Matter of Ghokassian v Portala-Ghokassian
2026 NY Slip Op 04854
August 5, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
In the Matter of Zareh Ghokassian, appellant,
v
Nicole Portala-Ghokassian, respondent.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on August 5, 2026
2025-03283, (Docket Nos. V-9364-22/22A, V-9364-22/23B, V-9364-22/23C, V-9365-22/22A, V-9365-22/23B, V-9365-22/23C, V-9366-22/22A, V-9366-22/23B, V-9366-22/23C, F-5213-24/24A)
Mark C. Dillon, J.P.
Paul Wooten
William G. Ford
Helen Voutsinas
James P. McCormack, JJ.
Quatela | Chimeri PLLC, Hauppauge, NY (Christopher J. Chimeri and Sophia Arzoumanidis of counsel), for appellant.
Mitev Law Firm, P.C., Stony Brook, NY (Vesselin Mitev of counsel), for respondent.
Thomas W. McNally, Hauppauge, NY, attorney for the children.
[*1]
DECISION & ORDER
In related proceedings, inter alia, pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Mary E. Porter, J.), dated December 17, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, denied the father's petition to modify the custody provisions of a judgment of divorce of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Glenn A. Murphy, J.) entered September 2, 2021, which incorporated but did not merge a stipulation of settlement dated May 17, 2021, so as to award him sole legal and residential custody of the parties' children, dismissed those branches of the father's separate petitions which were to hold the mother in contempt for violating the parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce, and, in effect, granted the mother's cross-motion, in effect, to modify the custody and parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce so as to award her sole legal custody of the parties' children and to terminate the father's parental access with the parties' children.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The parties are the divorced parents of three children, born in 2008, 2011, and 2013. Pursuant to a stipulation of settlement dated May 17, 2021, which was incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce entered September 2, 2021, the parties agreed, inter alia, to share joint legal custody of the children, with sole residential custody to the mother and certain parental access to the father.
The father filed separate petitions pursuant to Family Court Act article 6 alleging that the mother violated the parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce (hereinafter the father's violation petitions) by failing to produce the children for parental access with the father on certain dates. The father also filed a petition to modify the custody provisions of the judgment of divorce [*2]so as to grant him sole legal and residential custody of the children (hereinafter the father's modification petition). Thereafter, the mother cross-moved, in effect, to modify the custody and parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce so as to award her sole legal custody of the children and to terminate the father's parental access with the children.
In an order dated December 17, 2024, made after a hearing, and after in camera interviews with the children, the Family Court, inter alia, denied the father's modification petition, dismissed those branches of the father's separate petitions which were to hold the mother in contempt for violating the parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce, and, in effect, granted the mother's cross-motion. The father appeals.
"In order to modify an existing court-ordered custody arrangement, 'there must be a showing of a subsequent change in circumstances so that modification is required to protect the best interest[s] of the child'" (Matter of Pierce v Caputo, 214 AD3d 877, 878, quoting Pettei v Pettei, 207 AD3d 670, 671). "The paramount concern when making such a determination is the best interests of the child under the totality of the circumstances" (id., 214 AD3d at 878 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Limanov v Limanov, 225 AD3d 872, 874; Matter of Soper v Soper, 203 AD3d 1162). "Since the Family Court's determination with respect to custody and parental access depends to a great extent upon its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and upon the character, temperament, and sincerity of the parties, its findings are generally accorded great deference and will not be disturbed unless they lack a sound and substantial basis in the record" (Matter of Freyer v Macruari, 234 AD3d 755, 756 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Watling v Watling, 236 AD3d 1047, 1048).
"'When deciding whether a modification is in a child's best interests, factors to be considered include the quality of the home environment and the parental guidance the custodial parent provides for the child, the ability of each parent to provide for the child's emotional and intellectual development, the financial status and ability of each parent to provide for the child, the relative fitness of the respective parents, and the effect an award of custody to one parent might have on the child's relationship with the other parent'" (Matter of Narine v Singh, 229 AD3d 700, 701, quoting Matter of Martinez v Gaddy, 223 AD3d 816, 817). "'While the express wishes of the child are not controlling, they are entitled to great weight, particularly where . . . the child's age and maturity would make his or her input particularly meaningful'" (Vayner v Vayner, 226 AD3d 1063, 1063-1064 [alteration omitted], quoting Matter of Coull v Rottman, 131 AD3d 964, 964). "The court must also consider the stability and continuity afforded by maintaining the present arrangement" (id. at 1064 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Morales v Diaz, 233 AD3d 1033, 1036).
Here, although the Family Court found that the mother had engaged in conduct that interfered with the father's relationship with the children, the totality of the circumstances provided a sound and substantial basis for the court's determination that it was in the children's best interests to remain in the sole residential custody of the mother (see Matter of Diaz v Vicente, 241 AD3d 1559; Matter of Brisard v Brisard, 211 AD3d 838, 839). The evidence presented at the hearing established, among other things, that the mother was the children's primary caretaker, that the children had a very close relationship with the mother and were thriving in her care, that the mother adequately provided for the children's educational and medical needs, and that the children were closely bonded to their step-parent and step-siblings in the mother's household (see Matter of Miller v Perez, 232 AD3d 898, 899; Matter of Martinez v Driscoll, 209 AD3d 653, 655). Moreover, the record supports the court's finding that removing the children from residential custody with the mother and placing the children in the residential custody of the father "would be devastating to the[ ] [children]" (see Matter of Sullivan v Plotnick, 145 AD3d 1018, 1020-1021). Thus, there is no basis to disturb the Family Court's determination to continue the mother's sole residential custody of the children.
Moreover, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the mother sole legal custody of the children. "'Joint custody is encouraged as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion. However, joint custody is inappropriate where the parties are antagonistic towards each other and have demonstrated an [*3]inability to cooperate on matters concerning the child'" (Matter of Haase v Jones, 230 AD3d 774, 777, quoting Matter of Martinez v Gaddy, 223 AD3d at 818). Here, the record establishes that the volatile nature of the parties' relationship effectively precluded joint decision-making, and therefore, joint custody was inappropriate (see id. at 778; Matter of Martinez v Gaddy, 223 AD3d at 818).
Furthermore, giving due consideration to the wishes, ages, and maturity of the children, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to schedule parental access for the father, as the children were vehemently opposed to parental access time with the father and repeated attempts at therapeutic parental access between the father and the children were unsuccessful (see Matter of Jackson v Hall, 234 AD3d 967, 968-969; Matter of Sullivan v Plotnick, 145 AD3d at 1021).
Although our dissenting colleagues agree that the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to schedule parental access between the father and the parties' oldest child, who was 15 years old at the time of her in camera interview, our dissenting colleagues determine that a different result is warranted with respect to the parties' two younger children. We respectfully disagree and determine that the court afforded appropriate weight to the express wishes of the parties' two younger children, who were 11 and 13 years old, respectively, at the time of their in camera interviews and who were sufficiently mature to express their wishes to the court during those interviews (see Matter of Baalla v Baalla, 158 AD3d 676, 678; Matter of Morocho v Jordan, 123 AD3d 1037, 1038; see also Matter of Smisek v DeSantis, 239 AD3d 867, 870).
Our dissenting colleagues also determine that the Family Court erred in effectively delegating the father's right to parental access with the children by directing that the mother "must permit the children to visit the father if they so desire." As our dissenting colleagues indicate, "[a] court may not delegate its authority to determine parental access to either a parent or a child" (Matter of Mondschein v Mondschein, 175 AD3d 686, 687; see Matter of Clezidor v Lexune, 192 AD3d 792, 794). Here, however, the court did not award the father parental access conditioned upon the agreement of the children, but rather declined to make any award of parental access to the father (cf. Matter of Leva v Sokol, 240 AD3d 496, 498). Read in context, we determine that the provision directing that the mother "not make any disparaging remarks and/or comments about the father and must permit the children to visit the father if they so desire" served merely as a directive to the mother not to engage in any conduct inconsistent with the children having any desire in the future to have a relationship with the father and to permit the father to file a violation petition if the mother engages in such conduct.
Furthermore, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in dismissing those branches of the father's petitions which were to hold the mother in contempt for violating the parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce. "'To establish a willful violation of a Family Court order, the petitioner has the burden of proving his or her case by clear and convincing evidence'" (Matter of Omelime v Odudukudu, 221 AD3d 1012, 1013, quoting Matter of Sicina v Gorish, 209 AD3d 658, 658). "'The [petitioner] must establish that: (1) a lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, was in effect, (2) the order was disobeyed and the party disobeying the order had knowledge of its terms, and (3) the [petitioner] was prejudiced by the offending conduct'" (Matter of Morales v Diaz, 233 AD3d at 1038, quoting Matter of Freeborn v Elco, 188 AD3d 677, 680). Here, contrary to the father's contention, he failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother, by her conduct, knowingly disobeyed an unequivocal mandate of the court (see Matter of Garanin v Bykhovsky, 216 AD3d 779, 781; Matter of Tedesco v Mazzara, 206 AD3d 917, 919). Although the court found that the mother "contributed to the escalation" of the rift between the children and the father, the record supports the court's findings, among other things, that the father's lack of parental access with the children in late 2022 was due primarily to the children's own refusal to have parental access time with the father.
The mother's remaining contention is without merit.
WOOTEN, FORD and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.
MCCORMACK, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, and votes to modify the order, on the law, on the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by adding thereto a provision awarding the father therapeutic parental access with the two younger children, and (2) by deleting the provision thereof dismissing that branch of the petition filed by the father in January 2023 which was to hold the mother in civil contempt for violating the parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce, and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of that petition, and, as so modified, to affirm the order insofar as appealed from and remit the matter to the Family Court, Suffolk County, to set an appropriate schedule of therapeutic parental access between the father and the two younger children, to adjudicate the mother in civil contempt, and for the imposition of an appropriate sanction against the mother, with the following memorandum, in which DILLON, J.P., concurs:
I respectfully dissent in part, and vote to modify the order for several reasons. While I agree with my colleagues in the majority that there was a sound and substantial basis in the record for the Family Court's determinations relating to custody of the children and parental access with respect to the oldest child, I believe the court erred in declining to set a parental access schedule between the father and the two younger children and in dismissing that branch of the father's petition filed in January 2023, which sought to hold the mother in contempt. Therefore, I would instead remit the matter to the Family Court, Suffolk County, to set an appropriate schedule of therapeutic parental access between the father and the two younger children in accordance with the best interests of those children (see Matter of Lopez v Neira, 237 AD3d 1097, 1100; Matter of Clezidor v Lexune, 192 AD3d 792, 794-795), to adjudicate the mother in civil contempt, and for the imposition of an appropriate sanction against the mother (see Matter of Mendoza-Pautrat v Razdan, 160 AD3d 963, 965).
The parties are the divorced parents of three children, born in 2008, 2011, and 2013. Pursuant to the custody provisions set forth in a stipulation of settlement dated May 17, 2021, the parties had joint legal custody of the children, the mother had residential custody of the children, and the father had certain parental access with the children. The stipulation of settlement was incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce entered September 2, 2021.
In July 2022 and January 2023, the father filed petitions, inter alia, to hold the mother in contempt for violating the parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce by failing to produce the children for parental access on certain dates. In October 2023, the father filed a petition to modify the custody and parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce so as to award him sole legal and residential custody of the children. In March 2024, the mother cross-moved, in effect, to modify the custody and parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce so as to award her sole legal custody and to terminate the father's parental access with the children.
On January 2, 2024, the Family Court conducted separate in camera interviews with each child in the presence of the attorney for the children. After a hearing, in an order dated December 17, 2024, the court, inter alia, dismissed those branches of the father's separate petitions which were to hold the mother in contempt for violating the parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce, denied the father's petition to modify the custody and parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce so as to award him sole legal and residential custody of the children, and, in effect, granted the mother's cross-motion, in effect, to modify the custody and parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce so as to award her sole legal custody of the children and directed that the mother "must permit the children to visit the father if they so desire."
I agree with my colleagues in the majority that the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in directing that sole residential custody of the children remain with the mother. Although the court found that there was evidence that the mother engaged in conduct that interfered with the father's relationship with the children and that this conduct should not be condoned, the totality of the circumstances provided a sound and substantial basis for the court's determination that it was in the best interests of the children to remain in the sole residential custody of the mother (see Matter of Diaz v Vicente, 241 AD3d 1559, 1560; Matter of Brisard v Brisard, 211 AD3d 838, 839). The evidence presented at the hearing established, among other things, that the mother had been the [*4]children's primary caretaker, the children had a very close relationship with the mother and were doing well in her care, the mother provided for the children's education and medical needs and arranged their extracurricular activities, and the children had a very close bond with each other as well as with their step-parent and step-siblings, with whom they resided in the mother's home (see Matter of Miller v Perez, 232 AD3d 898, 899; Matter of Martinez v Driscoll, 209 AD3d 653, 655). Thus, I agree that there is no basis to disturb the court's determination, made after a hearing and separate in camera interviews with each of the children, that a change of residential custody would not be in the children's best interests.
Likewise, I agree that the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the mother sole legal custody of the children. "'Joint custody is encouraged as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents behaving in mature civilized fashion. However, joint custody is inappropriate where the parties are antagonistic towards each other and have demonstrated an inability to cooperate on matters concerning the child'" (Matter of Haase v Jones, 230 AD3d 774, 777, quoting Matter of Martinez v Gaddy, 223 AD3d 816, 818). Here, the record establishes that the nature of the parties' relationship effectively precluded joint decision-making and, therefore, joint custody was inappropriate (see id. at 778; Matter of Martinez v Gaddy, 223 AD3d at 818).
I further agree with my colleagues in the majority that the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to schedule parental access between the oldest child, who is almost 18 years old, and the father, giving due consideration to that child's wishes, age, and maturity level (see Matter of Jackson v Hall, 234 AD3d 967, 968-969; Matter of Sullivan v Plotnick, 145 AD3d 1018, 1021).
However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion that the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to set a parental access schedule between the father and the two younger children. "A court may not delegate its authority to determine parental access to either a parent or a child" (Matter of Mondschein v Mondschein, 175 AD3d 686, 687; see Matter of Clezidor v Lexune, 192 AD3d at 794). "[T]he determination of [parental access] is entrusted to the court based upon the best interests of the children" (Matter of Jayceon H. [Aniya M.], 248 AD3d 1116, 1119 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "While a child's views are to be considered in determining custody or parental access, they are not determinative" (Matter of Mondschein v Mondschein, 175 AD3d at 687). "An access provision which is conditioned on the desires of the children tends to defeat the right of parental access" (id.; see Matter of Clezidor v Lexune, 192 AD3d at 794). Here, the order appealed from effectively conditions the father's parental access on the children's wishes and leaves the determination as to whether there should be access at all to the children, despite finding that the mother has alienated the children from the father. Accordingly, I think it was error for the court to provide that the mother "must permit the children to visit the father if they so desire," and I would remit the matter to the Family Court, Suffolk County, to set an appropriate schedule of therapeutic parental access between the father and the two younger children in accordance with the best interests of those children (see Matter of Lopez v Neira, 237 AD3d at 1100; Matter of Clezidor v Lexune, 192 AD3d at 794-795).
Furthermore, I do not agree with my colleagues in the majority that the Family Court properly dismissed that branch of the father's petition filed in January 2023 which was to hold the mother in contempt for violating the parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce. To prevail on a motion to hold a party in civil contempt, "the moving party must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that a lawful order of the court was in effect, clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate, (2) the appearance, with reasonable certainty, that the order was disobeyed, (3) that the party to be held in contempt had knowledge of the court's order, and (4) prejudice to the right of a party to the litigation" (Matter of Guy v Weichel, 173 AD3d 1027, 1028; see Matter of Chaundhry v Saleem, 153 AD3d 518, 520). Here, the evidence at the hearing established that the mother deliberately frustrated the father's parental access with the children, by, inter alia, calling the police on two separate occasions in December 2022 when the father arrived to pick up the children, failing to encourage and facilitate regular parental access, and ultimately supporting the children's decision to refuse parental access with the father (see generally Matter of Thompson v Thompson, [*5]78 AD3d 845, 847). As such, the father established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the mother willfully violated the parental access provisions of the judgment of divorce, thereby prejudicing the father's rights to parental access with the children, and the court should have granted that branch of the father's petition filed in January 2023 which was to hold the mother in civil contempt (see Matter of Guy v Weichel, 173 AD3d at 1028; Matter of Chaundhry v Saleem, 153 AD3d at 520). I would, therefore, remit the matter to the Family Court, Suffolk County, for the court to adjudicate the mother in civil contempt and for the imposition of an appropriate sanction (see Matter of Mendoza-Pautrat v Razdan, 160 AD3d at 965).
ENTER:
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court