Matter of a Member of the Bar: Gelof

CourtSupreme Court of Delaware
DecidedJune 10, 2016
Docket143, 2016
StatusPublished

This text of Matter of a Member of the Bar: Gelof (Matter of a Member of the Bar: Gelof) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of a Member of the Bar: Gelof, (Del. 2016).

Opinion

IN TI-IE SUPREM]E COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

In the Matter of a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware

No. 143, 2016

Board Case No. 1l2424-B

ADAM D. GELOF,

) ) ) ) ) Respondent. )

Submitted: June 8, 2016 Decided: June 10, 2016

Before HOLLAND, VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.

PER CURIAM:

This 10"‘ day of June, 2016, it appears to the Court that the Board on Professional Responsibility has filed a Report on this matter pursuant to Rule 9(d) of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed no objections to the Report. Respondent, through counsel, filed objections which this Court has considered. The Off`1ce of Disciplinary Counsel responded to Respondent’s objections. Oral argument was held on June 8, 2016.

This Court has reviewed the matter pursuant to Rule 9(e) of the Delaware

Lawyer’s Rules of Disciplinary Procedure and concludes that the Board’s Report should

be approved. NOW, 'IHER.EFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Report filed by the Board on

Professional Responsibility on March 23, 2016 (Exhibit A attached) is hereby

APPROVED.

The Court hereby imposes a suspension of 30 days, beginning July 1, 2016. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel is directed to tile within ten days of the date of this Order the costs of the disciplinary proceedings Therea{ter, Respondent is directed to have all costs paid within thirty days. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel is directed to disseminate this Order in accordance with the Rules of the Board on Professional

Responsibility.

request of Garrison did not immediately believe what had transpired. (Tr. 219). Withers testified that when she told Respondent shortly thereafter, "dude, that wasn’t cool," he (Respondent) sat down and "the expression on his face told me he had no idea what I was talking about. He really didn’t understand what had just happened.” (Tr. 120-121).

The following morning, February 5, 2015, Det. King emailed Karen Taylor, Deputy Court Administrator for the Supen`or Court in and for Sussex County to inform the Court about the incident. (Jt. Ex 2).8 Taylor forwarded the email to the Honorable Judge Richard F. Stokes and was summoned to the courthouse for a meeting. (Tr. 33-34). Taylor and Judge Stol

Jurden and Linda Car1nichael, Superior Court Staff Attorney, were notified (Tr.

3 In the email to Taylor, Det. King stated, in part:

This obviously alarmed me and I began to react by attempting to get to my weapon. Before 1 drew my weapon there was a chuckle in the room and the door closed. l immediately questioned who that was and was told it was Dell [ z h aili f. Apparently he was playing a joke. My concern is that had I een in a different position to draw my weapon it is quite po ible would have fired my weapon in light of the threat I perceived or had it been a second longer l may have decided to wrestle the u om this person. My intent is to make someone aware becau I ee hat he action demonstrated extremely poor judgment with re ard o the handling of a firearm in the courthouse. (Jt. Ex. 2).

RLF| ]4]59£35\'_|

37-38). Peggy Marshall, the Sussex County Chief Prosecutor, was contacted. (Tr. 38). Capitol Police were asked to conduct a criminal investigation. On February 6, 2015, Garrison was placed on administrative leave and escorted from the Courthouse. (Tr. 38-39).

On February 9, 2015, Administrative Order 2015-l was issued by President Judge Jurden. (Jt. Ex. 8). The Administrative Order was intended to be an internal documentg but was mistakenly published on Superior Court’s website and then reported by the press. (Jt. Exs. 6, 7). Respondent was named in that account and acknowledged that he “involved a bailiff in a practical joke" and was "professionally and personally embarrassed for all involved that my actions have resulted in the matter going this far." (Jt. Ex. 6).

On Friday February 13, 2015, at 4:30 pm, Respondent was informed he was indefinitely suspended. His badge and keys were removed and he was escorted out of the Department of Justice building. (Tr. 216).

In early March 2015, Garrison returned to work with similar job responsibilities, but was demoted from Chief of Security to a Court SecurityI with a

corresponding reduction in pay. (Tr. 42-43). Garrison appealed the employment

9 The Administrative Order was withdrawn from the website due to security

concems. (Tr. 46-47).

9 Ru=l 14\59235\¢.1

decision. By letter dated June 4, 20l5, by Stephanie Fitzgerald, the Court of Common Pleas Administrator, upheld the employment decision. (Jt. Ex. 5).

Alter the Capitol Police investigation, the matter was presented to the Departrnent of Justice for criminal review and it was determined criminal charges were not warranted. On or about April 27, 2015, Respondent was approved to return to work. He served a 2 month paid suspension (effectively prohibiting his practice of law). Respondent was demoted from a DAG Level 5, Unit Head 2 to a DAG Level 3, an entry level position he last held 18 years earlier in 1997. (Tr. 92). His return at Level 3 (a 12 step demotion) carried a more than 2 % pay cut. (Tr. 92, 217). Respondent was "put on a probationary period of a year." He was not allowed to prosecute felony cases, which is what he has been doing since 1998, until it was approved by the Chief Deputy, Respondent’s Court Supervisor and the Attorney General himself Respondent also was put on a performance improvement plan and was subject to review periods. (Tr. 93). Respondent took full responsibility for what occurred'° and accepted these consequences.

Considerable resources were expended on this matter. Attending meetings, conference calls and hearings, Taylor’s time alone in responding to this incident was in excess of 50 hours. (Tr. 52). In addition, during Garrison’s suspension, Taylor

‘° Respondent testifted: "I mean I will be the first to say it, if it weren’t for me,

Del wouldn’t have done this." (Tr. at 90).

10 RLF\ 14159235\».1

assumed Garrison’s responsibilities as Chief of Security in addition to her own administrative duties for approximately five (5) months. (Tr. 41-42, 52). In executing her duties as Chief of Security, Taylor worked approximately 70-75 hours of uncompensated 0vertime. (Tr. 52).

The Delaware Capitol Police conducted eleven (ll) interviews, obtained courthouse surveillance and briefed Dennis Kelleher, Esquire, the DAG responsible for determining whether criminal charges would be flled. (Jt. Ex. 3; Tr. 45). Capitol Police expended 85 - - 90 hours on their investigation. (Tr. 53).

III. THE PRESUMPTIVE SANCTION

Attorney discipline is not intended to be punitive. fn re Koyste, 111 A.Bd 581 (Del. 201 5). Rather, the objectives of the Lawyer Disciplinary System are to protect the public, to protect the administration of justice, to preserve confidence in the legal profession, and to deter other lawyers from similar conduct. In re Fountaz'n, 878 A.Zd 1167, 1173 (Del. 2005). To "further these objectives and ‘to promote consistency and predictability in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions,"’ the Supreme Court looks for guidance to the ABA Standards for lrnposing Lawyer

Sanctions ("ABA Standards"). See id. (citation omitted).

1 l RLF\ 14\59235\».1

A. ABA STANDARDS

In formulating an appropriate sanction, the Court is generally guided by the ABA Standards and to relevant Delaware precedent when making an initial determination of an appropriate or presumptive sanction after finding attorney misconduct.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In Re a Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the State Lassen
672 A.2d 988 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 1996)
In Re Anvahnay S.
16 A.3d 1244 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 2011)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Matter of a Member of the Bar: Gelof, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-a-member-of-the-bar-gelof-del-2016.