Matter of Hernandez v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys.

Opinion

Matter of Hernandez v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys.

2026 NY Slip Op 05027

August 19, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

In the Matter of Kevin Hernandez, respondent,

v

New York City Employees' Retirement System, appellant.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 19, 2026

2024-08670, (Index No. 524405/23)

Betsy Barros, J.P.

Lillian Wan

James P. McCormack

Phillip Hom, JJ.

Steven Banks, Corporation Counsel, New York, NY (Jamison Davies and Chase Henry Mechanick of counsel), for appellant.

Kevin Hernandez, Bronx, NY, respondent pro se.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Trustees of the New York City Employees' Retirement System dated April 17, 2023, which denied the petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement benefits, the New York City Employees' Retirement System appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Rupert V. Barry, J.), dated February 5, 2024. The judgment granted the petition to the extent of, in effect, annulling the determination and remitting the matter to the New York City Employees' Retirement System for further proceedings.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits.

The petitioner, a supervisor for the New York City Department of Sanitation, allegedly was injured on January 30, 2018, while performing his job duties as a result of a slip and fall that occurred while he was on duty. The fall occurred when he slipped on an icy condition on a sidewalk while investigating a snow and ice condition thereon to determine if a summons should be issued. On March 13, 2018, while working at a garage, the petitioner allegedly was injured when he fell while getting up from a chair. In January 2020, the petitioner applied to the New York City Employees' Retirement System (hereinafter NYCERS) for ordinary disability retirement (hereinafter ODR) benefits pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law § 506 and accidental disability retirement (hereinafter ADR) benefits pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law § 507. The Medical Board of NYCERS (hereinafter the Medical Board) evaluated the petitioner, reviewed medical records, and determined that, although the petitioner was disabled, the incidents that caused the petitioner's injuries were not accidents. The Medical Board recommended that the petitioner be denied ADR benefits and granted ODR benefits. On April 17, 2023, the Board of Trustees of NYCERS (hereinafter the Board of Trustees) adopted the recommendation of the Medical Board and denied the petitioner's application for ADR benefits.

The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the determination of the Board of Trustees. In a judgment dated February 5, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the petition to the extent of, in effect, annulling the determination and remitting the matter [*2]to NYCERS for further proceedings. NYCERS appeals.

In reviewing the determination, this Court must consider only whether the "determination was made in violation of lawful procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion" (CPLR 7803[3]). "In applying the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard, a court inquires whether the determination under review had a rational basis" (Matter of Halperin v City of New Rochelle, 24 AD3d 768, 770; see Matter of Akeson v Incorporated Vil. of Asharoken, 227 AD3d 706, 707).

"An applicant for accident disability retirement has the burden of establishing that the disability is causally connected to a line-of-duty accident" (Matter of Halloran v NYC Employees' Retirement Sys., 172 AD3d 715, 715-716). An accident is a "sudden, fortuitous mischance, unexpected, out of the ordinary, and injurious in impact" (Matter of Lanni v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 189 AD3d 841, 842 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Lichtenstein v Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of Police Dept. of City of N.Y., Art. II, 57 NY2d 1010, 1012). However, not every injury that occurs while a worker is performing his or her ordinary duties will support an award of ADR benefits (see Matter of Lanni v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 189 AD3d at 842). "[A]n incident caused by a risk inherent in the petitioner's regular [job] duties is not an accident for purposes of ADR benefits" (Matter of Compagnone v DiNapoli, 42 NY3d 1075, 1076 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Kelly v DiNapoli, 30 NY3d 674, 683).

Here, the determination made by the Board of Trustees was not arbitrary and capricious. With respect to the petitioner's fall in January 2018, the petitioner's injury was sustained while he was performing his routine duties and was "not so out-of-the-ordinary or unexpected as to constitute an accidental injury as a matter of law" (Matter of Cravotta v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 89 AD3d 842, 843 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Fragale v D'Alessandro, 55 AD3d 607, 607). Moreover, given the inconsistencies in the petitioner's statements and the documentary evidence with respect to his fall in March 2018, there was a rational basis for the Board of Trustees's conclusion that the petitioner failed to prove that his fall was the result of anything other than his own misstep (see Matter of Young v DiNapoli, 208 AD3d 1411, 1413). "A fall . . . as a result of one's own misstep, without more, is not so out-of-the-ordinary or unexpected as to constitute an accidental injury as a matter of law" (Matter of Starnella v Bratton, 92 NY2d 836, 839; see Matter of Fragale v D'Alessandro, 55 AD3d at 607).

Accordingly, since the determination of the Board of Trustees denying the petitioner's application for ADR benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, the Supreme Court should have denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

BARROS, J.P., WAN, MCCORMACK and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court