Matter of Armanida Realty Corp. v. Town of Oyster Bay

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Matter of Armanida Realty Corp. v. Town of Oyster Bay

126 A.D.3d 894, 3 N.Y.S.3d 612

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 18, 2015

Docket2013-00458

StatusPublished

Cited by257 cases

This text of 126 A.D.3d 894 (Matter of Armanida Realty Corp. v. Town of Oyster Bay) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Matter of Armanida Realty Corp. v. Town of Oyster Bay, 126 A.D.3d 894, 3 N.Y.S.3d 612 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

Pincite

Opinion

In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondents/defendants dated May 4, 2012, finding that the subject premises contained a dangerous condition, and, inter alia, prohibiting entry into the subject premises, and action for injunctive relief, the petitioner/ plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Galasso, J.), entered October 11, 2012, as denied its motion to preliminarily enjoin the respondents/defendants from enforcing the determination during the pendency of the proceeding/action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

“Although the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a trial, the remedy is considered a drastic one, which should be used sparingly” (Trump on the Ocean, LLC v Ash, 81 AD3d 713, 715 [2011]). “To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction, and (3) a balancing of the equities in the movant’s favor” (Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v Marchese, 96 AD3d 791, 791-792 [2012]; see CPLR 6301; Nohu Next Door, LLC v Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]). “The decision to grant or deny a *895 preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court” (Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v Marchese, 96 AD3d at 792; see Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 [1988]).

Here, the petitioner/plaintiff, Armanida Realty Corp. (hereinafter Armanida), failed to demonstrate its claim of irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction, as the alleged injuries were all economic in nature (see Matter of Rice, 105 AD3d 962, 963 [2013]). In addition, Armanida failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits (see Matter of Rice, 105 AD3d at 963; Family-Friendly Media, Inc. v Recorder Tel. Network, 74 AD3d 738 [2010]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying Armanida’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief.

Skelos, J.R, Balkin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondents/defendants dated May 4, 2012, finding that the subject premises contained a dangerous condition, and, inter alia, prohibiting entry into the subject premises, and action for injunctive relief, the petitioner/ plaintiff appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Galasso, J.), entered October 11, 2012, as denied its motion to preliminarily enjoin the respondents/defendants from enforcing the determination during the pendency of the proceeding/action.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

“Although the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a trial, the remedy is considered a drastic one, which should be used sparingly” (Trump on the Ocean, LLC v Ash, 81 AD3d 713, 715 [2011]). “To obtain a preliminary injunction, a movant must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction, and (3) a balancing of the equities in the movant’s favor” (Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v Marchese, 96 AD3d 791, 791-792 [2012]; see CPLR 6301; Nohu Next Door, LLC v Fine Arts Hous., Inc., 4 NY3d 839, 840 [2005]). “The decision to grant or deny a *895 preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court” (Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v Marchese, 96 AD3d at 792; see Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750 [1988]).

Here, the petitioner/plaintiff, Armanida Realty Corp. (hereinafter Armanida), failed to demonstrate its claim of irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction, as the alleged injuries were all economic in nature (see Matter of Rice, 105 AD3d 962, 963 [2013]). In addition, Armanida failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits (see Matter of Rice, 105 AD3d at 963; Family-Friendly Media, Inc. v Recorder Tel. Network, 74 AD3d 738 [2010]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying Armanida’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief.

Skelos, J.R, Balkin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

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126 A.D.3d 894, 3 N.Y.S.3d 612, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-armanida-realty-corp-v-town-of-oyster-bay-nyappdiv-2015.

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