Mateo Mateo v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-7789
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 10 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROSA MARIA MATEO MATEO; LAURA No. 24-7789 FLORES FRANCISCO MATEO; MATEO Agency Nos. GONZALEZ FRANCISCO MATEO, A208-306-512 A208-306-513 Petitioners, A208-306-514 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 2, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, OWENS, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Rosa Maria Mateo Mateo (“Mateo”) and her two minor children (together

“Petitioners”), natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of a decision

of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal from an

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction

under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We deny the petition for review.

We review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for substantial

evidence. J.R. v. Barr, 975 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 2020). Substantial evidence is

an extremely deferential standard, requiring the petitioner to “establish that the

evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it.” Farah v. Ashcroft,

348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). We have applied both the

substantial evidence and de novo standards of review to determinations that past

harm did not rise to the level of persecution. See, e.g., Singh v. Garland, 57 F.4th

643, 651-52 (9th Cir. 2023) (as amended) (acknowledging this court’s precedent

has applied both the substantial evidence and de novo standards of review to the

BIA’s determination that past harm rises to the level of persecution). In this case,

however, we need not and do not decide which standard applies because under

either standard, the result would be the same.

Here, the BIA reached two issues, (1) whether Mateo was a member of her

alleged particular social group and (2) whether the alleged harm constituted

persecution.1 We focus our review on those issues reached by the BIA. Santiago-

1 The BIA also incorporated its prior June 17, 2020, decision denying relief under the CAT into the decision currently before us. Because, as discussed later in this disposition, the BIA did not err in finding that the alleged harm did not

2 24-7789 Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In reviewing the decision

of the BIA, we consider only the grounds relied upon by that agency.” (citation

omitted)); see also Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Our

review is limited to those grounds explicitly relied upon by the Board.”).

1. The BIA held that Mateo failed to challenge the IJ’s determination that

she was not a member of her proposed social group and thus forfeited any

argument challenging that determination. Here, Petitioners do not challenge the

BIA’s forfeiture determination in their opening brief. Thus, there are two distinct,

but related instances of forfeiture in this appeal. First, by failing to challenge the

IJ’s determination that Mateo was not a member of her proposed social group to

the BIA, Petitioners forfeited any challenge to the IJ’s determination. See In re R-

A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 657, 658 n.2 (BIA 2012) (explaining that arguments not

raised on appeal to the BIA may be deemed forfeited). Second, by failing to

challenge the BIA’s determination of forfeiture in their opening brief before this

court, Petitioners forfeited any argument challenging the BIA’s determination. See

Bolin v. Davis, 13 F.4th 797, 809 n.4 (9th Cir. 2021) (“By not raising these

constitute persecution, the BIA necessarily did not err in finding that the alleged harm did not constitute torture. See Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1217 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting torture is more severe than persecution). The BIA thus properly denied Petitioners’ CAT claim. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (petitioners must establish that “it is more likely than not that [they] would be tortured if removed”).

3 24-7789 arguments in his opening brief, [Appellant] has forfeited them.”). Petitioners have

thus doubly-forfeited any challenge to this dispositive issue.

2. Petitioners allege persecution based on “credible and repeated” death

threats made by Mateo’s father-in-law. The BIA held that these threats did not rise

to the level of persecution. We have found that death threats alone can constitute

persecution. Kaur v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 1216, 1227 (9th Cir. 2021). “We

generally look at all of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the

threats are actually credible and rise to the level of persecution.” Duran-Rodriguez

v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). However, “[u]nfulfilled threats are

very rarely sufficient to rise to the level of persecution . . . .” Hussain v. Rosen,

985 F.3d 634, 647 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d

1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Mere threats, without more, do not necessarily

compel a finding of past persecution.”).

The record here demonstrates that Mateo’s father-in-law threatened to kill

her and her children three times, in 2008, 2012, and 2015. At no point, however,

did Mateo or her children suffer any actual harm and at no point were the threats

accompanied by violent conduct toward her or the children. Indeed, there is no

evidence in the record that Mateo’s father-in-law engaged in any conduct or

behavior furthering the alleged threats in the seven-year period between 2008 and

2015. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the

4 24-7789 threats did not rise to the level of persecution. See Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d

1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003) (unfulfilled threats “constitute harassment rather than

persecution”).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.2

2 The temporary stay of removal (Dkt. No. 3) will dissolve upon the issuance of the mandate. The motion for a stay of removal (id.) is otherwise denied.

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