Matter of BLJ

717 P.2d 376
Alaska Supreme Court·Decided April 18, 1986·No. S-648·Published

Opinion

717 P.2d 376 (1986)

In the Matter of B.L.J., J.P.J., and C.T.J., Minors Under the Age of Eighteen (18) Years.

No. S-648.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

April 18, 1986.

*377 G. Nanette Thompson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Anchorage, Harold M. Brown, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for Department of Health and Social Services.

No appearance for parents, stepparent, children or superior court.

Before RABINOWITZ, C.J., and BURKE, MATTHEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.

OPINION

COMPTON, Justice.

This case involves an interpretation of the children in need of aid statute, AS 47.10.080(c)(1). The Department of Health and Social Services (Department) contends that once a court declares a minor a child in need of aid and commits the minor to the Department under AS 47.10.080(c)(1), then the Department has the authority to direct the placement of the minor. The court can review the Department's decision to see if it constitutes an abuse of discretion, but it cannot make a specific placement order once legal custody has been granted to the Department. We agree.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

B.L.J., T.P.J. and C.T.J. are minor children. After their parents divorced, mother remarried stepfather.

The Department assumed emergency custody of the children after B.L.J. was severally beaten and bruised by stepfather.

Subsequently, a petition to adjudicate the minors as children in need of aid under AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) and (C) was filed. After a probable cause hearing, the Department obtained temporary legal custody. The children were physically placed with mother, provided they were never left alone with stepfather.

At an adjudication hearing, it was held that the children were in need of aid and committed to the legal custody of the Department. The court later continued the order in which the children were physically placed with mother, but vacated the restriction on contact between stepfather and children.

Mother and stepfather agreed to participate in a treatment plan that required stepfather to complete a thirty day Treatment Alternative to Street Crime (TASC) evaluation and required the couple to receive family counseling at the Center for Children and Parents. The couple did not complete this plan.

A few months after the adjudication hearing, the Department's social worker petitioned for return of legal custody to mother. The guardian ad litem opposed this recommendation and a hearing was held. The children's court master entered an oral ruling which granted a transfer of legal custody, but neither the children's court master nor the superior court filed a written order.

In a predisposition report, the Department's social worker suggested that the children be placed in the home of their natural father until mother and stepfather completed their treatment plan. At the hearing, the children's court master recommended that the children remain in the legal custody of the Department with physical placement in the home of mother and stepfather provided the couple obtained family and individual counseling, stepfather completed the TASC program, and no further incidents of domestic violence occur. *378 The Department filed objections to the master's report, claiming that the court lacked authority to dictate the physical placement of the children under AS 47.10.080(c)(1).

Thereafter, Judge Victor D. Carlson entered a memorandum of decision in which he concluded that there was no legal basis for the Department to change the children's placement from the mother's to the natural father's home. Judge Carlson stated that the original order only granted the Department legal custody but not physical custody. The Department could not remove the children from their mother's home without filing a petition requesting an additional order. The Attorney General appeals this decision on behalf of the Department. We reverse.

DISCUSSION

I. DOES THE DEPARTMENT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DIRECT THE PLACEMENT OF MINORS WHO ARE IN ITS LEGAL CUSTODY?

AS 47.10.080(c)(1) and (2) provide:

(c) If the court finds that the minor is a child in need of aid, it shall
(1) order the minor committed to the department for placement in an appropriate setting for a period of time not to exceed two years or in any event past the date the minor becomes 19 years of age, except that the department may petition for and the court may grant in a hearing (A) two-year extensions of commitment which do not extend beyond the minor's 19th birthday if the extension is in the best interests of the minor and the public; and (B) an additional one-year period of supervision past age 19 if the continued supervision is in the best interests of the person and the person consents to it; the department may transfer the minor, in the minor's best interests, from one placement setting to another, and the minor, the minor's parents or guardian, and the minor's attorney are entitled to reasonable notice of the transfer;
(2) order the minor released to the minor's parents, guardian or some other suitable person, and, in appropriate cases, order the parents, guardian, or other person to provide medical or other care and treatment; if the court releases the minor, it shall direct the department to supervise the care and treatment given to the minor... .

The Department argues that under AS 47.10.080(c)(1) it has the responsibility for placement of minors who are in its legal custody.[1] It argues that if the court determines a minor is a child in need of aid and commits the child to the Department for placement, then the Department, and not the court, has the power to place minors in the best environment.

The Department relies upon State v. A.C., 682 P.2d 1131 (Alaska App. 1984), in which the court of appeals interpreted the delinquency provisions of As 47.10.080(b)(3).[2] The delinquency and child in *379 need of aid provisions are analogous. In A.C., the court held that AS 47.10.080(b)(3) grants the court authority to order the delinquent minor committed to the Department and placed on probation. After this order, it is up to the Department to determine the appropriate placement of the minor. 682 P.2d at 1134.[3] The court found that the legislature intended for the Department to make decision concerning the placement of the minor:

It appears to us that in enacting AS 47.10.080(b)(3), the legislature intended for the department to make the decisions concerning placement of the minor. We note that the statute does provide for the court to "order the minor committed to the department," and that "the department transfer the minor, in his best interests, from one of the probationary placement settings listed in this paragraph to another." The fact that the department has the authority to move the minor from one placement to another, without prior permission of the court, is consistent with the department having the authority to determine an appropriate placement. It is important that the statute does not provide that the department only has the power to move a minor to another placement if there are exigent circumstances which would make prior court approval difficult.

Id.

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