Matter of Del Balso H. Corp. v. McKenzie

New York Court of Appeals

Matter of Del Balso H. Corp. v. McKenzie

3 N.E.2d 438, 271 N.Y. 313, 1936 N.Y. LEXIS 1204

CourtNew York Court of Appeals

DecidedJuly 8, 1936

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 3 N.E.2d 438 (Matter of Del Balso H. Corp. v. McKenzie) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Matter of Del Balso H. Corp. v. McKenzie, 3 N.E.2d 438, 271 N.Y. 313, 1936 N.Y. LEXIS 1204 (N.Y. 1936).

Pincite

Opinion

*315 Crouch, J.

The sole question before us is whether or not the city of New York may exact rent as one of the conditions for granting a permit to the petitioner for the construction of a pier upon lands under water in West-chester creek.

The petitioner alleges that it is the owner in fee simple absolute of certain described premises, which include the locus of the proposed pier, and that those premises consist “ of upland as well as land beyond the mean high-water mark and adjacent and in part under Westchester Creek.” The city denies the allegation of ownership. It says, further, that the alleged upland is not in truth *316 upland, but is land under water unlawfully filled in and made fast, the title to which is in the city.

The answer to the question propounded depends upon a determination of the facts at issue under the pleadings as above stated. The order denying a peremptory mandamus was, therefore, proper. If the petitioner is the owner of the land under water upon which the pier is to be built, the city may not, under the guise of its conceded regulatory authority, exact rent. If the city is the owner of the land under water, the petitioner has no right whatever to enter thereon and build a pier, unless it owns adjacent upland. If the petitioner is an upland owner, it has the well-settled riparian right of access by means of a pier to navigable water in front of its upland, subject to the rights of the public. (Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74; Sage v. Mayor, 154 N. Y. 61.) The exercise of that right is subject to certain prescribed statutory conditions (see inter alia, §§ 83 et seq., and §§ 816 et seq., Greater New York Charter, Laws of 1901, ch. 466), which, however, do not include the exaction of rent. On the contrary, the riparian rights of owners of private property are expressly preserved by the charter; nor could it well have been otherwise.

The order should be modified by directing the issuance of an alternative order of mandamus to determine the rights of the parties, and as so modified affirmed, without costs.

Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran and Finch, JJ., concur.

Ordered accordingly.

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*315 Crouch, J.

The sole question before us is whether or not the city of New York may exact rent as one of the conditions for granting a permit to the petitioner for the construction of a pier upon lands under water in West-chester creek.

The petitioner alleges that it is the owner in fee simple absolute of certain described premises, which include the locus of the proposed pier, and that those premises consist “ of upland as well as land beyond the mean high-water mark and adjacent and in part under Westchester Creek.” The city denies the allegation of ownership. It says, further, that the alleged upland is not in truth *316 upland, but is land under water unlawfully filled in and made fast, the title to which is in the city.

The answer to the question propounded depends upon a determination of the facts at issue under the pleadings as above stated. The order denying a peremptory mandamus was, therefore, proper. If the petitioner is the owner of the land under water upon which the pier is to be built, the city may not, under the guise of its conceded regulatory authority, exact rent. If the city is the owner of the land under water, the petitioner has no right whatever to enter thereon and build a pier, unless it owns adjacent upland. If the petitioner is an upland owner, it has the well-settled riparian right of access by means of a pier to navigable water in front of its upland, subject to the rights of the public. (Town of Brookhaven v. Smith, 188 N. Y. 74; Sage v. Mayor, 154 N. Y. 61.) The exercise of that right is subject to certain prescribed statutory conditions (see inter alia, §§ 83 et seq., and §§ 816 et seq., Greater New York Charter, Laws of 1901, ch. 466), which, however, do not include the exaction of rent. On the contrary, the riparian rights of owners of private property are expressly preserved by the charter; nor could it well have been otherwise.

The order should be modified by directing the issuance of an alternative order of mandamus to determine the rights of the parties, and as so modified affirmed, without costs.

Crane, Ch. J., Lehman, O’Brien, Hubbs, Loughran and Finch, JJ., concur.

Ordered accordingly.

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3 N.E.2d 438, 271 N.Y. 313, 1936 N.Y. LEXIS 1204, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-del-balso-h-corp-v-mckenzie-ny-1936.

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