Mathews v. Wedemeyer

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

COURTNEY B. MATHEWS #232626, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) NO. 3:23-cv-00644 v. ) ) JUDGE RICHARDSON ROBERT WILEY WEDEMEYER, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Courtney Mathews is a state prisoner pursuing a direct appeal in his state criminal case. He filed a civil complaint in this Court and paid the filing fee. As explained below, this Court will not exercise jurisdiction over this case based on the Younger abstention doctrine, and Plaintiff also lacks standing to pursue some of his claims.1 Accordingly, this case will be dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiff’s pending motions will be denied as moot. I. Background2 Plaintiff is serving a life sentence. (Doc. No. 1 at 14.) He is currently pursuing a direct appeal in the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA). (Id. at 14–15.) The TCCA granted

1 Younger abstention and standing are both issues that the Court can raise sua sponte. See Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d 193, 206 n.3 (6th Cir. 2017) (Younger); Bench Billboard Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 675 F.3d 974, 983 (6th Cir. 2012) (standing). And both issues are properly considered as questions of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See Doe v. Lee, No. 3:21-cv-00809, 2022 WL 1164228, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 19, 2022) (Younger); Lyshe v. Levy, 854 F.3d 855, 857 (6th Cir. 2017) (standing).

2 The Court is considering whether to exercise jurisdiction based on the face of the pleadings. The analysis of subject-matter jurisdiction that follows, therefore, is facial rather than factual. See Gentek Bldg. Prod., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing distinction between facial challenges and factual challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction, explaining that the former “questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading” while the latter requires a court to “weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter does or does not exist”). As such, this Background is drawn only from the allegations in the Complaint and the attached exhibits, which the Court accepts as true. See id. (“When reviewing a facial attack, a district court takes the allegations in the complaint as true, which is a similar safeguard employed under 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.”). him permission to represent himself, and when Plaintiff filed his appellate brief, he requested oral argument under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 (hereinafter, “Rule 35”). (Id. at 15.) As relevant to the Complaint, Rule 35(g) explains that two things may happen if a party fails to appear for oral argument: (1) the party who does appear will still be able to participate in oral argument; and (2) the party who does not appear (if that is the party that requested oral

argument) may be assessed “reasonable costs incurred by the party who does appear,” which “may include a reasonable attorney’s fee.” (Id. at 16, 28 (emphasis added).) The TCCA denied Plaintiff’s request for oral argument on June 6, 2023. (Id. at 15.) One week later, Plaintiff filed a civil complaint in this Court3 against the four judges of the TCCA’s Middle Section and the five justices of the Tennessee Supreme Court asserting claims covering two issues: who is permitted to participate in oral argument in his appeal (id. at 25–35 (hereinafter, “Participation Claims”)), and potential financial sanctions that (according to him) could be imposed against him for failing to appear for oral argument after requesting it. (Id. at 18–25, 33– 35 (hereinafter, “Financial Sanction Claims”).) Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief,

seeking to secure his participation in oral argument before the TCCA, prevent the State from participating in oral argument without him, and ensure that he is not financially sanctioned for requesting oral argument and then failing to appear pursuant to Rule 35(g). (Id. at 35–36.) II. General Principles: Inquiry Into Subject-matter Jurisdiction For a federal court, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is always a threshold determination.” Doe, 2022 WL 1164228, at *4 (quoting Am. Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534, 537

3 Because Plaintiff is a pro se prisoner, the Court considers the Complaint filed on the date he signed it— June 13, 2023. (Doc. No. 1 at 36); Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (“[A] pro se prisoner’s complaint is deemed filed when it is handed over to prison officials for mailing to the court[,] . . . with an assumption that, absent contrary evidence, a prisoner does so on the date he or she signed the complaint.”). (6th Cir. 2007)). The Court may raise the question of whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction without a motion being filed. See Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Patel, 445 F.3d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re Lewis, 398 F.3d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 2005)). And if the Court answers that question in the negative—that is, if the Court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction”—then the Court “must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

As noted in a footnote above, challenges to a federal district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction “fall into two general categories: facial attacks and factual attacks.” Mucerino v. Martin, No. 3:21-cv-00284, 2021 WL 5585637, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 30, 2021). Here, the Court is considering only the sufficiency of the pleading, so this is a facial analysis of subject-matter jurisdiction, whereby the Court “takes the allegations in the complaint as true.” Doe, 2022 WL 1164228, at *4 (citing Gentek, 491 F.3d at 330). And Plaintiff, as “the party invoking federal jurisdiction[,] has the burden to prove that jurisdiction.” Doe, 2022 WL 1164228, at *4 (citing Global Tech., Inc. v. Yubei (XinXiang) Power Steering Sys. Co., 807 F.3d 806, 810 (6th Cir. 2015); Golden v. Gorno Bros., 410 F.3d 879, 881 (6th Cir. 2005)).

III. ANALYSIS A. Younger Abstention “[L]ower federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only those powers granted to them by Congress.” Baze v. Parker, 632 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 550 (1989)). “[F]ederal courts,” therefore, “must be reluctant to infer that Congress has expanded their jurisdiction”—and even more so “where an expansion of jurisdiction would implicate federalism concerns.” Id. (citations omitted). “Federalism concerns are particularly strong in criminal matters, and, absent a clear directive from Congress or the Constitution, a federal court should be loath to assume jurisdiction to interfere with state criminal proceedings, including postconviction proceedings.” Id. at 341 (collecting cases, including Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971)). The Younger abstention doctrine is a recognition of this principle. It reflects the “desire to prevent federal courts from interfering with the functions of state criminal prosecutions and to preserve equity and comity.” Doe v. Univ. of Kentucky, 860 F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing

Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). Under Younger, a federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction where: 1) there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding; 2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; and 3) there is an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in the state proceeding. Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d 193, 206 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Squire v. Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2006)). Accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true, Younger abstention is appropriate with respect to this entire case, including Plaintiff’s Participation Claims and his Financial Sanction Claims. First, the direct appeal proceedings in Plaintiff’s state criminal case are currently ongoing; indeed, Plaintiff’s goal in this case is for this Court to exercise authority over his direct appeal by

ostensibly dictating who can participate in oral argument and blocking Plaintiff from receiving a potential financial sanction. Second, Tennessee’s interest in the administration and enforcement of its criminal laws is paramount. See Younger, 405 U.S. at 51–52 (“Since the beginning of this country’s history Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts.”); Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 8 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Younger and O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1973) (“Younger established a near-absolute restraint rule when there are pending state criminal proceedings. O’Shea, in effect, extends this near-absolute restraint rule to situations where the relief sought would interfere with the day-to-day conduct of state trials.”)). And third, “Tennessee courts provide a criminal defendant with an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges.” Doe, 2022 WL 1164228, at *6 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982) (“Minimal respect for the state processes, of course, precludes any presumption that the state courts will not safeguard federal constitutional rights.”). Accordingly, the three criteria for applying Younger abstention are met

here. There are, however, exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine, including: 1) bad faith or harassment; 2) “flagrant unconstitutionality of the statute or rule at issue,” Doe, 860 F.3d at 371 (citing Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 1996)); and 3) “where there is ‘an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief.’” Aaron v. O’Connor, 914 F.3d 1010, 1019 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 (1975)). But these exceptions “have generally been interpreted narrowly by the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit.” Doe, 2022 WL 1164228, at *6 (citing Gorenc v. City of Westland, 72 F. App’x 336, 338–39 (6th Cir. 2003)).

Again accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Complaint does not support the application of a Younger exception. First, “[t]he bad faith/harassment exception to Younger abstention ‘is extremely narrow and applies only in cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken without hope of obtaining valid convictions.’” Doe, 2022 WL 1164228, at *8 (quoting McNatt v. Texas, 37 F.3d 629 (5th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiff’s allegations do not present the type of “extreme facts” implicating this exception. See id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted (“Courts limit findings of bad faith to extreme facts, such as when Texas city police officers repeatedly engaged in searches and seizures they knew to be unlawful, or when a county prosecutor office filed twelve separate actions . . . in order to harass the plaintiffs and drain them of all their financial resources.”)). Second, the “flagrant unconstitutionality” exception likewise “is a high bar,” requiring “the challenged policy to be facially unconstitutional ‘as well as [unconstitutional in application.’” Watkins v. Ohio Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:21-cv-04482, 2022 WL 672565, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2022) (quoting Doe, 860 F.3d at 371). And although Plaintiff alleges that the TCCA’s application of Rule 35(g) is unconstitutional “as applied to him” (Doc. No. 1 at 4), he makes no

allegation or argument that Rule 35(g) is facially unconstitutional. (See id. at 22 (alleging that Rule 35(g) “is both sensible and rational[] and therefore[] serves a legitimate government interest when applied to non-incarcerated litigants”).) “The last exception to Younger abstention—‘an extraordinarily pressing need for immediate equitable relief’—is reserved for situations where ‘the federal court concludes that the state proceedings are inadequate because there is no available state forum for the plaintiff’s constitutional claims.’” Doe v. Lee, No. 3:20-cv-00610, 2020 WL 4926607, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 21, 2020) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 107–08 (1975)). Liberally construing the Complaint in Plaintiff’s favor, he makes two arguments that implicate this exception. First, he

alleges that he cannot “bring any of his U.S. Constitutional claims” in a state trial court because the order denying his request for oral argument on direct appeal was issued by a judge of the TCCA and is therefore binding on the lower courts. (Doc. No. 1 at 12.) And second, Plaintiff alleges that “there are no appellate procedural rules or statutory provisions that would allow Plaintiff to challenge the arbitrary imposition of financial sanctions by any of the defendants.” (Id.) The Court is unpersuaded by either argument. With his first argument, Plaintiff is essentially asking the Court to find that Younger carries no weight in federal court when the parallel state court proceedings are appellate in nature because lower state courts are bound by a higher state court’s order. Such a finding would be inconsistent with well-established precedent providing that Younger “applies to state appellate proceedings as well as state trials.” See Foster v. Kassulke, 898 F.2d 1144, 1145 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (holding that abstention from federal intervention in state direct appeal proceedings was appropriate)). As to Plaintiff’s second argument, the Court notes that it is made in support of just his Financial Sanction Claims (and not his Participation Claims). Beyond the general proposition,

noted above, that “Tennessee courts provide a criminal defendant with an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges,” Doe, 2022 WL 1164228, at *6 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), Plaintiff’s alleged concern about financial sanctions does not justify application of this exception. Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that no state procedures exist to challenge any future financial sanctions under Rule 35(g), but Plaintiff apparently made no effort to secure the relief sought in this case in state court before filing in federal court. And the Supreme Court has held that “when a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state- court proceedings, a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,

481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). So, Plaintiff has not carried his burden of demonstrating an absence of a state forum in which to litigate his Financial Sanction Claims. Moreover, the extraordinarily- pressing-need exception may potentially apply only where a plaintiff faces “great, immediate, and irreparable harm.” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 433 (1979) (citing Kugler, 421 U.S. 117). But for essentially the same reasons that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue the Financial Sanction Claims, discussed below, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff faces great and immediate harm from a potential financial sanction he may or may not receive for failing to appear at a potential oral argument that may or may not occur. Finally, apparently anticipating that Younger may present a barrier to litigating this case (in federal court), Plaintiff included in the Complaint some argument directly addressing Younger. Plaintiff alleges that Younger abstention is inappropriate because he is not asking the Court to enjoin the pending state proceedings and the relief he is seeking is not “relevant” to his underlying convictions or the substantive issues presented in his direct appeal. (Doc. No. 1 at 7–8.) But

Younger abstention is appropriate not just where the relief sought would completely enjoin a state proceeding, but also where federal court action would interfere with it. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43 (discussing the federal policy “to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts”); Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1074 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971) (noting that Younger abstention is appropriate in declaratory judgment actions, as well as actions seeking injunctive relief, “because they involve ‘precisely the same interference with and disruption of state proceedings’ as an injunction”). The Supreme Court has “recognized that the States’ interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should

influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). Accordingly, “the Sixth Circuit has held that Younger [generally] bars ‘even minimal interference with . . . a state proceeding.’” Stevenson v. Motors, No. 5:16-CV-421-KKC, 2017 WL 512750, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 7, 2017) (quoting J. P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1084 (6th Cir. 1981)). Plaintiff is asking this Court to step in and administer part of a direct appeal in a state criminal case that would normally be administered by the TCCA, which would easily constitute the minimal level of interference required to apply Younger abstention. See Watson v. Kentucky, Civ. No. 15-21-ART, 2015 WL 4080062, at *2 (E.D. Ky. July 6, 2015) (quoting Parker, 626 F.2d at 8 (“‘Younger established a near-absolute restraint rule when there are pending state criminal proceedings’— even when the interference would not actually halt the prosecution altogether.”)). To sum up, the three requirements for Younger abstention are met, and none of the exceptions to abstention apply. Based on the principles of federalism, comity, and equity embodied in the Younger abstention doctrine, the Court will not exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s case,

which represents an improper attempt for a federal court to interfere with and administer part of a pending direct appeal in a state criminal case. And because Plaintiff sought only equitable relief in this case, the Court will exercise its discretion to dismiss it without prejudice. See Nimer v. Litchfield Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 707 F.3d 699, 702 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 865 (6th Cir. 2006) (“If the plaintiffs seek equitable relief, such as an injunction, then the district court may exercise its discretion and decide whether to dismiss the case.”)); Aaron, 914 F.3d at 1020–21 (citations omitted (“A dismissal based on Younger is without prejudice.”)). B. Standing With regard to Plaintiff’s Financial Sanction Claims, it is also clear from the face of the

pleadings that Plaintiff lacks standing. “Standing ‘ensure[s] that federal courts do not exceed their authority’ and ‘limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Tenn. Gen. Assembly v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 931 F.3d 499, 507 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)). “[A]s the party invoking federal jurisdiction,” Plaintiff has the burden of establishing standing by alleging facts demonstrating that he: “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338 (citations omitted). “Standing is to be determined as of the time the complaint is filed.” Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that he suffered an injury in fact related to the Financial Sanction Claims as of the time he filed the Complaint., To be clear, Plaintiff does not allege that he has already been sanctioned; rather, he alleges that he is “subject to the arbitrar[y] imposition

of punitive financial sanctions” in the future. (Doc. No. 1 at 5.) But an injury in fact requires that a plaintiff “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 339 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). “A threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and ‘allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.’” In re Teixeira, 844 F. App’x 847, 854 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 411 (2013)). “And courts are ‘reluctan[t] to endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent actors.’” Id. (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414). Plaintiff’s concern about a potential financial sanction in the future is simply too

speculative to plausibly suggest a cognizable injury in fact. The Court accepts as true that the TCCA denied Plaintiff’s request for oral argument under Rule 35. The Court likewise accepts as true that Rule 35(g) permits a state appellate court to assess a financial sanction against a party who requests and then does not appear for oral argument. But Plaintiff’s theory of cognizable injury would then require the Court to make several unwarranted leaps of logic that the Court will not make, such as: that the TCCA will actually hold oral argument (when the Complaint contains no indication that oral argument has been scheduled);4 that the TCCA would consider Plaintiff to

4 Tennessee appellate courts can and do decide cases without oral argument. See Tenn. R. App. P. 35(h); Alexandria-Williams v. Goins, No. W2018-01024-COA-R10-CV, 2018 WL 3198799, at *1 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2018) (finding oral argument to be unnecessary). be the requesting party for any oral argument that it holds (when Plaintiff’s request for oral argument was denied); that the TCCA would consider Plaintiff’s absence from any oral argument it holds to be a “failure to appear” for purposes of Rule 35(g) (when Plaintiff would have been prevented from appearing due to a court ruling); and that the TCCA would actually sanction Plaintiff under Rule 35(g) (when the decision to issue a Rule 35(g) sanction is entirely within the

court’s discretion). Plaintiff alleges that being sanctioned under Rule 35(g) “is not some far off theoretical possibility” for him, in light of the “fines, fees, and litigation taxes” that have been routinely imposed by the State of Tennessee against him and other incarcerated pro se litigants in the past. (See Doc. No. 1 at 20–21.) But Plaintiff has not pointed to a single example of another incarcerated pro se litigant receiving a Rule 35(g) sanction in particular—much less when such a litigant’s request for oral argument was denied. (See id. at 21 (alleging that Plaintiff was “doubled [sic] charged for records”); Doc. No. 1-7 (documentation of fees and costs levied against other incarcerated pro se litigants with no apparent connection to Rule 35(g).) So, what Plaintiff has

alleged with regard to his Financial Sanction Claims is, at most, a “mere exposure to a vague risk of possible harm.” “[W]ithout more,” that “is insufficient for Article III standing.” Saleh v. Barr, 801 F. App’x 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). This lack of standing provides an additional basis, aside from Younger abstention, for the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Financial Sanction Claims without prejudice. See Thompson v. Love’s Travel Stops & Country Stores, Inc., 748 F. App’x 6, 11 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[A] dismissal for lack of standing is without prejudice.”). IV. Conclusion For these reasons, the Court abstains from exercising jurisdiction in this case pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine, and Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his Financial Sanction Claims. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED without prejudice, and Plaintiff's pending motions (Doc. Nos. 3, 7) are DENIED as moot. The Court also CERTIFIES that any appeal in this matter would not be in good faith, so Plaintiff will not be granted leave to proceed as a pauper on any appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). IT IS SO ORDERED.

ChE Richardson ELI RICHARDSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE