Matter of Heinchon Dairy, Inc. v. Village of Pawling Planning Bd.
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Opinion
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Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter
Matter of Heinchon Dairy, Inc. v Village of Pawling Planning Bd.
2026 NY Slip Op 04195
July 1, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
In the Matter of Heinchon Dairy, Inc., et al., respondents-appellants,
v
Village of Pawling Planning Board, et al., appellants-respondents.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on July 1, 2026
2022-03757, (Index No. 53770/20)
Francesca E. Connolly, J.P.
Valerie Brathwaite Nelson
Barry E. Warhit
Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.
Van DeWater & Van DeWater, LLP, Poughkeepsie, NY (Kyle W. Barnett of counsel), for appellants-respondents.
Catania, Mahon & Rider, PLLC, Newburgh, NY (John W. Furst, Jonathan DeJoy, and Jeffrey S. Sculley of counsel), for respondents-appellants.
DECISION & ORDER
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review two determinations of the respondent/defendant Village of Pawling Planning Board, both dated October 13, 2020, which, respectively, denied the petitioners/plaintiffs' applications for site plan approval and a special use permit, and action for declaratory relief, the respondents/defendants appeal, and the petitioners/plaintiffs cross-appeal, from an amended judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Christi J. Acker, J.), dated April 22, 2021. The amended judgment, insofar as appealed from, granted the amended petition and annulled the determinations. The amended judgment, insofar as cross-appealed from, remitted the matter to the respondent/defendant Village of Pawling Planning Board for new determinations.
ORDERED that the amended judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
In 2019, the petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners) submitted applications for site plan approval and a special use permit to the respondent/defendant Village of Pawling Planning Board (hereinafter the Planning Board) in connection with a project to develop certain real property located in the Village of Pawling. The petitioners proposed, inter alia, to convert an existing building to retail and office use and to construct two multifamily residential buildings and a hotel. In January 2020, following a public hearing, the Planning Board issued a negative declaration of environmental significance pursuant to the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8) with respect to the project. Thereafter, in two determinations dated October 13, 2020, the Planning Board denied the applications for site plan approval and a special use permit, respectively.
The petitioners commenced this hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the Planning Board's determinations and action for declaratory relief. In an amended judgment dated April 22, 2021, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted the amended petition, annulled the determinations, and remitted the matter to the Planning Board for new determinations, finding, in effect, that the Planning Board failed to explain why it was deviating from [*2]its findings in the negative declaration. The respondents/defendants (hereinafter the respondents) appeal, and the petitioners cross-appeal.
A local planning board has broad discretion in deciding applications for site plan approval and special use permits, and judicial review is limited to determining whether the board's action was illegal, arbitrary and capricious, or an abuse of discretion (see Matter of Chestnut Petroleum Dist., Inc. v Town of Mount Pleasant Planning Bd., 222 AD3d 748, 750; Matter of Ramapo Pinnacle Props., LLC v Village of Airmont Planning Bd., 145 AD3d 729, 730; Matter of Bagga v Stanco, 90 AD3d 919, 920). As such, a planning board's determination should be upheld on judicial review if it was not illegal, has a rational basis, and is not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Ramapo Pinnacle Props., LLC v Village of Airmont Planning Bd., 145 AD3d at 730; Matter of Bagga v Stanco, 90 AD3d at 920). "When reviewing the determinations of a local planning board, courts consider substantial evidence only to determine whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the rationality of the board's determination" (Matter of Fildon, LLC v Planning Bd. of the Inc. Vil. of Hempstead, 164 AD3d 501, 503 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]).
Nevertheless, "[a] decision of an administrative agency which neither adheres to its own prior precedent nor indicates its reason for reaching a different result on essentially the same facts is arbitrary and capricious" (Matter of Nicolai v McLaughlin, 163 AD3d 572, 574 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Knight v Amelkin, 68 NY2d 975, 977; Matter of Monte Carlo 1, LLC v Weiss, 142 AD3d 1173, 1175). "Such a determination must be annulled even if there may otherwise be evidence in the record sufficient to support the determination" (Matter of Bout v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Oyster Bay, 71 AD3d 1014, 1014; see Matter of Nicolai v McLaughlin, 163 AD3d at 574).
Here, the Planning Board failed to provide any factual findings that it relied upon in denying the applications (see Matter of Mancuso v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Mount Pleasant, 240 AD3d 900, 901; Matter of Gabrielle Realty Corp. v Board of Zoning Appeals of Vil. of Freeport, 24 AD3d 550, 550-551; Matter of Paloma Homes, Inc. v Petrone, 10 AD3d 612, 613). The Planning Board, in its determinations denying the applications, made only conclusory statements, which, in effect, merely restated pertinent sections of the Code of the Village of Pawling (see Matter of Morrone v Bennett, 164 AD2d 887, 888-889; Leibring v Planning Bd. of Town of Newfane, 144 AD2d 903; Matter of Kadish v Simpson, 55 AD2d 911). Further, these conclusory findings deviated from the Planning Board's findings in the negative declaration that it made only eight months earlier, and the Planning Board failed to offer any reasoning or evidence for these deviations (see Knight v Amelkin, 68 NY2d at 977-978; Matter of Ramapo Pinnacle Props., LLC v Village of Airmont Planning Bd., 145 AD3d at 729-731; Matter of Oyster Bay Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v Town Bd. of Town of Oyster Bay, 303 AD2d 410, 410-411; Matter of SCI Funeral Servs. of N.Y. v Planning Bd. of Town of Babylon, 277 AD2d 319, 320; see also Leonard v Planning Bd. of Town of Union Vale, 136 AD3d 868, 872).
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