Matter of Ford

615 F. Supp. 259
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 26, 1985
DocketM 11-188 (RWS)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 615 F. Supp. 259 (Matter of Ford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Ford, 615 F. Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

Opinion

OPINION

SWEET; District Judge.

Civil contemnor Dr. Jean Ford has applied to this court for release from confinement despite his failure to purge himself of his civil contempt. For the reasons discussed below, his motion is granted.

Dr. Ford was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury of this district investigating a suspected conspiracy to violate provisions of federal law by commission of armed robberies, prison breaks and other illegal acts, and was granted use immunity. Dr. Ford moved before the Honorable Charles S. Haight to quash the subpoena on the grounds of marital privilege because his wife, Collette Pean, was under indictment on the conspiracy charge which was the subject of the grand jury investigation. On January 9, 1985 Judge Haight denied Dr. Ford’s motion on the grounds that his spousal privilege was adequately protected by a “Chinese Wall” created in the United States Attorney’s Office, and directed him to comply with the subpoena. Dr. Ford thereafter appeared before the grand jury *260 on January 24, 1985 and refused to answer questions on the basis of the spousal privilege. The government then moved before this court for an order of contempt pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826 and at the same time Dr. Ford asked this court to reconsider his motion to quash. By order dated January 28, 1985 Dr. Ford’s motion was denied. Dr. Ford having once again declined to testify, he was found in contempt and confined pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a). The adjudication of civil contempt was subsequently affirmed by the Second Circuit in Grand Jury Subpoena of Ford v. United States, 756 F.2d 249 (2d Cir.1985). Dr. Ford has been incarcerated in the Metropolitan Correctional Center since January 28, 1985.

Dr. Ford now seeks release from confinement, despite his continued failure to comply with this court’s order, on the grounds that further incarceration would not serve the coercive purposes of civil contempt. He first argues that he should be released because the work of the grand jury before which he was subpoenaed has concluded. In addition, he contends that because he will never abandon his refusal to testify his release is mandated by Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.1983) and Sanchez v. United States, 725 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.1984).

The purpose of the civil contempt sanction is to coerce a contemnor into complying with an order to testify before a grand jury. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966). When the grand jury’s term expires, the contemnor must be released because confinement can no longer have any coercive impact. Id. In the present case, Dr. Ford contends that even though the grand jury before which he was subpoenaed is still sitting, its work has effectively come to an end and therefore his continued incarceration can serve no purpose. In support, he points to the fact that no new indictments or subpoenas have issued from the grand jury in several months.

Despite Dr. Ford’s claims, there remains a present need for his testimony before the grand jury. The grand jury’s investigation culminated in part in the trial of several defendants on charges of RICO conspiracy presently going forward before the Honorable Robert L. Carter in United States v. Chimurenga et at, 84 Cr. 818 (RLC). It appears that Dr. Ford has knowledge of several of the Chimurenga defendants and may have knowledge of criminal activities in which the Chimurenga defendants as well as others may have engaged. According to the government, the evidence at the Chimurenga trial has demonstrated that the enterprise on trial conducted its affairs on a “need to know” basis and therefore no one person was privy to all criminal participants and activities. Dr. Ford may have knowledge that would fill remaining gaps in the investigation. In addition, Dr. Ford’s claim that there is no public necessity for his testimony because the grand jury is no longer actively pursuing its investigation is not convincing. As the Honorable Peter K. Leisure noted in In re Jean Baptiste, No. M 11-188 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1985), “the investigation did not simply end, it ran into a brick wall because Jean-Baptiste and seven of his compatriots who have been subpoenaed have all decided to go to jail rather than testify ... A contemnor should not be able to gain release on grounds of lack of public necessity when he himself brought the investigation to a halt.” Slip op. at 9. The grand jury’s recent inactivity does not justify Dr. Ford’s premature release.

Dr. Ford also contends that his unwillingness to testify at any future time renders the coercive element of confinement ineffective. Incarceration for civil contempt is intended to be remedial rather than punitive. Shillitani v. United States, supra. The civil contempt sanction is intended to coerce a contemnor into compliance rather than to punish him for his refusal to comply. Id. By enacting § 1826(a), Congress determined that confinement for up to eighteen months is coercive rather than punitive in nature. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Braun, 600 F.2d 420, 425-27 (3d Cir.1979); Matter of Dorie Clay, No. *261 M 11-188, slip op. at 6-7 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 1985) (Brieant, J.).

Our Circuit has stated, however, that courts retain the discretion to determine, at some point prior to the expiration of eighteen months or the grand jury term, if the confinement is no longer coercive but is instead primarily punitive. Simkin v. United States, supra, 715 F.2d at 37; Sanchez v. United States, supra, 735 F.2d at 31. According to the Second Circuit, the court in each instance must decide if any “realistic possibility exists that the contemnor might yet testify if confinement is continued.” If the court is convinced “after a conscientious consideration of the circumstances pertinent to the individual contemnor,” Simkin, supra, at 37, that further incarceration is not likely to compel compliance, the contempt sanction becomes punitive rather than remedial in character and the contemnor must be released. Soobzokov v. CBS, Inc., 642 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.1981); Sanchez, supra; Simkin, supra.

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Bluebook (online)
615 F. Supp. 259, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-ford-nysd-1985.