Mathews, Aaron

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Decided: January 11, 2023
• Docket: WR-91,731-01
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. WR-91,731-01

EX PARTE AARON MATHEWS, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 1392768-A IN THE 208TH DISTRICT COURT FROM HARRIS COUNTY

KELLER, P.J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which HERVEY, RICHARDSON, KEEL, WALKER, SLAUGHTER and MCCLURE, JJ., joined. YEARY and NEWELL, JJ., concurred.

OPINION

We previously filed and set this case to address whether the requirements for the inference

of falsity that this Court adopted in Ex parte Coty1 should apply in cases involving a police officer

with a demonstrated pattern of misconduct in drug-related cases.2 We concluded that it should, and

we remanded the case for the habeas court to determine whether evidence substantiates Applicant’s

1 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 2 Ex parte Mathews, 638 S.W.3d 685, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). MATHEWS — 2

Coty claim.3 In particular, we were concerned about whether there was evidence that Officer Goines

committed repeated acts of misconduct in pursuit of illicit-drug investigations.4 This was relevant

to the second Coty prong: whether the state actor “committed multiple instances of intentional

misconduct in another case or cases.”5 And depending on when a second instance of misconduct

occurred, it might also be relevant to the fifth Coty prong, whether the actor’s conduct in an

applicant’s case occurred “within roughly the same period of time as the other misconduct.”6 The

only evidence of misconduct before us at the time was Officer Goines’s false testimony and evidence

in cases involving the Mallet brothers in 2008.7

After we had remanded this case, we decided Ex parte Jeffery.8 In that case, it was

determined that Officer Goines “conducted fictional drug buys, provided false information in the

affidavit for the search warrant, and testified falsely at Applicant’s trial that Applicant had admitted

ownership of a cell phone found in close proximity to the drugs in this case.”9 Officer Goines’s

misconduct in that case occurred in 2018.

On the basis of the Mallet and Jeffery cases, the habeas court now concludes that Goines

3 Id. at 692. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 689, 691, 692. 6 Id. 7 Id. at 688-89 (observing that there was an allegation that Goines falsified information in a 2019 search warrant affidavit but the record at that time contained “no hard evidence to otherwise substantiate that allegation”). 8 No. WR-92,544-01, 2022 WL 4088689 (Tex. Crim. App. September 7, 2022) (not designated for publication). 9 Id. MATHEWS — 3

engaged in multiple instances of misconduct and that his conduct in Applicant’s case, occurring in

2013, occurred within roughly the same period of time as the other misconduct.10 The habeas court

found that all the Coty prongs were met in Applicant’s case and that a presumption of falsity

applied.11 The habeas court also determined that Goines’s misconduct was material because, apart

from his offense report, “the State possesses no evidence to support the applicant’s guilt.”12 The

habeas court also credited the portion of Applicant’s unsworn declaration that stated that he would

not have pled guilty but would have insisted on a trial if he had known about Goines’s misconduct

in other cases.13

These findings by the habeas court are supported by the record.14 Consequently, we grant

relief.

10 Agreed Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Paragraph 16 (September 16, 2022). 11 Id. 12 Id., Paragraph 18. 13 Id., Paragraphs 19-20. 14 In a footnote in our prior opinion, we said that Applicant “alleges collateral consequences, such as the possibility of an enhanced penalty for a future conviction, potential impeachment of his credibility in future proceedings, and increased difficulty in procuring a job,” Mathews, 638 S.W.3d at 687 n.2, and the habeas court concluded that Applicant had asserted collateral consequences by making such allegations. Findings, Paragraph 22. There is good reason to question how much value to give a footnote such as this. In Young v. State, 826 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), we refused to follow footnote 6A of Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 229 n. 6A (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), upon which, some judges believed, the outcome of Tompkins rested. See Young, supra at 147 (Campbell, J., dissenting); id. at 153 (Benavides, J., dissenting on mot. for reh’g). We also said that it was “generally true” that footnotes are dicta. Id. at 144 n.5. In this case, moreover, our prior opinion did not dispose of the case, raising the possibility that the collateral consequences issue could be revisited. Here, though, Applicant’s unsworn declaration also alleged, “They enhanced me with this conviction in charging me in a later offense (no. 2182308).” Given that allegation, we will not reconsider our earlier conclusion that Applicant sufficiently alleged collateral consequences. MATHEWS — 4

Delivered: January 11, 2023 Publish