Matter of Argenti v. Town of Riverhead

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Matter of Argenti v. Town of Riverhead

131 A.D.3d 1053, 16 N.Y.S.3d 470

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedSeptember 16, 2015

Docket2013-09851

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 131 A.D.3d 1053 (Matter of Argenti v. Town of Riverhead) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Matter of Argenti v. Town of Riverhead, 131 A.D.3d 1053, 16 N.Y.S.3d 470 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

Pincite

Opinion

Proceeding *1054 pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Town Board of the Town of Riverhead dated July 17, 2012, which adopted in part and rejected in part the recommendation of a hearing officer, made after a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75, finding the petitioner guilty of two charges of misconduct and/or insubordination, and terminated the petitioner’s employment.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

Our review of an administrative determination in an employee disciplinary case made after a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75 is limited to considering whether the determination was supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Jeffery v Israel, 109 AD3d 543, 544 [2013]; Matter of Guidarelli v Israel, 105 AD3d 739, 740 [2013]). Here, the determination of the Town Board of the Town of Riverhead that the petitioner was guilty of two charges of misconduct and/or insubordination was supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Jeffery v Israel, 109 AD3d at 544).

We may set aside an administrative penalty only if it “ ‘is so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness,’ thus constituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law” (Matter of Waldren v Town of Islip, 6 NY3d 735, 736 [2005], quoting Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 237 [1974]; see Matter of Guidarelli v Israel, 105 AD3d at 740). Here, the penalty of dismissal is not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness (see Matter of Jeffery u Israel, 109 AD3d at 544; Matter of Guidarelli v Israel, 105 AD3d at 740), especially in light of the petitioner’s prior disciplinary record.

Balkin, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Proceeding *1054 pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Town Board of the Town of Riverhead dated July 17, 2012, which adopted in part and rejected in part the recommendation of a hearing officer, made after a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75, finding the petitioner guilty of two charges of misconduct and/or insubordination, and terminated the petitioner’s employment.

Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.

Our review of an administrative determination in an employee disciplinary case made after a hearing pursuant to Civil Service Law § 75 is limited to considering whether the determination was supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Jeffery v Israel, 109 AD3d 543, 544 [2013]; Matter of Guidarelli v Israel, 105 AD3d 739, 740 [2013]). Here, the determination of the Town Board of the Town of Riverhead that the petitioner was guilty of two charges of misconduct and/or insubordination was supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Jeffery v Israel, 109 AD3d at 544).

We may set aside an administrative penalty only if it “ ‘is so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness,’ thus constituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law” (Matter of Waldren v Town of Islip, 6 NY3d 735, 736 [2005], quoting Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 237 [1974]; see Matter of Guidarelli v Israel, 105 AD3d at 740). Here, the penalty of dismissal is not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one’s sense of fairness (see Matter of Jeffery u Israel, 109 AD3d at 544; Matter of Guidarelli v Israel, 105 AD3d at 740), especially in light of the petitioner’s prior disciplinary record.

Balkin, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

131 A.D.3d 1053, 16 N.Y.S.3d 470, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-argenti-v-town-of-riverhead-nyappdiv-2015.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack