Matter of Lindholm

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 15, 2024
• Docket: 24CA0805
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

24CA0805 Matter of Lindholm 08-15-2024

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0805

Kiowa County District Court No. 24MH1

Honorable Samuel S. Vigil, Judge

In the Matter of Laura Catherine Lindholm, Ward,

Kenneth Lindholm and Nora Elaine Lindholm,

Petitioners-Appellees,

v.

Laura Catherine Lindholm,

Respondent-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division IV

Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE*

Navarro and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)

Announced August 15, 2024

Steerman Law Offices PLLC, Donald L. Steerman, Lance P. Clark, Lamar,

Colorado, for Petitioners-Appellees

Randa Davis-Tice, Lamar, Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2023.

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¶ 1 Respondent, Laura Catherine Lindholm, appeals the district

court’s order granting her parents and legal guardians’ (petitioners)

request for the imposition of a legal disability or deprivation of legal

rights pursuant to section 27-65-127, C.R.S. 2023. We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 In January 2024, petitioners filed a petition to impose a legal

disability on Lindholm and deprive her of her legal rights to

determine her place of residence and make her own decisions for

medical treatment. According to the petition, Lindholm had been

diagnosed with schizophrenia, refused to take prescribed

medication, and exhibited signs of paranoia and delusional

thoughts. The district court granted a temporary imposition of legal

disability and deprivation of legal rights, and Lindholm was placed

in an inpatient treatment facility.

¶ 3 In February 2024, the district court issued an order for the

imposition of a legal disability and deprivation of legal rights, and

the matter was set for a review hearing so that Lindholm, who had a

new attorney appointed, could present additional evidence opposing

the court’s order. After the hearing, the court concluded that its

prior order should remain in place and set the matter for a review

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hearing in April. The court found that (1) Lindholm has “a mental

health disorder,” “is a danger to herself or others,” and “is gravely

disabled”; and (2) “the requested disability or deprivation being

proposed” — the rights to determine her place of residence and

decision making for medical treatment — were “necessary and

desirable.” The court made these findings after hearing testimony

from Lindholm, as well as her treating psychiatrist, mother, former

counselor, and former employer.

¶ 4 In April 2024, Lindholm’s treating psychiatrist advised the

district court that while he remained concerned about her mental

condition and her willingness to take medication, inpatient

treatment was no longer necessary. Rather, placement with the

petitioners was the least restrictive placement option for her.

Lindholm objected to a continuation of the court’s legal disability

and deprivation of legal rights order. She did not object to leaving

the inpatient treatment facility but said she was agreeable to living

with the petitioners only until she got “back on her feet.” She also

objected to any order requiring her to participate in outpatient

treatment or take forced medications.

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¶ 5 After hearing from both sides, the court reaffirmed its prior

findings, noting that the findings and the requirements in the

orders were “still valid and appropriate,” and continued its

imposition of legal disability and deprivation of legal rights order.

But the court modified the order so that Lindholm could be

discharged from inpatient treatment and reside with the petitioners.

And, as relevant here, the court ordered that Lindholm (1) “not

travel to the state of Nebraska without the petitioners”; (2) “engage

in outpatient [therapeutic] services”; and (3) comply with “any

recommended treatment under her discharge plan,” including

taking “any prescribed medication as recommended by the

outpatient facility” and “forced medication if necessary.”

II. Discussion

¶ 6 Lindholm contends that the district court’s order depriving her

of her legal right to determine her place of residence, make her own

medical treatment decisions, and travel is not supported by the

record. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 7 Where, as here, a person challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the court’s finding on any one of the elements

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outlined in section 27-65-127(2), we review the court’s conclusions

of law de novo and defer to its factual findings if supported by the

evidence. See People v. Marquardt, 2016 CO 4, ¶ 8. Where ample

record evidence supports the court’s findings and conclusions

based on clear and convicting evidence, we may not substitute our

judgment for that of the district court. See People in Interest of

A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 255 (Colo. 2010).

B. Analysis

¶ 8 Under the statutory scheme governing mental health care and

treatment, any interested person may petition the district court to

impose a legal disability or deprive another of a legal right. § 27-65-

127(1)(a). An order under section 27-65-127 is permitted only

where a court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the

subject person (1) has a mental health disorder and is either a

danger to themselves or others, is gravely disabled, or is insane;

and (2) the requested disability or deprivation is both necessary and

desirable. § 27-65-127(2), (5)(d).

¶ 9 Lindholm argues that the district court erred by finding that

she was a danger to herself or others because nothing in her

psychological history indicated that this was so, and her treating

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psychiatrist testified otherwise at the March 2024 hearing. But the

relevant statute required the court to find that she “is a danger to

[her]self or others, is gravely disabled, or is insane.” § 27-65-

127(2)(a) (emphasis added). And the court made a finding — which

Lindholm does not challenge on appeal — that she is gravely

disabled. Thus, her argument necessarily fails. See Lombard v.

Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 571 (Colo. 2008) (the

use of the word “or” in a statute marks distinctive categories).

¶ 10 Even so, the district court had ample evidence to support its

conclusion that Lindholm is a danger to herself or others. Her

former employer testified that Lindholm “developed . . . an alternate

reality in her head that [he was] in love with her” despite being

“happily married” with “two small children.” He testified that she

had sent “dozens and dozens and dozens of text messages and

voicemails” professing her love to him and “thinks that [his] two

young children are actually her children.” Asked if he had concerns

about his family’s safety, he responded that he did. He “installed

security cameras all around [his] house,” had “a restraining order

ready to file if and when she ever does arrive back in Hastings,” and

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noted that she is still in contact with him, having sent a message to

him “in the last three days.”

¶ 11 Lindholm’s treating psychiatrist also testified that before being

placed in the inpatient facility, Lindholm “was found in a dangerous

situation several times,” including reports that she was found “in

the middle of the street when she was walking her dog and that she

had no (words jumbled) in what she was doing.” Another time, he

testified, “she was found in the middle of, I believe, another state,

Kansas or Nebraska.” The court, relying on this testimony, found

that Lindholm was a danger to herself and to others, and the record

is sufficient to support these findings.

¶ 12 Having concluded that the record supports the district court’s

findings as to “danger to herself or others” and given that Lindholm

does not challenge any of the other elements in section 27-65-

127(2), her remaining contentions necessarily fail. Indeed,

Lindholm does not argue that the court acted outside of its

authority under section 27-65-127 when it deprived her of her

“right to reside and travel where she wants” or her “right to physical

autonomy.” Cf. People v. Pflugbeil, 834 P.2d 843, 848-49 (Colo.

App. 1992) (considering whether an interested person may petition

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the court for an order to deprive a person of their legal right to

weapons and concluding that section 27-65-127, formerly section

27-10-125, confers such authority).

¶ 13 To the extent Lindholm argues that the district court’s

conditions are unconstitutional restrictions on her rights to reside

and travel where she wants or her right to bodily autonomy, these

claims are unpreserved. Lindholm never raised a constitutional

objection to the court’s conditions related to her care, residence,

travel, or forced medication. So we will not address these claims.

See People v. Cagle, 751 P.2d 614, 619 (Colo. 1988) (“It is axiomatic

that this court will not consider constitutional issues raised for the

first time on appeal.”); see also Colgan v. State, Dep’t of Revenue,

623 P.2d 871, 874 (Colo. 1981) (same). And we decline to address

Lindholm’s undeveloped assertion that conditions “4 and 5 on page

4” of one of the court’s orders are “duplicative, and likely to cause

confusion for the provider or the Appellant.” See People v. Lowe,

2021 CO 51, ¶ 20 n.4. (appellate court will not address undeveloped

assertions of error lacking support in legal authority).

III. Disposition

¶ 14 The order is affirmed.

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JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.