Matsugishi v. Chen

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedFebruary 18, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-01840
StatusUnknown

This text of Matsugishi v. Chen (Matsugishi v. Chen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matsugishi v. Chen, (D. Nev. 2025).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Takenobu Matsugishi, et al., 2:24-cv-01840-JAD-MDC 4 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STAY 5 vs. DISCOVERY 6 Bell Ventures, Inc., et al., 7 Defendant(s). 8 Pending before the Court is defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF No. 28). For the reasons 9 stated below, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Stay. 10 DISCUSSION 11 I. BACKGROUND 12 This action arises from certain disputes among family members concerning a family business. In 13 2018, Plaintiff Takenobu Matsugishi (“Matsugishi”) formed and funded defendant Bell Ventures 14 (“Bell”) by investing over $9 million into the company. ECF No. 13 at ¶¶ 16-20. Bell went on to 15 purchase 37 residential properties in Arizona and Florida, which were to be used as rentals and 16 generating income for the company. Id. at ¶¶ 21-27. Defendant Peter Chen (“Peter”) is Matsugishi’s 17 brother and defendant James Chen (“James”) is plaintiff’s nephew. Id. at ¶¶ 24-25. Matsugishi alleges 18 that Peter and James took control of Bell and used the company as part of a scheme for personal profit. 19 Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20) on December 20, 2024. Plaintiffs filed a 20 Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 24) on January 7, 2025. Defendants filed the Motion to 21 Stay Discovery (ECF No. 28) on January 14, 2025. Plaintiffs oppose (ECF No. 32) the Motion to Stay. 22 II. LEGAL STANDARD 23 A. The Court Has Inherent Discretion To Control Discovery 24 Federal courts have the “power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every 25 court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 1 counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S. Ct. 163, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936). 2 “The district court has wide discretion in controlling discovery[.]” Tradebay, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 278 3 F.R.D. 597, 601 (D. Nev. 2011) (citing Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988)). 4 When considering a motion to stay discovery while a dispositive motion is pending, “this court 5 considers the goal of Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which directs that the Rules shall 6 ‘be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 7 action.’” Tradebay, 278 F.R.D. at 602 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). Thus, the Court may consider staying 8 discovery pursuant to its inherent powers and discretion, together with the goals pronounced by Rule 1. 9 B. The Pragmatic Approach 10 The undersigned Magistrate Judge previously adopted the pragmatic approach when considering 11 motions to stay discovery because a dispositive motion is pending. Aristocrat Techs., Inc. v. Light & 12 Wonder, Inc., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90611, at *4 (D. Nev. May 21, 2024). The pragmatic approach 13 considers only the following two elements: (1) if the dispositive motion can be decided without further 14 discovery; and (2) good cause exists to stay discovery. Id. 15 III. ANALYSIS 16 Defendants move to stay discovery pending a determination on their motion to dismiss. ECF No. 17 28. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion to Stay. ECF No. 32. Under the pragmatic approach, the Court finds 18 that [1] the motion to dismiss can be determined without discovery and [2] good cause exists to stay 19 discovery. 20 A. Discovery Is Not Needed For The Motion To Dismiss 21 Parties disagree on whether discovery is needed to decide the Motion to Dismiss. Defendants 22 argue that the Motion to Dismiss can be decided without discovery. Plaintiffs disagree and argue that 23 discovery is needed because the Motion to Dismiss introduces an exhibit to establish a new fact and to 24 resolve defendants’ argument that Mrs. Matsugishi lacks Article III standing. ECF No. 32. 25 1 The Court agrees with defendants that discovery is not needed to decide the Motion to Dismiss. 2 The Court also finds that plaintiff failed to articulate the specific discovery needed, if any, to address the 3 pending issues. 4 Plaintiffs’ argument that discovery is needed because of an exhibit attached to defendants’ 5 Motion to Dismiss is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs claim the exhibit establishes some “new fact.” Plaintiffs, 6 however, do not specify what the “new fact” is, which undermines not only the substance of argument 7 but the credibility thereof. In contrast, defendants point out that the exhibit attached to their Motion to 8 Dismiss is an email which plaintiffs incorporated into their Amended Complaint. ECF No. 37 at 3. The 9 Ninth Circuit has recognized that “[a] court may consider evidence on which the complaint ‘necessarily 10 relies’ if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff's claim; 11 and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.” Marder v. 12 Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994), 13 overruled on other grounds.). “The court may treat such a document as ‘part of the complaint, and thus 14 may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).’” Marder, 15 450 F.3d at 448 (citing United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003)). As defendants point 16 out in their Reply (ECF No. 37), plaintiffs reference the exchange of emails in their Amended Complaint 17 (ECF No. 13 at 15-16, ¶¶ 78-81) (referencing an exchange of emails that occurred on or around May 18 2024). Thus, plaintiffs have not established that defendants’ exhibit necessitates discovery to determine 19 defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, let alone that it will be converted into a motion for summary judgment. 20 See e.g., Axon Enter. v. Luxury Home Buyers, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 256449, at *5-6 (D. Nev. 21 Oct. 29, 2020) (“[T]here is no guarantee that the Court will convert the defendant's motion to dismiss to 22 one for summary judgment.”). Even assuming that the exhibit attached to the Motion to Dismiss 23 transforms it into a motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs have not shown what specific discovery is 24 needed to respond to a potential converted motion for summary judgment. “A party seeking to delay 25 summary judgment for further discovery must state what other specific evidence it hopes to discover 1 [and] the relevance of that evidence to its claims.” Stevens v. CoreLogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 678 (9th 2 Cir. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). 3 Plaintiffs’ argument that they are entitled to discovery to respond to defendants’ challenge of 4 Mrs. Matsugishi’s standing per Rule 12(b)(1) is also unpersuasive. Plaintiffs do not identify any specific 5 discovery they need to respond to defendants Rule 12(b)(1) motion. In contrast, defendants point out 6 that their motion to dismiss Mrs. Matsugishi for lack of standing is based on plaintiffs’ failure to plead 7 the elements. ECF No. 20 at 5; ECF No. 37 at 4, fn. 2. Such matters are issues of law and can be 8 determined without discovery.

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