fees are not compensable from the bankruptcy estate, but remain the personal obligation of debtor. See, In re Reed, 95 B.R. 626 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Ark.1988), aff'd. 890 F.2d 104 (8th Cir.1989) (services in dis-chargeability proceedings not generally compensable from the bankruptcy estate). In a no-asset Chapter 13 case, where unsecured creditors are paid nothing, the legal services provided in connection with the case are of little benefit to the estate. No-asset, zero payment cases are quite common in Nebraska, and they almost exclusively benefit debtor, debtor’s counsel, and the Chapter 13 Trustee. Debtor receives the protection of the automatic stay under § 362, the ability to write down secured claims to collateral value under § 506 and the comprehensive discharge under § 1328. Debtor’s counsel gets paid fees from debt- or’s future earnings. The trustee receives a percentage fee under 28 U.S.C. § 586. These zero payment, no-asset cases pay nothing to unsecured creditors. The entire case serves little purpose except to permit deferred payment of attorney fees. If a debtor does not have $500.00 to $700.00 in cash, Chapter 7 is not a possible alternative because debtor’s counsel must be paid before filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Due to the limited benefit of legal services to the estate in no-asset, zero payment Chapter 13 cases, attorney compensation from the estate should be limited.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
142 B.R. 353, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1094, 1992 WL 143761, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-malewicki-nebraskab-1992.