Matter of Estate of Lande

567 N.E.2d 668, 209 Ill. App. 3d 55, 153 Ill. Dec. 710, 1991 Ill. App. LEXIS 234
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedFebruary 21, 1991
Docket4-90-0519
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 567 N.E.2d 668 (Matter of Estate of Lande) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Estate of Lande, 567 N.E.2d 668, 209 Ill. App. 3d 55, 153 Ill. Dec. 710, 1991 Ill. App. LEXIS 234 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991).

Opinion

PRESIDING JUSTICE LUND

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a February 22, 1990, order of the circuit court of Adams County, which provided for the distribution of a wrongful-death settlement, and from the order of June 28, 1990, denying the motion for reconsideration. The order provided for distribution of 90% of the funds to Gladys Lande, mother of decedent Renee A. Lande, and 10% of the funds to Anita Lande, a sister of Renee. The order provided that Gilbert Lande, Renee’s father, would receive nothing.

Renee died at age 23 in a vehicle accident in Adams County. Immediately preceding her death, she was a television news reporter. The trial court’s February 22, 1990, order specifically provided:

“1. Gilbert Lande is the natural father of the decedent, Renee A. Lande, Gladys Lande is her natural mother, and Anita Lande is her sister.
2. Following the divorce of Gilbert and Gladys Lande, when Renee was about two years old, Gilbert provided minimal child support and declined to exercise visitation with the children. After his child support was reduced shortly after the divorce due to a decrease in his income, Gilbert never increased the support despite subsequent increases in his income.
He testified that he spoke with Renee two or three times while she was in high school, contacting her by phone, and also when she was in college. He lived twelve blocks from his daughters’ home for nearly fifteen years while they attended grade school, high school and college, but never attempted to visit them. He did not send his daughters cards or letters. He claims that his former wife, Gladys, discouraged and/or prevented contact with the children. Gladys denied such conduct on her part, and Anita, who was very close to Renee in age and as a sister, testified Renee never mentioned being contacted by Gilbert.
At the time of her death, Gilbert did not know where Renee lived or how she was employed, and did not know when she had moved out of her mother’s home. He did not pay any of her college expenses, nor did he receive any financial support from Renee, despite being disabled while Renee was employed after college.
3. The testimony of Gladys and Anita is credible, while that of Gilbert is not totally credible.
4. In view of the evidence and the circumstances, Gilbert was estranged from his daughter, Renee, and therefore is not entitled to recover for a claim of pecuniary injury due to loss of society. Gabriel v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., [171] Ill. App. 3d 663 (1988).”

Gilbert contends that the evidence did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was estranged from Renee and, additionally, that estrangement is not sufficient and a showing of abandonment is necessary to justify an order denying him part of the wrongful-death settlement.

Section 2 of the Wrongful Death Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 70, par. 2) provides for recovery for pecuniary injuries and includes the following provisions:

“[NJext of kin of such deceased person in the proportion, as determined by the court, that the percentage of dependency of each such person upon the deceased person bears to the sum of the percentages of dependency of all such persons upon the deceased person.”

The distribution of the funds has been tied to the right to recover for loss of a child’s society, in the absence of evidence of the child’s actual support of a parent or sibling. (Gabriel v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. (1988), 171 Ill. App. 3d 663, 668-69, 525 N.E.2d 864, 867-68.) Parents are entitled to a presumption of pecuniary injury in the loss of a child’s society, but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence that a parent and child were estranged. (Bullard v. Barnes (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 505, 517, 468 N.E.2d 1228, 1234.) We are aware that the question of whether the loss of society presumption applies to children who have reached the age of majority was not present in the Bullard case. (Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 517, 468 N.E.2d at 1234.) While the Bullard opinion expressly uses the word “estranged,” Gilbert would have us decide that there must be a finding of abandonment, citing Mortensen v. Sullivan (1972), 3 Ill. App. 3d 332, 335, 278 N.E.2d 6, 9. Gilbert also contends that the Gabriel opinion suggests the presumption of loss discussed in Bullard must be rebutted by “clear and convincing” evidence. We find no such suggestion in Bullard or elsewhere. The Gabriel appellate opinion quoted the trial court decision, which stated in part: “ ‘The Court finds that the evidence is clear and convincing that no relationship existed ***.’ ” (Gabriel, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 666, 525 N.E.2d at 866.) There is no further reference to “clear and convincing,” and the appellate opinion does not adopt that test. We do not adopt the clear and convincing test, but acknowledge that issue is not before us. The trial evidence was in fact clear and convincing.

The Mortensen opinion discussed loss of future financial support from a son who was near college age at the time he was killed. At the time of the Mortensen opinion, a presumption of pecuniary loss upon the death of a child existed, which arose from the common law rule that a parent is entitled to the services and earnings of an unemancipated minor child. This presumption was put to rest by the opinion in Bullard. (Bullard, 102 Ill. 2d at 516-17, 468 N.E.2d at 1234.) The trial court in Mortensen held there was no possibility that the decedent would ever contribute to his father’s support at any time, basing its decision solely on the fact that the father had sought termination of child support because the son was employed and self-supporting. This fact, combined with evidence that the son had applied for college admission, was the only evidence which would have defeated the then-existing presumption of benefits. The facts are not similar to the present case, and the opinion predates the Bullard decision. We find it inapplicable.

Other authorities are cited by Gilbert, arguing his abandonment theory. If the theory was adopted by this court, it would be in conflict with the Bullard opinion and, in our opinion, would be unjustified.

The hearing for purposes of determining the distribution of the agreed settlement consisted first of testimony in open court by Gladys Lande and the decedent’s sister, Anita Lande. Based on representation of counsel that for health reasons Gilbert could not appear in court, he was allowed to subsequently give an evidence deposition.

Gladys Lande testified of the 1967 divorce, at which time Renee was two years of age (Anita was one year younger). Support was set at $250 per month but, within a few months, Gilbert petitioned for modification based upon no income, and the payments were reduced to a total of $20 per week for both children. According to Gladys (and also testified to by Gilbert), this amount was never increased.

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Bluebook (online)
567 N.E.2d 668, 209 Ill. App. 3d 55, 153 Ill. Dec. 710, 1991 Ill. App. LEXIS 234, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-estate-of-lande-illappct-1991.