Mattel, Inc. v. United States

76 Cust. Ct. 84, 1976 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1073
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedMarch 8, 1976
DocketC.D. 4639; Court Nos. 70/42525, etc.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 76 Cust. Ct. 84 (Mattel, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mattel, Inc. v. United States, 76 Cust. Ct. 84, 1976 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1073 (cusc 1976).

Opinion

Maletz, Judge:

The question involved in this consolidated action is the proper tariff classification of articles invoiced as “voice units” that were imported from Mexico in 1968 and 1969.

The importations were classified by the government under item 737.90 of the Tariff Schedules of the United States, as modified by T.D. 68-9, as parts of toys, not specially provided for, and assessed with duty at the rate of 31 percent or 28 percent ad valorem, depending upon the date of entry.

Plaintiff contends that the articles are properly classifiable under item 685.32 of the tariff schedules, as modified by T.D. 68-9, as phonographs, dutiable at the rate of 10 percent or 9 percent ad valorem, depending upon the date of entry.

The provisions of the tariff schedules with which we are concerned read as follows:

General Headnotes and Rules of Interpretation
10. General Interpretative Rules. * * *
***##*:*
(ij) a provision for “parts” of an article covers a product solely or chiefly used as a part of such article, but does not prevail over a specific provision for such part. [Emphasis added.]
Schedule 7, Part 5
Subpart E. - Models; Dolls, Toys, Tricks, Party Favors
Subpart E headnotes:
1. The articles described in the provisions of this subpart (except parts) shall be classified [86]*86in sucb provisions, whether or not such articles are more specifically provided for elsewhere in the tariff schedules * * *. [Emphasis added.]
Classified under [Schedule 7, Part 5, Subpart E]:
Toys, and parts of toys, not specially provided for:
***** * * 737.90 Other_
31% or 28% ad val. [as modified by TJD. 68-9]
Claimed under [Schedule 6, Part 5]:
685.32 Record players, phonographs, record changers, turn-tables, and tone arms, and parts of the foregoing-;- 10% or 9%
ad val. [as modified by T.D. 68-9]

The parties agree that the voice units in question are'parts of toys; that in. their condition as imported they have no independent play' or amusement value; and that they are not used in their condition as imported. Rather, at plaintiff’s factory in the United States, they are inserted into dolls, stuffed animals and other objects manufactured by plaintiff.1 Further, it is undisputed — and the court agrees— that the provision for phonographs in item 685.32 is a specific provision within the meaning of general interpretative rule 10(ij). Thus, if the imported articles are phonographs within the ambit of item 685.32, as claimed, then general interpretative rule 10(ij) and headnote 1 of schedule 7, part 5, subpart E require that this phonograph provision prevail over the item 737.90' “parts of toys” provision. In these circumstances, the single issue is whether or not the importations constitute “phonographs” within the common meaning of item 685.32.

The imported article, which is patented, comes enclosed in a plastic casing which has an eyelet in the side of the housing.2 It has a turntable, spindle, tone arm assembly, stylus or needle, loudspeaker cone, a clock spring that serves as a driving spring, and a drawstring which is wrapped around a pulley that is attached to the clock spring. The drawstring extends through the tone arm assembly and through the [87]*87eyelet to the exterior of the casing where the other end is attached to a plastic ring.

The device also contains a disc or record which is permanently affixed by glue or cement to the turntable and cannot be.removed without destroying the article. The unit is operated in the following manner, as described by its inventor (R. 36): • .

When you pull the string it winds up a spring; when you release the string, the spring turns a turntable. There’s, a record on the turntable, and the record is played by a stylus or phonograph needle which is in a tone arm. The vibrations on the record are reproduced by the needle moving and pressing against the loud speaker cone. The loud speaker cone transmits the sound into the air.

The record, however, differs from the “conventional” monophonic or stereophonic record. For the conventional record has but one continuous spiral groove or sound track radiating inward to the center, whereas the record in the imported voice unit contains several interleaved sound tracks on the surface. These tracks consist of continuous spiral grooves which start at different points on the circumference and run on nearly parallel paths into the center of the record. Put otherwise, a conventional record has but one spiral groove while an interleaved record has two or more spiral grooves in the same record.3

Each spiral in the imported voice unit contains a separate and distinct prerecorded sentence or saying which generally runs from two to three, but not more than four seconds. The records affixed to these units have between eleven and thirteen of such prerecorded statements, thus containing about forty seconds of recorded material.

The imported device is designed and constructed so that the record cannot be played sequentially. When the string which starts the mechanism is pulled, the stylus will fall in' a random fashion into any one of the spiral grooves or sound tracks and play only that prerecorded sound which, as noted, runs no longer than four seconds. Thus, [88]*88an essential characteristic of the article is that the operator can neither control nor determine in advance which sound track will be played. In other words, as the parties stipulated, the article is a “random selection device.”

Turning now to the legal aspects, it is fundamental that absent contrary legislative intent, the common meaning of a term controls in construing the tariff statutes. “And this common meaning is, of course, ‘a matter of law to be determined by the court, for which purpose the court may consult dictionaries and other authorities, may receive the testimony of witnesses, which is advisory only, and may rely on its own knowledge’.” Mattel, Inc. v. United States, 65 Cust. Ct. 616, 619, C.D. 4147 (1970). See also e.g., United States v. O. Brager-Larsen, 36 CCPA 1, 3, C.A.D. 388 (1948); West Coast Cycle Supply Co. v. United States, 66 Cust. Ct. 500, 503, C.D. 4242 (1971).

Against this background, plaintiff called as expert witnesses the inventor of the voice units, who is an electrical engineer; a patent lawyer and engineer with over 30 years of experience in the sound equipment and electronics fields; a manager of technical operations for a company which provides consulting and engineering services to its clients in the magnetic recording and sound reproduction businesses; and a professor of mechanical engineering who is a specialist in mechanical design in vibration and the author of a widely used text on vibration.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
76 Cust. Ct. 84, 1976 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 1073, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mattel-inc-v-united-states-cusc-1976.