Matias Perez v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 24, 2025
• Docket: 25-704
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 24 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUANA DOROTEA MATIAS PEREZ, No. 25-704 Agency No. Petitioner, A201-670-602 v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 20, 2025** San Jose, California

Before: SCHROEDER and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and SCHREIER, District Judge.***

Juana Dorotea Matias Perez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for

review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation. denial by an immigration judge (“IJ”) of her application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part and grant in part the petition

for review, and remand for further proceedings.

Petitioner is a woman of indigenous Mayan descent who is an evangelical

Christian. Her claims focus on the conduct of a woman named Amanda, who

operated a stand next to the one Petitioner and her mother established to sell fruit.

Petitioner testified concerning the threats, racial epithets, and anti-Christian slurs

she endured from Amanda and persons connected with her, and the IJ found

Petitioner’s testimony to be credible.

Petitioner contends that the past harm she suffered was on account of her

ethnicity and religion, citing the ethnic and anti-Christian slurs her attackers used.

The agency found that the threats and intimidation were motivated by animosity

toward a competitor and not on account of a protected ground. We have

recognized, however, that use of such slurs establishes a connection between

harmful acts and a petitioner’s ethnicity and religion. See, e.g., Baballah v.

Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The use of this slur amply

establishes the connection between the acts of persecution and [the petitioner’s]

ethnicity and religion.”).

The record does not compel a finding that the protected grounds were a

2 25-704 “central reason” for the attacks, the standard required for asylum relief. See 8

U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). However, the nexus requirement for withholding of

removal claims is less demanding, and the applicant need only show that a

protected ground is “a reason” for future persecution. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(C); see also Garcia v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1136, 1146 (9th Cir.

2021) (“[T]he requirement that an applicant demonstrate that a protected

characteristic would be ‘a reason’ for future persecution is a ‘weaker motive’ than

the ‘one central reason’ required for asylum. ‘A person may have “a reason” to do

something that is not his “central” reason or even “one central reason.”’” (citations

omitted) (quoting Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359 (9th Cir. 2017)).

The BIA opinion does not appropriately apply that standard. Accordingly,

we remand to the agency for further consideration of Petitioner’s withholding of

removal claim. See Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004); see

also Garcia, 988 F.3d at 1147 (“The difference between the motive standards

matters, particularly in cases like this one, in which the BIA’s decision turns on its

nexus determination.”).

Petitioner, however, has identified no error in the agency’s denial of her

CAT claim. The record shows the agency sufficiently took into account all the

evidence of past threats and attempted vehicular harm, as well as generalized

country conditions evidence depicting discrimination and violence committed

3 25-704 against indigenous Guatemalans. The record does not compel the conclusion that

Petitioner is more likely than not to suffer the intentional infliction of “an extreme

form of cruel and inhuman treatment,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2), with “the consent

or acquiescence of a public official” if removed to Guatemala. Xochihua-Jaimes v.

Barr, 962 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2020).

We therefore grant the petition only with respect to withholding of removal,

and remand to the agency for further consideration of that claim. The petition is

otherwise denied.

Petition DENIED in part; GRANTED in part; and REMANDED.1

1 The motion to stay removal (Docket No. 2) is granted. The stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

4 25-704