Matter of Jordan

130 B.R. 185, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1065, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1579, 1991 WL 145843
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedJuly 29, 1991
Docket19-11810
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 130 B.R. 185 (Matter of Jordan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Jordan, 130 B.R. 185, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1065, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1579, 1991 WL 145843 (N.J. 1991).

Opinion

OPINION

JUDITH H. WIZMUR, Bankruptcy Judge.

In these two unrelated chapter 13 cases, the issue presented is the appropriate interest rate to be applied to the allowed secured claim of the secured creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). In each case, the debtor proposes to retain a motor vehicle and to pay to the secured creditor the value of the vehicle over the term of the chapter 13 plan, with ten percent interest. In both cases, the secured creditor is General Motors Acceptance Corporation.

DISCUSSION

Observers have noted that “[f]ew bankruptcy issues have met with as much confusion as the determination of a proper discount rate” in the context of a chapter 13 confirmation of a plan which crams down a secured creditor’s interest. Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L.Rev. 1061 (1985). Among the various approaches to the question have been the use of the contract rate between the parties in the origi *187 nal agreement 1 , the application of a market rate of interest, sometimes reflected by the Treasury bill rate, 2 application of the rate specified under 26 U.S.C. § 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code, 3 the legal rate of interest, 4 and the adoption of a compromise rate between the contract rate and the market rate. 5

The starting point of analysis is the statutory language of § 1325(a)(5), which requires as a condition of confirmation that:

(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan—
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B)(i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain the lien secured such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to such holder.

It is commonly recognized that, absent a secured creditor’s consent, where a debtor retains property and proposes to pay the allowed secured claim through the plan, the phrase “value, as of the effective date of the plan” requires the debtor to make interest payments through the life of the chapter 13 plan so as “not to dilute the value of [the secured creditor’s] claim through delay in payment.” Memphis Bank and Trust Company v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 429 (6th Cir.1982).

The' present value language of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) is virtually identical to the present value language appearing in several other statutory provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including chapter 11 and chapter 12 provisions. United States v. Neal Pharmacol Company, 789 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir.1986), citing In the Matter of Southern States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647, 652 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1022, 104 S.Ct. 1275, 79 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984). 6 A review of cases applying the identical language to determine the appropriate discount rate in other contexts is instructive. In re Aztec Company, 99 B.R. 388 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1989), reheard 113 B.R. 414 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn.1990).

In the context of the repayment of priority tax obligations through a chapter 11 plan of reorganization, under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C), several circuit courts, including the Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh circuits, have determined, with consistent reference to the familiar citation from Collier on the subject, 7 that the proper discount rate is the prevailing market rate for a loan of a term equal to the pay-out period, with due consideration for the quality of the security and the risk of subsequent default. In re Monnier Brothers, 755 F.2d 1336, 1339 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. *188 Neal Pharmacol Company, supra, 789 F.2d at 1285; In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 818 F.2d 1503, 1505 (9th Cir.1987) and In re Southern States Motor Inns, Inc., supra, 709 F.2d at 651. In other words, the present value rate is the rate of interest that the debtor would pay to borrow a similar amount on similar terms in a commercial loan market at the time the chapter 11 plan is being considered for confirmation. In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, Inc., supra at 1506. The circuit decisions under § 1129(a)(9)(C) are generally in agreement that a case by case determination of the prevailing market rate is necessary to determine present value under § 1129(a)(9)(C), taking into account the risk of non-payment, the length of the payment period and the existence and quality of collateral. The Treasury rate, or the interest rate charged against delinquent federal income taxpayers under 26 U.S.C. § 6621, may be indicators of the prevailing market rate, but must be adjusted to consider factors such as risk.

In the context of a non-consensual chapter 11 cramdown of a secured interest under § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), a substantially similar standard has been applied, that of “the current market rate of interest used for similar loans in the region”, determined “at the time the new loan is made”, or, in other words, at the time of confirmation. In re Aztec Company, supra.

In Aztec, supra, Judge Lundin reviewed the testimony received from the experts of the debtor and the secured creditor to reach the conclusion that the appropriate interest rate representing the present value of the creditor’s allowed secured claim eq-ualled the interest rate on Treasury instruments of a maturity rate equal to the rate proposed by the debtor, plus two percent to account for the demonstrated risk of the loan.

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Bluebook (online)
130 B.R. 185, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1065, 21 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1579, 1991 WL 145843, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-jordan-njb-1991.