February 2 2016
DA 15-0160
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2016 MT 27
IN THE MATTER OF:
K.A., A.A., & A. A.,
Youths in Need of Care.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, In and For the County of Glacier, Cause Nos. DN 13-01, DN 13-02, DN 13-03 Honorable Robert G. Olson, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Nancy G. Schwartz, N.G. Schwartz Law, PLLC; Billings, Montana
For Appellee:
Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant Attorney General; Helena, Montana
Emily Von Jentzen, Assistant Attorney General, Child Protection Unit; Kalispell, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 18, 2015
Decided: February 2, 2016
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 The Ninth Judicial District Court, Glacier County, entered an order terminating the
parental rights of the birth father (Father) to his three minor children, K.A., A.A., and
A.A. Father appeals the District Court’s decision. We affirm, and address the following
restated issue on appeal:
¶2 Did the District Court err in terminating Father’s parental rights?
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
¶3 The subject family consists of Father, the birth mother (Mother), and three minor
children, ages seven, two and one, respectively, at the time of removal. Concerns were
initially raised regarding this family in early 2013, when the Department of Public Health
and Human Services (DPHHS or Department) received anonymous reports about the
parents using methamphetamines “as often as they can get their hands on it,” and reports
of physical violence in front of the children. Stephanie Moran (Moran), a social worker,
met with the oldest child, K.A., at school on March 7, 2013. K.A. appeared to be clean
and adequately dressed, and spoke highly of his parents, but mentioned that the family
had moved a lot and that his father had lost his job. Moran reviewed K.A.’s school
attendance record, and found that he had a significant number of absences and tardies.
K.A. explained to Moran that his mother was not waking up in time to get K.A. off to
school.
¶4 Moran again met with K.A. at school on March 26, 2013, and K.A. told the case
worker that he had not eaten breakfast that day because there was very little food in the 2 home, and he wasn’t sure he was going to eat dinner that night. K.A. also described
physical violence between his parents, but denied that Father was physically violent
towards him. During this interview, Moran noted with some concern that K.A.’s clothes
were dirty and that his shoes had no soles on them and appeared to be falling apart.
¶5 On the same day, Moran made contact with Mother. The family was living in a
motel room at this point and Moran observed only a jar of peanut butter and a can of chili
on top of the refrigerator, and only bottled water in the refrigerator. Mother told the case
worker that the family was out of money and out of public assistance funds until after the
first of the month. Later that day, Moran returned to the motel room to meet with both
Mother and Father, and questioned both parents about reports of their drug use. Both
parents admitted to using methamphetamine within the past two months, and Father
admitted to current use of cannabis and alcohol. When Moran asked, both parents agreed
to submit to a urinalysis (UA) test that afternoon. When neither parent showed up for the
scheduled UA, Moran returned to the motel.
¶6 No one answered the door when Moran knocked, although she knew the family
was at home because she had seen K.A. arrive there from school, and she could hear the
television and a baby crying from within the room. Fearing for the children’s well-being,
and due to the lack of cooperation by the parents, Moran contacted law enforcement, who
eventually forced open the door to the motel room. Once inside, Moran informed the
parents that she was removing the children. Moran testified that Father became very
upset, “bouncing all over” the motel room, yelling and screaming with his hands raised. 3 Moran believed that Father’s behaviors were consistent with being under the influence of
methamphetamine. All three children sat on the bed next to their mother, crying. Backup
law enforcement officers were called to the scene; at one point the officers pulled out
their Tasers to prevent a physical altercation with Father when he stood on the bed.
Moran and law enforcement removed the children from the premises.
¶7 The next day, Father had been arrested on a charge of disorderly conduct arising
out of an incident separate from removal of the children, and was unavailable for a UA.
Mother submitted to a UA that day and tested positive for cannabis, methamphetamine,
and Ecstasy. On April 2, 2013, DPHHS filed a petition seeking emergency protective
authority, adjudication of the children as youth in need of care, and temporary legal
custody. Attached to the petition was Moran’s affidavit, which averred that Father and
Mother did not have the resources to meet the basic needs of their children, that both
parents were violent and aggressive, and that both parents were currently unable or
unwilling to perform parental duties and responsibilities. The District Court promptly
granted emergency protective custody, and an adjudicatory hearing was held on April 17.
¶8 At the hearing, Moran provided testimony concerning the above facts to the
District Court. She added that Mother had failed to appear for UAs on two separate
occasions since the children were removed, but that Mother and Father had provided a
UA on April 6, 2013, and both tests were negative for illegal substances. Father testified
that he and Mother had never used drugs in front of the children, that he had never
physically abused Mother or the children, and that at the time the children were removed, 4 there had been food in the freezer in the motel room. However, the District Court found
that both parents had failed to take drug tests when requested, failed to provide for the
basic needs of the children, abused the children by using illegal drugs, specifically
methamphetamine, neglected to have K.A. attend school regularly, and that returning the
children to the home would place them in unreasonable risk of harm. The court
adjudicated all children as youths in need of care, granted temporary legal custody to
DPHHS, and ordered that treatment plans be developed.
¶9 On June 4, 2013, the District Court signed treatment plans for both Mother and
Father, each of which stated a primary goal of reunifying the children with their parents.
At the time the plans were signed, Mother had engaged in initial services, but Father had
not. The plan required Father to obtain a chemical dependency evaluation and follow all
recommendations of that evaluation, and listed as a specific goal to maintain sobriety for
“a period of six months.” In addition, the Treatment Plan required Father to obtain
individual counseling to address mental health issues, to complete parenting and anger
management classes, and to stay in regular contact with Moran.
¶10 In early August 2013, DPHHS placed the children with Mother, who was then
living with her parents, for a trial home visit. Since that date, the children have remained
with Mother. In October 2013, DPHHS filed a petition to extend temporary legal custody
of the children for another six months in order to allow the parents more time to complete
their treatment plans. At that point, Father had completed in-patient treatment at
Montana Chemical Dependency Center, but had not yet begun out-patient treatment, 5 mental health counseling, or parenting and anger management classes. Upon a
stipulation of all the parties, the District Court granted an order extending temporary legal
custody for another six months.
¶11 In April 2014, DPHHS again requested an extension of temporary legal custody,
given developments in the case, and a hearing was held in May 2014. Moran testified
that, although Father had completed his chemical dependency evaluation, was
participating in classes again (after having stopped for a period of time), and had
completed anger management and parenting classes, he had returned to using alcohol.
He was arrested for fighting at a bar and creating a disturbance in April 2014, and had
brought “turmoil within the home.” Father “went back to the home knowing that he had
just been arrested,” causing the District Court to express concerns about his drug and
alcohol use and for the family’s safety. Because Father and Mother were living together
at this point with the children, Moran expressed concern about turmoil in the home and
Mother’s ability to display her protective capacity, concluding that DPHHS wanted
additional time to monitor the family situation. Moran reported that Mother had made
progress in her Treatment Plan, but that DPHHS still had some lingering concerns,
specifically, that while Mother displayed that she was able to recognize threats to her and
her children, a question remained about whether Mother was able to actually assert her
protective role. The District Court granted DPHHS’ petition, noting the family had made
progress, but that DPHHS still had reason to be involved, especially in light of Father’s
recent setbacks in treatment. The results of Father’s recent UA had not yet been returned, 6 and Moran testified that if the UA was positive, the Department believed Father should
live separately from the family. The District Court stated that Father had made a serious
mistake in continuing to consume alcohol but that, before the Department could remove
the children or either parent from the home, the court would conduct an emergency
hearing.
¶12 DPHHS received the results of Father’s drug test on June 19, 2014, which
indicated that he had been using alcohol, methamphetamine, and amphetamines. Days
later, DPHHS filed an expedited motion requesting that the District Court order Father to
move from the family residence. The District Court held a hearing on July 2 and Father
testified that he had been taking cold medication at the time of the drug test, and had not
used methamphetamine, to which the District Court responded:
I don’t believe you. Point blank. I don’t believe that you didn’t use methamphetamines, I think you got up here and lied. I am just gonna say it point blank. I think that’s what you did. The Court would have had a much easier time with being less restrictive if you had owned your actions, took responsibility and tried to do something to prevent it from happening again and that’s not what I heard.
Despite testimony that Father had already moved out of the house, the District Court
ordered that Father live separately from the family until further order of the court, and
that the visits between him and the children be supervised. The District Court also
ordered that Mother begin work on a supplemental treatment plan, focusing on obtaining
financial independence from Father, before the next hearing.
7 ¶13 A week later, on July 9, 2014, Father showed up at the family residence
intoxicated. When Mother asked him to leave, he refused. Mother called police to
remove Father from the premises, reporting that, while Father was not physically violent,
she wanted him removed. Mother did not advise police that Father was there in violation
of a court order. Father left the premises before police were able to make contact with
him.
¶14 Mother filed an objection to the supplemental treatment plan and a motion to
dismiss the proceeding on August 18, 2014. At a hearing in September 2014, the drug
testing agency testified that it was having problems obtaining drug tests because Father
was evading the testing. Testimony was also taken that Father had been unsuccessfully
discharged from his out-patient chemical dependency treatment program, had failed to
stay in contact with DPHHS, had failed to notify DPHHS of his address changes, and had
stopped participating in his treatment plan at all. The District Court continued the
restriction on Father living in the family residence, and also took Mother’s motion to
dismiss under advisement.
¶15 DPHHS filed its own motion to dismiss in November 2014. DPHHS’ motion
sought to dismiss the case as to both Mother and Father, but to place continuing
restrictions on Father, specifically, prohibiting Father from unsupervised contact with his
children until he had completed UA testing, mental health treatment, and chemical
dependency treatment. DPHHS’ motion stated that only Mother had met the “minimum
standards for appropriate parenting at this time.” 8 ¶16 Mother and Father responded by filing objections to any continuing restrictions
upon Father and a joint motion to dismiss the proceeding as against both of them, relying
on Mother’s progress under her treatment plan. Mother and Father argued that “mother
has demonstrated she can adequately protect the children,” “the children are safe,” and “it
is therefore illogical to argue that additional restrictions are needed to protect the
children.” In its reply, DPHHS requested that, alternatively, if the District Court did not
grant its motion to dismiss against Mother and impose restrictions upon Father, that the
District Court grant DPHHS leave to pursue termination of Father’s parental rights.
Stating that it lacked authority to impose continuing restrictions upon the parties after
dismissal, the District Court granted leave for DPHHS to petition the court for
termination of Father’s parental rights, which it did.
¶17 The District Court conducted a hearing on the petition for termination of Father’s
parental rights in January 2015. Father was represented by counsel but did not attend the
hearing. Moran testified to the Department’s concerns with Father, including his
unaddressed chemical dependency, including his positive testing for alcohol and
methamphetamines, his lack of compliance with his court-ordered treatment plan, his
complete disengagement from services, and his lack of any contact with the Department
since September of 2014.
¶18 In terminating Father’s parental rights, the District Court found that Father had
completed several treatment plan tasks, but that “the treatment plan has not been
successful in addressing birth father’s issues with chemical dependency and mental 9 health which led to the children’s removal in this matter.” Also noting that Father
“stopped participating in Department services over seven months ago and failed to attend
the hearing despite having notice,” the District Court reasoned that Father’s condition
was “unlikely to change within a reasonable time” based on his unresolved chemical
dependency and mental health issues, and that continuation of the parental relationship
would likely result in continued abuse or neglect of the children, concluding that Father’s
behavior “convinces the Court that continuation of the parent-child legal relationship is
not in the children’s best interests.” The District Court granted DPHHS’ motion to
dismiss with respect to Mother. Father appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶19 This Court reviews a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights for an
abuse of discretion. In re E.Z.C., 2013 MT 123, ¶ 19, 370 Mont. 116, 300 P.3d 1174
(citing In re T.W.F., 2009 MT 207, ¶ 17, 351 Mont. 233, 210 P.3d 174).
A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or in excess of the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. This Court will not disturb a district court’s decision on appeal unless “there is a mistake of law or a finding of fact not supported by substantial evidence that would amount to a clear abuse of discretion.” We review a district court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct.
In re T.S., 2013 MT 274, ¶ 21, 372 Mont. 79, 310 P.3d 538 (quoting In re D.B., 2012 MT
231, ¶ 17, 366 Mont. 392, 288 P.3d 160) (internal citations omitted).
10 ¶20 The question of whether a district court properly denied a motion to dismiss is a
conclusion of law, which this Court will review de novo to determine if the court’s
interpretation and application of the law are correct. In re L.V.-B., 2014 MT 13, ¶ 12, 373
Mont. 344, 317 P.3d 191 (“We review de novo a district court’s decision on a motion to
dismiss.”).
DISCUSSION
¶21 Did the District Court err in terminating Father’s parental rights?
¶22 Father argues that the District Court’s decision to terminate his parental rights was
in error, citing his bond with the children, his ability to support the family, and the
absence of evidence that he put his children at risk. He argues the termination of his
parental rights was not in the best interest of his children, and that the District Court erred
by not dismissing the case.
¶23 Pursuant to § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, termination of the parent-child legal
relationship may be ordered upon a finding that the child is an adjudicated youth in need
of care, and 1) an appropriate treatment plan that has been approved by the court has not
been complied with by the parent, or has not been successful; and 2) the conduct or
condition of the parent rendering the parent unfit is unlikely to change within a
reasonable time.
¶24 Under this statute, Father first contests the adjudication of the children as youths in
need of care (YINC). Section 41-3-102(34), MCA, defines a YINC as “a youth who has
been adjudicated or determined, after a hearing, to be or have been abused, neglected, or 11 abandoned.” Section 41-3-102(7)(a), MCA, further provides that “child abuse or
neglect” is defined as “(i) actual physical or psychological harm to a child; (ii) substantial
risk of physical or psychological harm to a child; or (iii) abandonment.” We review a
district court’s conclusion of law for correctness. See In re T.S., ¶ 21. The District Court
found after the adjudication hearing that Mother had tested positively for
methamphetamine, cannabis, and Ecstasy, both parents had failed to provide UAs upon
request, both parents had admitted to using illegal drugs, the parents were failing to meet
their children’s basic needs, and that the parents were not ensuring that K.A. attended
school on a regular basis. These findings were supported by substantial evidence and the
children were properly adjudicated as YINC, as the District Court correctly noted several
conditions that would have placed the children in substantial risk of physical or
psychological harm.
¶25 Regarding compliance with and successful completion of a treatment plan under
§ 41-3-609(1)(f)(i), MCA, Moran testified at the termination hearing that, although
Father completed in-patient chemical dependency treatment, he had been dismissed from
out-patient chemical dependency treatment for lack of participation, thereafter tested
positive for methamphetamines and alcohol, failed to maintain sobriety, and failed to
complete his mental health tasks. There was substantial evidence to support the District
Court’s factual finding and conclusion of law that “the majority of his plan was not
complied with” and “has not been successful.” Indeed, Father concedes in his briefing
that he did not complete his court-ordered plan. 12 ¶26 Regarding whether Father’s conduct or condition rendering him unfit is unlikely to
change within a reasonable time, § 41-3-609(1)(f)(ii), MCA, Moran testified that, “[a]t
this time the Department’s been involved with these children for over 15 months. We
have not seen behavioral changes from [Father]. So it’s in the children’s best interest for
permanency.” The Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) submitted a report to the
District Court, stating, “I regret that this action has to be taken with [Father]. I feel that
the court has been given no choice but to terminate his rights. . . . [Father] is the one
losing out by not complying to[] the rules and not completing his requirements.” The
record demonstrates that Father was engaging in the same kind of behaviors over a year
after the treatment plan was implemented as he was when the children were originally
removed from his care. At times he was blatantly resistant to the Department and with
his treatment goals and, as the District Court found, deceptive about his behavior. As we
have stated on multiple occasions, “[W]e do not have a crystal ball to look into to make
this determination, so it must, to some extent, be based on a person’s past conduct.” In re
M.A.E., 1999 MT 341, ¶ 37, 297 Mont. 434, 991 P.2d 972 (citing In re C.A.R., 214 Mont.
174, 187, 693 P.2d 1214, 1221 (1984)). The record of Father’s behavior provides
abundant support for the District Court’s conclusion that “[t]he conduct or condition of
birth father is unlikely to change within a reasonable time based on his unresolved mental
health and chemical dependency issues.” The District Court’s conclusion that
continuation of the parent child legal relationship will likely result in continued abuse or
neglect was supported by the evidence of Father’s conduct over the 15 months of the 13 proceeding. Perhaps testimony crucial to establishing Father’s potential to change his
conduct within a reasonable time would have come from Father himself; however, he did
not participate in the termination hearing. In terminating Father’s parental rights, the
District Court clearly did not abuse its discretion. “A child’s need for a permanent
placement in a stable, loving home supercedes [sic] the right to parent a child.” In re
Custody & Parental Rights of D.A., 2008 MT 247, ¶ 21, 344 Mont. 513, 189 P.3d 631.
¶27 Finally, Father contends that the District Court should have dismissed this case
when “requested to do so by the parents and by DPHHS.” He argues that both Mother’s
motion to dismiss, and the parents’ joint motion, met the statutory criteria for dismissal,
as evidenced by DPHHS’ own motion to dismiss. Section 41-3-424, MCA, provides, in
pertinent part, that the court shall dismiss an abuse and neglect petition if all the
following criteria are met:
(1) a child who has been placed in foster care is reunited with the child’s parents and returned home; (2) the child remains in the home for a minimum of 6 months with no additional confirmed reports of child abuse or neglect; and (3) the department determines and informs the court that the issues that led to department intervention have been resolved and that no reason exists for further department intervention or monitoring.
Section 41-3-424, MCA. In its motion to dismiss, DPHHS expressed its continuing
concerns regarding Father’s issues that led to its original intervention with this family,
asking either for restrictions to be placed on Father’s visitation, or alternatively, that
DPHHS be granted leave to petition to terminate Father’s parental rights. The District
Court recognized these continuing concerns, and correctly denied the motions to dismiss
14 for not satisfying the statutory criteria. The District Court ultimately granted DPHHS’
motion as to Mother, but only in conjunction with terminating Father’s parental rights, as
that action resolved the need for further intervention with Father or for placement of
restrictions upon his interaction with the family.
¶28 Affirmed.
/S/ JIM RICE
We concur:
/S/ MIKE McGRATH /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT
Justice Laurie McKinnon, dissenting.
¶29 I disagree with the Court’s conclusions that the conduct or condition rendering
Father unfit was unlikely to change within a reasonable time and that; therefore,
continuation of the parent-child legal relationship will likely result in his children’s
continued abuse or neglect. Factors the trial court must consider in determining whether
the conduct or condition rendering a parent unfit is “unlikely to change within a
reasonable time” are found in § 41-3-609(2), MCA. They are:
15 (a) emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency of the parent of a duration or nature as to render the parent unlikely to care for the ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child within a reasonable time; (b) a history of violent behavior by the parent; (c) excessive use of intoxicating liquor or of a narcotic or dangerous drug that affects the parent’s ability to care and provide for the child; and (d) present judicially ordered long-term confinement of the parent.
Overall, “the court shall give primary consideration to the physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs of the child.” Section 41-3-609(3), MCA.
¶30 The relevant factors the District Court must have considered in this case concern
whether Father had a history of violent behavior, subsection (b), and whether Father’s
excessive use of alcohol or drugs affected his ability to care and provide for his children,
subsection (c). Related to subsection (b), there were allegations of physical abuse, but no
evidence of any specific instance of physical abuse concerning Father and Mother or the
children. The first tip DPHHS received concerning the family alleged physical violence
in front of the children; however, there was no evidence supporting that allegation. Both
Mother and Father denied any physical abuse occurred between them or against the
children. K.A. told Moran that Father had never hit him. Father was arrested twice for
disorderly conduct and for being involved in a disturbance at a bar; however, those two
events did not involve anyone in Father’s family or occur within their presence. The
record does not establish that Father has a history of violent behavior which will result in
continued abuse or neglect of his children.
¶31 Regarding subsection (c), there is evidence Father used drugs and alcohol;
however, no evidence that the drug or alcohol use caused any specific danger to the 16 children or was done in the children’s presence. Review of the record indicates Father
tested negative for all substances on April 6, 2013. Father failed to attend several UAs.
Father completed in-patient treatment at Montana Chemical Dependency Center on
October 15, 2013, and afterwards participated in, but did not complete, out-patient
treatment. After removal, Father tested positive, on one occasion, for methamphetamine
in a hair sample taken on June 13, 2014 and reported to DPHHS on June 19, 2014.
Father was intoxicated when Mother called the police to remove him from her and the
children’s home on July 9, 2014. Although there was one positive methamphetamine test
and one instance of Father being intoxicated at the children’s home, these instances are
insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish that Father’s use was “excessive” or
affected his “ability to care and provide” for his children.
¶32 Furthermore, in this case, there was evidence that continuation of the parent-child
relationship was not likely to result in continued abuse or neglect because testimony
indicated Mother had, over the course of the 18-month proceeding, developed an ability
to protect her children. Mother complied with DPHHS recommendations in her
Treatment Plan and learned to protect her children. Review of the record shows she
demonstrated an ability to protect the children when she removed them from the home
when she and Father argued or when Father was intoxicated. She asked Father to move
out of the family home after his methamphetamine-positive hair test. She further
demonstrated her ability and commitment to protect her children by calling the police
17 when Father came to where she and the children were living, when he was not supposed
to be there at all, and refused to leave.
¶33 Children have been in Mother’s care since August 2013 without incident. Father
is likely living with Mother and the children, in violation of the District Court’s order, as
he was served with notice of the termination hearing at the Mother and the children’s
home. Although we have recognized that a child’s placement with one parent has no
bearing on the parental rights of the other parent, In re L.V-B, ¶ 19, placement with a
parent who has demonstrated an ability to protect may be relevant to whether the child
will likely be subjected to continued abuse or neglect by the other parent. Had Mother
been unable to demonstrate an ability to protect the children absent termination of
Father’s rights, then termination may have been appropriate to preserve at least one
parent’s relationship with the children. Here, there was not, in the first instance, clear
and convincing evidence that continuation of Father’s relationship with the children
would result in continued abuse or neglect. The finding that Mother was able to protect
the children in the event of hostility or drug abuse on the part of Father should have
further informed the trial court in its discretion regarding the termination of Father’s
parental rights. We recognize that these distinctions are difficult to observe given the
complexity of family dynamics. Nevertheless, the court must always be guided by
considerations of the best interests of the children, despite the unearned benefit which
may be reaped by the parent unable to fully comply with the responsibilities and
obligations of parenting. 18 ¶34 Terminating a parent-child relationship “divests the child and the parents of all
legal rights, powers, immunities, duties, and obligations with respect to each other . . .
except the right of the child to inherit from the parent.” Section 41-3-611(1), MCA. One
such divested obligation is that of support and education. Section 40-6-211, MCA. Here,
Father’s children were ages nine, four, and two at the time of termination. Terminating
Father’s parental rights also extinguished Father’s obligation to provide for their support.
The record establishes that Father is employed in the oil industry and capable of
providing support to his children. Thus, Father’s ability to provide support for up to
sixteen years should have been a consideration in determining whether the children’s best
interests necessitated termination.
¶35 Additionally, the record establishes Mother wanted her relationship with Father to
continue and that the children had a “strong bond” with Father. CASA and the children’s
attorney counseled against termination. DPHHS stated they wanted Father to have
supervised visits with his children but could not achieve that result in the pending
proceeding. Instead, DPHHS advocated for termination, even though Moran testified she
otherwise did not think termination was in the children’s best interests because Mother
would not be able to receive child support from Father and the children have a strong
relationship with Father.
¶36 The District Court failed to appropriately give primary consideration to the needs
of the children. There is insubstantial evidence that Father posed a risk or danger to his
children or that continuation of their relationship would result in continued abuse or 19 neglect. The District Court conceded at the end of the termination hearing that it did not
know whether Father represented a danger at all, telling Mother, “The father of your
children. They think he’s a danger. And quite frankly, I’m not certain if he is or not.” If
the District Court was uncertain whether Father posed a danger to his children, than its
conclusion that continuation of the parent-child legal relationship would result in
continued abuse or neglect was certainly not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
The District Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights should be reversed.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON