Matos v. New York City Housing Authority

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Matos v. New York City Housing Authority

192 A.D.2d 590, 596 N.Y.S.2d 733

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York·Decided April 12, 1993·Published

Opinion

—In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Katz, J.), dated January 25, 1991, which granted the plaintiffs’ motion to vacate their default in answering the defendant’s summary judgment motion and, upon reargument, denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Since the plaintiffs proffered a reasonable excuse and demonstrated that they possessed a meritorious action, the Supreme Court properly vacated their default in answering the defendant’s summary judgment motion (see, CPLR 5015; Mineroff v Macy’s & Co., 97 AD2d 535). In addition, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that there was any extraordinary and unforeseeable act which severed the causal connection between the infant plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s alleged negligence (cf., Falcone v City of New York, 170 AD2d 575; Green v New York City Hous. Auth., 82 AD2d 780, affd 55 NY2d 966). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied. Lawrence, J. P., Eiber, O’Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Katz, J.), dated January 25, 1991, which granted the plaintiffs’ motion to vacate their default in answering the defendant’s summary judgment motion and, upon reargument, denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Since the plaintiffs proffered a reasonable excuse and demonstrated that they possessed a meritorious action, the Supreme Court properly vacated their default in answering the defendant’s summary judgment motion (see, CPLR 5015; Mineroff v Macy’s & Co., 97 AD2d 535). In addition, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that there was any extraordinary and unforeseeable act which severed the causal connection between the infant plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s alleged negligence (cf., Falcone v City of New York, 170 AD2d 575; Green v New York City Hous. Auth., 82 AD2d 780, affd 55 NY2d 966). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment was properly denied. Lawrence, J. P., Eiber, O’Brien and Ritter, JJ., concur.

Matos v. New York City Housing Authority, 192 A.D.2d 590, 596 N.Y.S.2d 733 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993).

Pincite

192 A.D.2d 590 (Matos v. New York City Housing Authority) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

Related