Mathies Coal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board

591 A.2d 351, 140 Pa. Commw. 24, 1991 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 282
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania·Decided May 14, 1991·No. No. 540 C.D. 1990·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinions

PELLEGRINI, Judge.

Mathies Coal Company (Employer) files a Petition for Review appealing an Order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming a Referee’s Decision granting the Fatal Claim Petition of Vickie Lynn Tau (Claimant).*

[26] Claimant’s deceased spouse, William P. Tau (Tau), worked for Employer as a utility man in the underground mine of the Employer. The utility man does all the odd jobs and gets “cuts” ready for the other miners. (29a).1 Upon arrival at work on October 10, 1984, Tau and several members of the “crew” went down into the mine. (29a-30a). Upon arriving at the “face” of the area to be mined; Tau was requested by his foreman to get more fan cable so that the fan could be moved up to the next cut to mine coal. (33a). To get the cable, Tau had to go back about three hundred feet from the cut site. (33a) Thus, the cable had to be dragged by hand about 300 feet. The cable was 800 feet in length, 1 to IV2 inches thick, and had five smaller insulated wires inside with an encompassing thick rubber coating insulation. (34a, 43a-45a). The cable carries 440 volts of electricity to run the fan. (44a).

While Tau was getting the cable, a co-worker, Robert Troup (Troup), mined coal and completed a cut which took about 30 minutes. (47a, 62a). After completion of the cut, Troup turned around and saw a light on the floor about 100 feet away. (36a-38a, 63a). Troup ran to the light and found Tau lying on his back, unconscious. (41a). His legs were in a puddle of water a couple of inches deep. (39a-40a, 64a). He was not in contact with the cable, but it was lying next to him in loops. (41a-42a, 65a-67a). Tau had pulled the cable up close to the fan where he was found. (47a). Troup dragged Tau out of the water to a drier spot about ten feet away. (39a, 43a). While dragging Tau, Troup saw a “tape job” or splice where the cable had been repaired on one of the loops of the cable Tau had dragged to the fan. (35a, 44a, 65a-67a). Efforts to resuscitate Tau at the scene were unsuccessful and he was taken to Canons-burg Hospital where he was pronounced dead.

The next morning an autopsy was performed by Ernest L. Abernathy, M.D., and witnessed by Washington County Coroner Farrell Jackson. The gross diagnosis of the autopsy was that Tau died from a coronary hypoplasia and [27] arteriosclerosis. (464a-466a). The death certificate, signed by Dr. Abernathy and dated the same day, indicated death attributable to ventricular fibrillation, due to coronary insufficiency, due to coronary arteriosclerosis and hypoplasia. (419a). On October 11, 1984, Coroner Jackson wrote a letter to the Employer, further explaining the autopsy results. Coroner Jackson reiterated the causes of death set forth in the death certificate. (518a-519a). He also made the following statement:

It has also been brought to our attention that he [Tau] was hanging miner cable of the 500 volt type, and I am not sure whether or not it was energized, but having this information and knowing of a past case which was considered a heart attack until we were able to determine it was electrocution, we examined Mr. Tau very closely for possible electrocution death. There was no indication found by the pathologist that he had in any way come in contact with any electric power source.

(518a-519a).

Despite the Coroner’s findings to the contrary, Claimant filed a Fatal Claim Petition on June 28, 1986, alleging that her husband’s death was due to cardiac arrhythmia produced by electric shock. (3a-4a). Following several hearings, the Referee issued a Decision concluding that Tau “died by virtue of an electrocution injury suffered within the scope and course of his employment which activated an arrhythmia in his heart already having a coronary heart disease called coronary hypoplasia” and awarded benefits. (13a). The Employer appealed the Referee’s Decision to the Board which affirmed. The Employer now appeals the Board’s Order.2

The Employer contends that Claimant has failed to satisfy her burden of proving by circumstantial evidence that Tau’s death was caused by electrocution. The Employer [28] argues that the Referee’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence, since Claimant’s circumstantial evidence does not so preponderate in favor of the conclusions reached as to outweigh the results of the autopsy and other evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom to the contrary. The Employer further contends that the Referee erred by relying on the incompetent medical opinions of Claimant’s expert witnesses, Joshua Perper, M.D., and Jay M. Ziegler, M.D., because their opinions were based upon a critical fact, Tau’s contact with electricity, which is not in evidence.

In a workmen’s compensation case, the claimant has the burden of proving that the injury arose in the course of employment and was casually connected with the claimant’s work. Northeastern Hospital v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Turiano), 134 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 164, 578 A.2d 83 (1990); Karsaba v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Bethlehem Steel Corp.), 71 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 303, 454 A.2d 682 (1983). In the present case, although the Claimant has presented direct evidence that Tau had been carrying the cable prior to his death, there is no direct evidence that Tau actually came in contact with electricity or that the cable was energized. Thus, Claimant must prove that Tau died because of electrocution through circumstantial evidence.

In Smith v. Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, 397 Pa. 134, 138, 153 A.2d 477, 480 (1959), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that:

When a party who has the burden of proof relies upon circumstantial evidence and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom, such evidence, in order to prevail, must be adequate to establish the conclusion sought and must so preponderate in favor of that conclusion as to outweigh in the mind of the fact-finder any other evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom which are inconsistent therewith. (Emphasis added.)

Moreover, evidence of an accident causing injury may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence; in the latter [29] instance, there must be a clear and logical indication of its occurrence. Adamchick v. Wyoming Valley Collieries Co., 332 Pa. 401, 3 A.2d 377 (1939); Evancik v. Coal Mining Co. of Graceton, 150 Pa.Super. 27, 27 A.2d 767 (1942).

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Mathies Coal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 591 A.2d 351, 140 Pa. Commw. 24, 1991 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 282 (Pa. Ct. App. 1991).

591 A.2d 351 (Mathies Coal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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