Matter of Adames v. Digangi

Opinion

Matter of Adames v Digangi

2026 NY Slip Op 05022

August 19, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

In the Matter of David Adames, appellant,

v

Alexandra Digangi, respondent.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 19, 2026

2024-02655, (Docket No. V-2898-24)

Colleen D. Duffy, J.P.

Janice A. Taylor

Lourdes M. Ventura

Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.

Law Offices of Eyal Talassazan, P.C., Garden City, NY, for appellant.

Wand & Goody, LLP, Commack, NY (Jennifer H. Goody of counsel), for respondent.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County (Rosamaria Abbate, J.), dated March 29, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the mother's motion which was to dismiss the father's petition for custody of the parties' child for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the proceeding.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the petition is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

The parties have one child in common, born December 20, 2023. In January 2024, the mother commenced custody proceedings in Hernando County, Florida. Thereafter, in February 2024, the father commenced this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6 for custody of the child. The mother then moved, among other things, to dismiss the father's petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, contending, inter alia, that the child was born in Florida and Florida is the home state of the child. The father opposed. In an order dated March 29, 2024, the Family Court, among other things, granted that branch of the mother's motion and dismissed the proceeding. The father appeals.

Pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (see Domestic Relations Law article 5-A), a New York court "may not exercise its jurisdiction" in a child custody proceeding "if, at the time of the commencement of the proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction substantially in conformity with [Domestic Relations Law article 5-A], unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum" (Domestic Relations Law § 76-e[1]; see Matter of Frankel v Frankel, 127 AD3d 1186, 1187-1188). "If the court determines that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with [Domestic Relations Law article 5-A], the court of this state shall stay its proceeding and communicate with the court of the other state" (Domestic Relations Law § 76-e[2]; see Domestic Relations Law § 77-f; Matter of Touchet v Horstman, 207 AD3d 639, 640; Matter of Frankel v Frankel, 127 AD3d at 1188). "If the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with [Domestic Relations Law article 5-A] does not determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of this state shall dismiss the proceeding" (Domestic Relations Law § 76-e[2]; see Matter of Frankel [*2]v Frankel, 127 AD3d at 1188).

A court, acting pursuant to these provisions, must make a record of its communications with a court of another state on substantive matters, must promptly inform the parties of the communication, and grant the parties access to the record (see Domestic Relations Law § 75-i[4]; Matter of Frankel v Frankel, 127 AD3d at 1188). The court may, in its discretion, allow the parties to participate in the communication, but "[i]f the parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made" (Domestic Relations Law § 75-i[2]; see Matter of Touchet v Horstman, 207 AD3d at 640; Matter of Frankel v Frankel, 127 AD3d at 1188).

Here, the record does not show that the Family Court followed the procedures mandated under the Domestic Relations Law. Although the court determined that there was a "proceeding concerning the custody of the child [that had] been commenced in a court of another state having jurisdiction" (Domestic Relations Law § 76-e[1]), there is no indication that the court engaged in the requisite communication with the court of the other state (see id. § 76-e[2]).

Under these circumstances, we reverse the order insofar as appealed from, reinstate the petition, and remit the matter to the Family Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings in accordance with Domestic Relations Law § 76-e(2), and thereafter, a new determination on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and the mother's motion (see id. § 76-e[1]-[2]; Matter of Frankel v Frankel, 127 AD3d at 1188).

The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be addressed in light of our determination.

DUFFY, J.P., TAYLOR, VENTURA and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

2024-02655 DECISION & ORDER ON MOTION

In the Matter of David Adames, appellant,

v Alexandra Digangi, respondent.

(Docket No. V-2898-24)

Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Suffolk County, dated March 29, 2024. Motion by the respondent to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the issues raised on the appeal are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated October 24, 2025, the motion was held in abeyance and referred to the panel of Justices hearing the appeal for determination upon the argument or submission thereof. Separate motion by the appellant, inter alia, to strike stated portions of the respondent's brief on the ground that they refer to matter dehors the record. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated May 11, 2026, that branch of the motion was held in abeyance and referred to the panel of Justices hearing the appeal for determination upon the argument or submission thereof.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motions and the papers filed in opposition thereto, and upon the argument of the appeal, it is

ORDERED that the motion to dismiss the appeal is denied; and it is further,

ORDERED that the branch of the separate motion which is to strike stated portions of the respondent's brief on the ground that they refer to matter dehors the record is granted to the extent that the following portions of the respondent's brief are stricken and have not been considered in the determination of the appeal: (1) the sentence on page 15 beginning with the words "Since then, Respondent," (2) the sentence on page 16 beginning with the words "Again, his arguments, to the extent they have any merit," (3) the sentence on page 18 beginning with the words "Again, and upon information and belief," (4) the sentence on page 19 beginning with the words "Moreover, as it [*3]became evident at the next proceeding," (5) the sentence on page 23 beginning with the words "His arguments regarding fitness," (6) the sentence on page 24 beginning with the words "Further, Respondent cannot alienate a parent," (7) the portion of the third full paragraph on page 24 beginning with the words "As above, there is now an Order," through the end of that paragraph, which ends with the words "any trial Court would consider," and (8) the last sentence on page 24 beginning with the words "Appellant's continued litigious conduct," and that branch of the separate motion is otherwise denied.

DUFFY, J.P., TAYLOR, VENTURA and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court