[817]*817In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 383-c to enforce the visitation provision of a judicial surrender of a child that resulted in the adoption of the child, Jennifer A., the biological mother, appeals, by permission, from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (McGowan, J.), dated January 22, 2013, which, sua sponte, dismissed her petition with prejudice.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petition is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Queens County, for a hearing and a new determination of the petition thereafter.
In December 2008, when the subject child was almost three years old, the biological mother executed a judicial surrender agreement (hereinafter the surrender agreement) in which she agreed to the child’s adoption by his foster parents (see Social Services Law § 383-c). The surrender agreement provided that, after the adoption, the biological mother would have one visit with the child every six months. The surrender agreement also provided for “such other visits as agreed upon” between the parties. The visits were to be supervised by one of the adoptive parents. The Family Court, Queens County (McGowan, J.), approved the surrender agreement in an order dated December 22, 2008.
In November 2012, nearly four years after the surrender agreement was executed, the biological mother filed a petition to enforce the visitation provision. She alleged that she had not been permitted to see the child since January 2010, a period of almost three years. She also stated that visitation had ceased after the child’s biological father threatened one of the adoptive parents. She contended that resumed visitation would be in the child’s best interests because the child would then not “have hatred” toward her, or “feel abandoned.”
At an appearance in January 2013, without holding a hearing, the Family Court sua sponte dismissed the petition on the ground that visitation would not be in the child’s best interests. The court noted that the surrender agreement had followed a “lengthy neglect case” during which the court had made a finding that the biological mother had not complied with any services. The court added that “the visits were going badly.” Additionally, the court observed, the mother delayed commencing an enforcement proceeding for an inordinately long time after the visitations had ceased. Finally, the court said, the child was now “well situated” and “happy.”
[818]*818After the attorney for the child stated that the adoptive parents had provided “extremely good care for very special needs children” during the period of foster care, the court emphasized that the subject child was a “very special needs child.”
The Family Court did not afford the biological mother’s attorney an opportunity to speak until after it stated that the petition was dismissed. When the biological mother’s attorney objected to the Family Court dismissing the petition without a hearing, the Family Court referred to the “long history” of the case and added, “This is not something that the court does not know the background on. The history, the lack of mother complying with services, the problem with visitations. But now to wait for two [sic] years after this surrender has taken place, it is not in the child’s best interest. Thank you. Case dismissed.”
In its order of dismissal, the Family Court repeated most of what it said orally, but it added that five prior neglect cases had been filed against the biological mother and that the biological mother had been found to have neglected all of her children, including the subject child. Moreover, in addition to the surrender of the subject child, her rights had been terminated with respect to two of her other children. Finally, the court noted that the biological mother had failed to comply with dispositional orders in her neglect cases, and noted that there was a neglect petition pending against her with respect to another child.
The biological mother appeals, by permission, from the Family Court’s sua sponte dismissal of her petition.
Social Services Law § 383-c (2) (b) permits the parties to a judicial surrender agreement to provide for a biological parent’s continued communication or contact with the child. In determining whether to approve the agreement, the court must determine whether continued contact with the biological parent would be in the child’s best interests (see Social Services Law § 383-c [2] [b]). A provision providing for visitation with the biological parent is not legally enforceable unless the court that approved the surrender agreement states, in a written order, that the provision would be in the child’s best interests (see Domestic Relations Law § 112-b [2]; cf. Social Services Law § 383-c [2] [b]). Even then, in an enforcement proceeding pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 112-b, a court “shall not enforce an order under this section unless it finds that the enforcement is in the child’s best interests” (Domestic Relations Law § 112-b [4]). In other words, there must be a best interests judicial determination both at the time the surrender agreement is accepted and at the time that enforcement of a visitation provision is sought (see [819]*819Domestic Relations Law § 112-b [2]; Social Services Law § 383-c [2] [b]).
On appeal, we give great deference to the Family Court’s best interests determination and will affirm that determination if it is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record, particularly if the determination is made a hearing (see Matter of Sapphire W. [Mary W.—Debbie R.], 120 AD3d 1584 [2014]; Matter of Kaylee O., 111 AD3d 1273, 1274 [2013]; Matter of Kristian J.P. v Jeannette I.C., 87 AD3d 1337, 1338 [2011]). As our dissenting colleague notes, neither Social Services Law § 383-c nor Domestic Relations Law § 112-b mandates that a hearing be held before a best interests determination is made. Further, a court may make a best interests determination without a hearing so long as it has “adequate relevant information to enable it to make an informed and provident determination with respect to the best interests of the children” (Piccinini v Piccinini, 103 AD3d 868, 870 [2013]; see Matter of Zaratzian v Abadir, 105 AD3d 1054 [2013]; Matter of Hom v Zullo, 6 AD3d 536, 536 [2004]).
Here, the Family Court dismissed the petition without affording the biological mother an opportunity to establish that enforcement of the visitation provision of the surrender agreement would be in the child’s best interests. Thus, there is no hearing record for us to review. Further, while it may be true that the Family Court was aware of facts and circumstances that may have supported a determination that enforcement of the visitation provision would not have been in the child’s best interests, the record before us does not contain those facts. Accordingly, we are unable to conduct effective appellate review of the court’s determination or to make required findings on our own (see Matter of Mya V.P. [Amber R.—Laura P.], 79 AD3d 1794, 1795-1796 [2010]; see also Matter of Fontaine v Fontaine, 94 AD3d 1430, 1431 [2012]; Matter of Bradbury v Monaghan, 77 AD3d 1424, 1424 [2010]; cf. Matter of Kairis v Kairis, 98 AD3d 1281, 1281-1282 [2012]). Specifically, while the Family Court alluded to matters in this and other proceedings, the court did not state specific facts that would permit adequate review on appeal.
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[817]*817In a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 383-c to enforce the visitation provision of a judicial surrender of a child that resulted in the adoption of the child, Jennifer A., the biological mother, appeals, by permission, from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (McGowan, J.), dated January 22, 2013, which, sua sponte, dismissed her petition with prejudice.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petition is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Queens County, for a hearing and a new determination of the petition thereafter.
In December 2008, when the subject child was almost three years old, the biological mother executed a judicial surrender agreement (hereinafter the surrender agreement) in which she agreed to the child’s adoption by his foster parents (see Social Services Law § 383-c). The surrender agreement provided that, after the adoption, the biological mother would have one visit with the child every six months. The surrender agreement also provided for “such other visits as agreed upon” between the parties. The visits were to be supervised by one of the adoptive parents. The Family Court, Queens County (McGowan, J.), approved the surrender agreement in an order dated December 22, 2008.
In November 2012, nearly four years after the surrender agreement was executed, the biological mother filed a petition to enforce the visitation provision. She alleged that she had not been permitted to see the child since January 2010, a period of almost three years. She also stated that visitation had ceased after the child’s biological father threatened one of the adoptive parents. She contended that resumed visitation would be in the child’s best interests because the child would then not “have hatred” toward her, or “feel abandoned.”
At an appearance in January 2013, without holding a hearing, the Family Court sua sponte dismissed the petition on the ground that visitation would not be in the child’s best interests. The court noted that the surrender agreement had followed a “lengthy neglect case” during which the court had made a finding that the biological mother had not complied with any services. The court added that “the visits were going badly.” Additionally, the court observed, the mother delayed commencing an enforcement proceeding for an inordinately long time after the visitations had ceased. Finally, the court said, the child was now “well situated” and “happy.”
[818]*818After the attorney for the child stated that the adoptive parents had provided “extremely good care for very special needs children” during the period of foster care, the court emphasized that the subject child was a “very special needs child.”
The Family Court did not afford the biological mother’s attorney an opportunity to speak until after it stated that the petition was dismissed. When the biological mother’s attorney objected to the Family Court dismissing the petition without a hearing, the Family Court referred to the “long history” of the case and added, “This is not something that the court does not know the background on. The history, the lack of mother complying with services, the problem with visitations. But now to wait for two [sic] years after this surrender has taken place, it is not in the child’s best interest. Thank you. Case dismissed.”
In its order of dismissal, the Family Court repeated most of what it said orally, but it added that five prior neglect cases had been filed against the biological mother and that the biological mother had been found to have neglected all of her children, including the subject child. Moreover, in addition to the surrender of the subject child, her rights had been terminated with respect to two of her other children. Finally, the court noted that the biological mother had failed to comply with dispositional orders in her neglect cases, and noted that there was a neglect petition pending against her with respect to another child.
The biological mother appeals, by permission, from the Family Court’s sua sponte dismissal of her petition.
Social Services Law § 383-c (2) (b) permits the parties to a judicial surrender agreement to provide for a biological parent’s continued communication or contact with the child. In determining whether to approve the agreement, the court must determine whether continued contact with the biological parent would be in the child’s best interests (see Social Services Law § 383-c [2] [b]). A provision providing for visitation with the biological parent is not legally enforceable unless the court that approved the surrender agreement states, in a written order, that the provision would be in the child’s best interests (see Domestic Relations Law § 112-b [2]; cf. Social Services Law § 383-c [2] [b]). Even then, in an enforcement proceeding pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 112-b, a court “shall not enforce an order under this section unless it finds that the enforcement is in the child’s best interests” (Domestic Relations Law § 112-b [4]). In other words, there must be a best interests judicial determination both at the time the surrender agreement is accepted and at the time that enforcement of a visitation provision is sought (see [819]*819Domestic Relations Law § 112-b [2]; Social Services Law § 383-c [2] [b]).
On appeal, we give great deference to the Family Court’s best interests determination and will affirm that determination if it is supported by a sound and substantial basis in the record, particularly if the determination is made a hearing (see Matter of Sapphire W. [Mary W.—Debbie R.], 120 AD3d 1584 [2014]; Matter of Kaylee O., 111 AD3d 1273, 1274 [2013]; Matter of Kristian J.P. v Jeannette I.C., 87 AD3d 1337, 1338 [2011]). As our dissenting colleague notes, neither Social Services Law § 383-c nor Domestic Relations Law § 112-b mandates that a hearing be held before a best interests determination is made. Further, a court may make a best interests determination without a hearing so long as it has “adequate relevant information to enable it to make an informed and provident determination with respect to the best interests of the children” (Piccinini v Piccinini, 103 AD3d 868, 870 [2013]; see Matter of Zaratzian v Abadir, 105 AD3d 1054 [2013]; Matter of Hom v Zullo, 6 AD3d 536, 536 [2004]).
Here, the Family Court dismissed the petition without affording the biological mother an opportunity to establish that enforcement of the visitation provision of the surrender agreement would be in the child’s best interests. Thus, there is no hearing record for us to review. Further, while it may be true that the Family Court was aware of facts and circumstances that may have supported a determination that enforcement of the visitation provision would not have been in the child’s best interests, the record before us does not contain those facts. Accordingly, we are unable to conduct effective appellate review of the court’s determination or to make required findings on our own (see Matter of Mya V.P. [Amber R.—Laura P.], 79 AD3d 1794, 1795-1796 [2010]; see also Matter of Fontaine v Fontaine, 94 AD3d 1430, 1431 [2012]; Matter of Bradbury v Monaghan, 77 AD3d 1424, 1424 [2010]; cf. Matter of Kairis v Kairis, 98 AD3d 1281, 1281-1282 [2012]). Specifically, while the Family Court alluded to matters in this and other proceedings, the court did not state specific facts that would permit adequate review on appeal. For example, the record does not disclose which deficiencies in the mother’s conduct predated the Family Court’s initial approval of the visitation provision and which occurred later. In this respect, we note that a best interests determination depends on what issue is before the court. What may be in the best interests of a child as to one issue, such as termination of custody, might not be in the child’s best interests with respect to another, such as visitation with a biological parent.
[820]*820Our dissenting colleague would find the record sufficient to uphold the Family Court’s determination on the basis of certain deficiencies in the mother’s conduct and diligence. We disagree. In particular, we note that the fact that the biological mother has not seen the child for an extended period of time does not establish that resumed visitation would not be in the child’s best interests. Nor does the fact that the child has special needs or that he was, according to the attorney for the child, doing well, necessarily militate against resumed visitation. Without additional facts, the record is simply inadequate to make a determination as to the child’s best interests with respect to visitation with the biological mother.
In sum, we find that there is no sound and substantial basis in the record for the Family Court’s determination that enforcement of the visitation provision of the surrender agreement is not in the child’s best interests (see Matter of Austin v Austin, 254 AD2d 703, 703-704 [1998]; cf. Matter of Bonet v Bonet, 121 AD3d 978 [2014]; Matter of Destiny H. [Valerie B.], 83 AD3d 939, 939 [2011]). Accordingly, we reverse the order appealed from and remit the matter to the Family Court, Queens County, for a hearing to determine whether enforcement of the visitation provision of the surrender agreement is in the child’s best interests (see Matter of Bradbury v Monaghan, 77 AD3d at 1424).
Balkin, J.P., Austin and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.