Matter of Cross

182 B.R. 42, 1995 WL 314432
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska
DecidedMay 4, 1995
Docket19-40212
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 182 B.R. 42 (Matter of Cross) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Cross, 182 B.R. 42, 1995 WL 314432 (Neb. 1995).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

JOHN C. MINAHAN, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the court is the Second Amendment to Chapter 12 Plan of Reorganization and Request for Confirmation of Plan, and the Trustee’s Objections to Confirmation. The Trustee’s Objections are overruled. I conclude that debtors may make payments to secured creditors directly and not through the Chapter 12 trustee.

FINDINGS OF FACT

There are only three creditors in this Chapter 12 case — Dawson County, Nebraska (“Dawson County”); Lincoln County, Nebraska (“Lincoln County”); and the Farmers Home Administration (“FmHA”). The claims of Dawson County and Lincoln County are for personal property taxes and/or real estate taxes, and are both fully secured. The claim of the FmHA is in regard to a real estate mortgage, which claim is part secured and part unsecured. Under the Second Amendment to Chapter 12 Plan, the debtors propose to pay Dawson County, Lincoln County, and the secured portion of the FmHA’s claim directly, rather than through the office of the Chapter 12 trustee. The debtors propose to pay the unsecured portion of the FmHA’s claim from disposable income through the office of the Chapter 12 trustee. The trustee has objected to the proposed direct payment of secured claims, asserting that such proposal is contrary to and in violation of various sections of Titles 11 and 28 of the United States Code.

DISCUSSION

The Chapter 12 trustee is entitled to no fees on payments made directly to creditors by the debtor. See 28 U.S.C. § 586 (1995). The trustee argues that the proposed direct payments to creditors are in violation of the Bankruptcy Code and Title 28 of the United States Code. I conclude that the position of the trustee is contrary to the holding of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Wagner, 36 F.3d 723 (8th Cir.1994). I also conclude that such position is contrary to the previous holdings of this court, which are consistent with In re Wagner.

In In re Wagner, the debtors’ Chapter 12 plans provided for direct payments to impaired secured creditors. In re Wagner, 36 F.3d at 725. The bankruptcy court had dismissed the bankruptcy cases involved in In re Wagner, holding that trustee fees can not be avoided by direct payment to impaired secured creditors. Id. The district court reversed, holding that the provisions of the Chapter 12 plans providing for direct payment to impaired secured creditors were valid, and such payments were not subject to trustee’s fees. Id. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court ruling, holding that direct payments to impaired secured creditors are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code. In re Wagner, 36 F.3d at 726 (citations omitted). Specifically, the court in In re Wagner held that direct *44 payments were not prohibited by §§ 1225 and 1226 of the Bankruptcy Code, two of the sections asserted by the trustee in the present case. Id. I agree with this holding, and, of course, am bound to follow it. Section 1225(a)(5) contemplates distribution by either the trustee or the debtor, and § 1226 deals with payments actually received by the trustee and expressly contemplates payments made by parties other than the trustee if so provided in a plan. Id. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5) and § 1226 (1995).

The trustee also asserts 28 U.S.C. § 586 in support of his position that direct payments are not allowed. However, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Wagner, held that an interpretation allowing direct payments to impaired secured creditors was not inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 586, which provides that fees are due to the trustee on “all payments received by such individual [the trustee] under the plan_” In re Wagner, 36 F.3d at 727; 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(2) (1995). Again, I agree with the court in In re Wagner. The trustee fee scheme developed by Congress and set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 586 expressly contemplates payment of trustee fees only on those monies actually received by the trustee. Thus nonpayment of trustee fees on payments made directly by the debt- or is not prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 586.

In support of his position that direct payments are prohibited, the trustee in this case also cites § 1222(a) and § 326(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. I conclude that these Code sections are irrelevant to the matter before the court. The trustee in this case is a standing trustee. Section 326(b) prohibits a court from compensating a standing trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 326(b) (1995). However, this prohibition does not infer a mandatory right to compensation under 28 U.S.C. § 586. Section 1222(a) provides for the submission of income of the debtor to the supervision and control of the trustee “as is necessary for execution of the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1222(a) (1995). Where a plan provides for direct payments to be made by the debtor, submission to the trustee of the portion of income to be paid directly is not “necessary” to execute the plan, because the plan expressly contemplates execution of these payments by the debtor.

I conclude, as a matter of law, based on In re Wagner, that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or Title 28 requires a debtor to make payments through the office of the Chapter 12 trustee, and that the trustee is not entitled to compensation on direct payments. This conclusion is not only consistent with the holding of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Wagner, it is also consistent with previous holdings of this court. See e.g. Matter of Harris, 107 B.R. 204 (Bankr.D.Neb.1989); Matter of Kosmicki, 161 B.R. 828 (Bankr.D.Neb.1993). Indeed, my previous decisions appear to be more narrow than the holding of In re Wagner.

However, I conclude that under § 105, I have the authority to issue an order that is necessary to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, including those provisions dealing with the compensation and duties of trustees. It is clear under the Bankruptcy Code that Congress intended that the Chapter 12 trustee would play a meaningful role in Chapter 12 cases, and that the expenses of administering the office of the Chapter 12 trustee be funded through fees assessed in Chapter 12 cases.

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Related

In Re McCann
202 B.R. 824 (N.D. New York, 1996)
Matter of Cross
195 B.R. 440 (D. Nebraska, 1996)
In Re Jennings
190 B.R. 863 (W.D. Missouri, 1995)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
182 B.R. 42, 1995 WL 314432, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-cross-nebraskab-1995.