25CA0622 Matter of Leoffler Trust 03-12-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0622 Kit Carson County District Court No. 24PR13 Honorable Stephanie M.G. Gagliano, Judge
In the Matter of Jerry Leoffler Trust.
Cortney Hancock,
Appellant,
v.
Shane Leoffler,
Appellee.
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Yun and Taubman*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 12, 2026
Cortney Hancock, Pro Se
Coan, Payton & Payne, LLC, Scott H. Challinor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3) and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Petitioner, Cortney Hancock, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of her petition for a writ of mandamus and her “Motion
for Removal of Trustee” filed against defendant, Shane Leoffler. We
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
¶2 At the heart of this appeal is Hancock’s claim that she is Jerry
Leoffler’s1 daughter and, as such, is entitled to benefit from his
trust (the Trust). If Hancock is Jerry’s daughter, she is an
interested party in the Trust and has standing to pursue at least
some of her claims against Shane. If not, at least some of her
claims must be dismissed for lack of standing.
¶3 Based only on Hancock’s pleadings and Shane’s motion to
dismiss, the district court dismissed Hancock’s petition for a writ of
mandamus and her motion for removal of the trustee, apparently
finding as a factual matter that Hancock is not Jerry’s daughter.
Because the allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true
1 Jerry shares the same last name as Shane Leoffler, the
respondent-appellee in this proceeding. As such, we refer to them by their first names and mean no disrespect in doing so.
1 at this stage of the proceedings, we conclude that the dismissal was
improper.
I. Background
¶4 After Jerry’s grandparents died, the Trust was created for
Jerry. Shane Leoffler became the trustee. Under the terms of the
Trust, if Jerry died before the final distribution, the remaining
income would go to his living descendants, or if he had no living
descendants, to descendants of Jerry’s grandparents.
¶5 Jerry died in December 2022. Before his death, he granted
Hancock power of attorney authorizing her to do “everything
necessary in [his] name and for [his] benefit which [he] could do if
[he] were personally present and able.” Hancock and Jerry had
discussed Jerry’s assets and wishes concerning his estate; and
while Jerry was still alive, Hancock attempted to contact Shane to
access information about the Trust and to remove him as trustee.
2 ¶6 After Jerry’s death, his will was admitted to probate. In his
will, Jerry identified Hancock as one of his children2 and named her
as his personal representative.
¶7 Two years after Jerry’s death, Hancock — acting pro se — filed
several pleadings concerning the Trust. First, she petitioned to
compel Shane to provide annual reports, statements, and
accountings related to the Trust; provide “all sections” of the Trust
that affect her as Jerry’s child; and distribute the Trust assets to
her. Second, she filed a motion to remove Shane as the trustee of
the Trust. Third, she filed a motion to inspect and copy documents
related to the Trust.
¶8 Shane moved to dismiss Hancock’s pleadings. Hancock did
not file a response, and the district court granted Shane’s motion.
Specifically, the court concluded that Hancock (1) was not an
interested party as to the Trust; (2) lacked standing to bring an
action against Shane; and (3) did not have standing to seek court
intervention regarding the administration of the Trust or to view,
2 Jerry’s will lists “Courtney Irene Hancock” as one of his children,
misspelling Hancock’s first name as “Courtney.” There appears to be no dispute, however, that this is a reference to petitioner Cortney Hancock.
3 access, or receive any information regarding the Trust. Hancock
now appeals the dismissal.
II. Analysis
¶9 In her opening brief on appeal, Hancock contends that (1) she
has standing to seek relief as Jerry’s daughter and via the power of
attorney; (2) the district court demonstrated bias against her; and
(3) the district court violated her due process rights. We conclude
that Hancock’s allegations about her parentage in her petition for
writ of mandamus and her accompanying motion for removal of the
trustee were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, and on
this ground, we reverse. For the reasons explained below, we do
not reach Hancock’s remaining appellate arguments.
4 A. Standing
¶ 10 Hancock contends that as Jerry’s daughter, she has standing
to bring an action against Shane related to the Trust.3 We agree.4
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 11 For a court to have jurisdiction over a dispute, the plaintiff
must have standing. Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo.
2004). To establish standing, (1) a plaintiff must have suffered an
injury in fact, and (2) the injury must have been to a legally
protected interest. Id. If a plaintiff lacks standing, a court must
dismiss the case. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ. v.
Olson, 687 P.2d 429, 435 (Colo. 1984). We review de novo whether
a plaintiff has standing. Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856.
¶ 12 We apply the same pleading standards to mandamus actions
as we do to complaints. Hansen v. Long, 166 P.3d 248, 249 (Colo.
3 Although Hancock’s standing argument violates several
requirements of C.A.R. 28, Hancock is self-represented, so we construe her arguments broadly, focusing on substance rather than form. See Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. We exercise our discretion to address Hancock’s standing argument to the extent that we understand it. 4 Because we conclude that Hancock has standing as Jerry’s
daughter, we do not reach her argument that she has standing as Jerry’s power of attorney.
5 App. 2007). Therefore, when assessing whether she has standing,
we accept as true Hancock’s factual allegations in the petition for a
writ of mandamus and the motion for removal of the trustee. See
Colo. Med. Soc’y v. Hickenlooper, 2012 COA 121, ¶ 23 (“In
determining whether standing has been established, all averments
of material fact in a complaint must be accepted as true.” (quoting
Olson, 687 P.2d at 434)), aff’d on other grounds, 2015 CO 41.
2. Injury in Fact
¶ 13 Hancock alleged that she suffered an injury in fact. See
Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856. While a remote possibility or future
speculation of harm does not constitute an injury in fact, Hancock
averred she has suffered both tangible and intangible harms.
Specifically, she contends Shane has denied her access to
information related to the Trust and to assets in the Trust.
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25CA0622 Matter of Leoffler Trust 03-12-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0622 Kit Carson County District Court No. 24PR13 Honorable Stephanie M.G. Gagliano, Judge
In the Matter of Jerry Leoffler Trust.
Cortney Hancock,
Appellant,
v.
Shane Leoffler,
Appellee.
ORDER REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Yun and Taubman*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 12, 2026
Cortney Hancock, Pro Se
Coan, Payton & Payne, LLC, Scott H. Challinor, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3) and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Petitioner, Cortney Hancock, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of her petition for a writ of mandamus and her “Motion
for Removal of Trustee” filed against defendant, Shane Leoffler. We
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
¶2 At the heart of this appeal is Hancock’s claim that she is Jerry
Leoffler’s1 daughter and, as such, is entitled to benefit from his
trust (the Trust). If Hancock is Jerry’s daughter, she is an
interested party in the Trust and has standing to pursue at least
some of her claims against Shane. If not, at least some of her
claims must be dismissed for lack of standing.
¶3 Based only on Hancock’s pleadings and Shane’s motion to
dismiss, the district court dismissed Hancock’s petition for a writ of
mandamus and her motion for removal of the trustee, apparently
finding as a factual matter that Hancock is not Jerry’s daughter.
Because the allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true
1 Jerry shares the same last name as Shane Leoffler, the
respondent-appellee in this proceeding. As such, we refer to them by their first names and mean no disrespect in doing so.
1 at this stage of the proceedings, we conclude that the dismissal was
improper.
I. Background
¶4 After Jerry’s grandparents died, the Trust was created for
Jerry. Shane Leoffler became the trustee. Under the terms of the
Trust, if Jerry died before the final distribution, the remaining
income would go to his living descendants, or if he had no living
descendants, to descendants of Jerry’s grandparents.
¶5 Jerry died in December 2022. Before his death, he granted
Hancock power of attorney authorizing her to do “everything
necessary in [his] name and for [his] benefit which [he] could do if
[he] were personally present and able.” Hancock and Jerry had
discussed Jerry’s assets and wishes concerning his estate; and
while Jerry was still alive, Hancock attempted to contact Shane to
access information about the Trust and to remove him as trustee.
2 ¶6 After Jerry’s death, his will was admitted to probate. In his
will, Jerry identified Hancock as one of his children2 and named her
as his personal representative.
¶7 Two years after Jerry’s death, Hancock — acting pro se — filed
several pleadings concerning the Trust. First, she petitioned to
compel Shane to provide annual reports, statements, and
accountings related to the Trust; provide “all sections” of the Trust
that affect her as Jerry’s child; and distribute the Trust assets to
her. Second, she filed a motion to remove Shane as the trustee of
the Trust. Third, she filed a motion to inspect and copy documents
related to the Trust.
¶8 Shane moved to dismiss Hancock’s pleadings. Hancock did
not file a response, and the district court granted Shane’s motion.
Specifically, the court concluded that Hancock (1) was not an
interested party as to the Trust; (2) lacked standing to bring an
action against Shane; and (3) did not have standing to seek court
intervention regarding the administration of the Trust or to view,
2 Jerry’s will lists “Courtney Irene Hancock” as one of his children,
misspelling Hancock’s first name as “Courtney.” There appears to be no dispute, however, that this is a reference to petitioner Cortney Hancock.
3 access, or receive any information regarding the Trust. Hancock
now appeals the dismissal.
II. Analysis
¶9 In her opening brief on appeal, Hancock contends that (1) she
has standing to seek relief as Jerry’s daughter and via the power of
attorney; (2) the district court demonstrated bias against her; and
(3) the district court violated her due process rights. We conclude
that Hancock’s allegations about her parentage in her petition for
writ of mandamus and her accompanying motion for removal of the
trustee were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss, and on
this ground, we reverse. For the reasons explained below, we do
not reach Hancock’s remaining appellate arguments.
4 A. Standing
¶ 10 Hancock contends that as Jerry’s daughter, she has standing
to bring an action against Shane related to the Trust.3 We agree.4
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 11 For a court to have jurisdiction over a dispute, the plaintiff
must have standing. Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo.
2004). To establish standing, (1) a plaintiff must have suffered an
injury in fact, and (2) the injury must have been to a legally
protected interest. Id. If a plaintiff lacks standing, a court must
dismiss the case. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. & Occupational Educ. v.
Olson, 687 P.2d 429, 435 (Colo. 1984). We review de novo whether
a plaintiff has standing. Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856.
¶ 12 We apply the same pleading standards to mandamus actions
as we do to complaints. Hansen v. Long, 166 P.3d 248, 249 (Colo.
3 Although Hancock’s standing argument violates several
requirements of C.A.R. 28, Hancock is self-represented, so we construe her arguments broadly, focusing on substance rather than form. See Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. We exercise our discretion to address Hancock’s standing argument to the extent that we understand it. 4 Because we conclude that Hancock has standing as Jerry’s
daughter, we do not reach her argument that she has standing as Jerry’s power of attorney.
5 App. 2007). Therefore, when assessing whether she has standing,
we accept as true Hancock’s factual allegations in the petition for a
writ of mandamus and the motion for removal of the trustee. See
Colo. Med. Soc’y v. Hickenlooper, 2012 COA 121, ¶ 23 (“In
determining whether standing has been established, all averments
of material fact in a complaint must be accepted as true.” (quoting
Olson, 687 P.2d at 434)), aff’d on other grounds, 2015 CO 41.
2. Injury in Fact
¶ 13 Hancock alleged that she suffered an injury in fact. See
Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856. While a remote possibility or future
speculation of harm does not constitute an injury in fact, Hancock
averred she has suffered both tangible and intangible harms.
Specifically, she contends Shane has denied her access to
information related to the Trust and to assets in the Trust. She
also alleges that Shane has violated her rights as an interested
party in the Trust. As alleged in the complaint, these injuries have
directly resulted from Shane’s actions and are neither speculative
nor incidental. Therefore, Hancock has alleged facts sufficient to
satisfy the first criterion for standing.
6 3. Legally Protected Interest
¶ 14 Hancock also adequately alleged that she has “a legal interest
protecting against the alleged injury.” Id.
¶ 15 The Colorado Uniform Trust Code recognizes the right of any
“interested person” to bring probate matters before the court. § 15-
5-201(1), C.R.S. 2025; see In re Estate of Little, 2018 COA 169,
¶ 38. An “interested person” is “a qualified beneficiary or other
person having a property right in or claim against a trust estate,
which right or claim may reasonably and materially be affected by a
judicial proceeding.” § 15-5-103(10), C.R.S. 2025. An interested
person “also includes fiduciaries and other persons having
authority to act under the terms of the trust.” Id. A “beneficiary” is
a person who either “[h]as a present or future beneficial interest in
a trust, vested or contingent,” or “holds a power of appointment
over trust property” in a capacity other than as trustee. § 15-5-
103(4)(a).
¶ 16 Jerry’s living descendants — to the extent that he has any —
are beneficiaries of the Trust and therefore interested persons. In
7 her complaint, Hancock alleges that she is Jerry’s daughter.5
Shane disputed that allegation in his motion to dismiss, asserting
“[u]pon information and belief” that Hancock is neither a “naturally
born nor adopted child[] of Jerry.” And on appeal, Shane asserts
that the record includes only “conclusory, unsupported references”
by Hancock that Jerry was her father. But the district court was
required to accept as true the facts Hancock alleged in her
complaint when deciding whether to dismiss the action. See
Hansen, 166 P.3d at 249.
¶ 17 Moreover, we cannot assume that Hancock has confessed to
not being Jerry’s daughter simply because she failed to respond to
the motion to dismiss. Cf. Hemmann Mgmt. Servs. v. Mediacell, Inc.,
176 P.3d 856, 858 (Colo. App. 2007) (“We conclude that, like
motions for summary judgment, motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim must be considered on their merits and cannot be
deemed confessed by a failure to respond.”).
5 Although it has no bearing on our analysis, given that we must
accept Hancock’s well-pleaded facts as true, we note that Jerry’s will also identifies Hancock as his daughter.
8 ¶ 18 If, as she alleges in the complaint, Hancock is Jerry’s living
descendant, she is a beneficiary of the Trust. That status would
make her an interested party and thus establish that her petition
for a writ of mandamus and motion to remove the trustee involve a
legally protected interest.
¶ 19 Accordingly, because Hancock has alleged that she suffered an
injury in fact to a legally protected interest, we must reverse.
B. Unpreserved Arguments
¶ 20 Turning to the remaining issues on appeal, we decline to
consider Hancock’s bias and due process arguments for three
reasons. First, Hancock raised these arguments for the first time
after filing her notice of appeal, in a “Motion to[] Object to Order
Dismissing Case and all Other Forms Denied.” Although the
district court treated this filing as a motion to reconsider its order of
dismissal, it no longer had jurisdiction to consider the motion after
the notice of appeal was filed. See Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d
244, 246 (Colo. 2006) (filing a notice of appeal generally divests the
district court of jurisdiction to take further substantive action
related to the judgment on appeal). Second, to the extent that
Hancock requested a change of venue or judicial disqualification in
9 this motion, she failed to file supporting affidavits as required by
C.R.C.P. 98 (change of venue) or C.R.C.P. 97 (judicial
disqualification). Third, Hancock’s appellate briefing inadequately
developed her bias and due process arguments, failing to comply
with C.A.R. 28. See Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d
582, 604 (Colo. App. 2007) (appellate courts do not address
underdeveloped arguments).
C. Attorney Fees
¶ 21 Shane contends that Hancock’s appeal is frivolous, and as
such, he is entitled to attorney fees and costs. Given our
disposition, we decline to award Shane attorney fees and costs.
III. Disposition
¶ 22 We reverse the district court’s order of dismissal and remand
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUDGE YUN and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.