20-1875 Mata v. United States
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2019 No. 20-1875
JOSE LUIS MATA, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
Motion for Leave to File Second or Successive Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
SUBMITTED: August 3, 2020 DECIDED: August 6, 2020
Before: PARK, NARDINI, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jose Luis Mata moves for leave of this Court to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence following his conviction pursuant to a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Victor Marrero, J.). Mata primarily contends that his conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) must be vacated in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). We hold that, because Rehaif resolved only a question of statutory interpretation, it did not announce a new rule of constitutional law as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). Because Mata has not made a prima facie showing that the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) are satisfied, we DENY his motion for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.
Jose Luis Mata, pro se, Glenville, WV, for Petitioner.
Won S. Shin, Assistant United States Attorney, for Audrey Strauss, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Jose Luis Mata moves in this Court for leave to file a
second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). As one of the bases for his motion,
Mata contends that his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
must be vacated in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v.
2 United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Mata argues that Rehaif
announced a new rule of constitutional law, and so he is entitled to
file his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). We disagree and hold that
Rehaif resolved only a question of statutory interpretation, did not
establish a new rule of constitutional law, and thus cannot serve as a
basis for a second or successive § 2255 motion. Concluding that
Mata’s other claim is meritless, we DENY the motion.
I. Background
In 2014, Mata was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of
conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district
court sentenced Mata primarily to 360 months in prison. On direct
appeal, Mata submitted a pro se supplemental brief arguing that he
had received ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court affirmed
his conviction and sentence. United States v. Mata, 614 F. App’x 35 (2d
Cir. 2015) (summary order).
3 In 2016, Mata filed his first motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
which the district court denied on the merits. He then moved for
reconsideration, arguing that the attorney assisting him with his
§ 2255 motion had failed to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel regarding his original defense counsel. The district court
denied the reconsideration motion, and our Court denied Mata a
certificate of appealability.
Mata now seeks to bring a second motion pursuant to § 2255
and, as required by statute, moves in this Court for leave to do so.
Mata raises two claims: one, that his conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) must be vacated in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Rehaif; and two, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
during the course of his plea and sentencing.
II. Discussion
To file a second or successive motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, a petitioner must “move in the appropriate court of appeals
4 for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”
Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). This Court may authorize such a motion “only if
[the Court] determines that the application makes a prima facie
showing that the application satisfies the requirements” of the statute.
Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C). We may grant the motion only if the application
contains:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
Id. § 2255(h).
Mata argues that his Rehaif claim is based on a new rule of
constitutional law that qualifies for relief under § 2255(h)(2). He also
asserts that his ineffective assistance claim relies on new evidence that
falls within § 2255(h)(1). We reject both arguments and write
5 specifically to clarify that claims based on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Rehaif do not come within the scope of § 2255(h)(2).
The Supreme Court’s Rehaif decision resolved only a question
of statutory interpretation and did not announce a rule of
constitutional law (much less a new one, or one that the Supreme
Court has made retroactive on collateral review or that was
previously unavailable). Rehaif clarified the mens rea applicable to a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), holding that the government must
prove that a defendant knew both that he possessed a firearm and
that he belonged to the relevant class of persons barred from
possessing a firearm. See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200. In reaching that
decision, the Supreme Court applied a standard “interpretive maxim”
to discern “congressional intent” about the meaning of the word
“knowingly” as it appears in the text of § 922(g). Id. at 2195. In other
words, the Supreme Court was simply construing a statute.
6 Because Rehaif did not announce any rule of constitutional law,
Mata has not made the required prima facie showing that his claim
satisfies the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h)(2). See Massey v.
United States, 895 F.3d 248, 252 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that the
defendant was not authorized to file a second or successive motion in
reliance on Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), because that
decision interpreted only the Armed Career Criminal Act’s force
clause and “did not announce a new rule of constitutional law”);
Washington v.
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20-1875 Mata v. United States
In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2019 No. 20-1875
JOSE LUIS MATA, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
Motion for Leave to File Second or Successive Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255
SUBMITTED: August 3, 2020 DECIDED: August 6, 2020
Before: PARK, NARDINI, and MENASHI, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jose Luis Mata moves for leave of this Court to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence following his conviction pursuant to a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Victor Marrero, J.). Mata primarily contends that his conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) must be vacated in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). We hold that, because Rehaif resolved only a question of statutory interpretation, it did not announce a new rule of constitutional law as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). Because Mata has not made a prima facie showing that the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) are satisfied, we DENY his motion for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion.
Jose Luis Mata, pro se, Glenville, WV, for Petitioner.
Won S. Shin, Assistant United States Attorney, for Audrey Strauss, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Jose Luis Mata moves in this Court for leave to file a
second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). As one of the bases for his motion,
Mata contends that his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
must be vacated in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v.
2 United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). Mata argues that Rehaif
announced a new rule of constitutional law, and so he is entitled to
file his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). We disagree and hold that
Rehaif resolved only a question of statutory interpretation, did not
establish a new rule of constitutional law, and thus cannot serve as a
basis for a second or successive § 2255 motion. Concluding that
Mata’s other claim is meritless, we DENY the motion.
I. Background
In 2014, Mata was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of
conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district
court sentenced Mata primarily to 360 months in prison. On direct
appeal, Mata submitted a pro se supplemental brief arguing that he
had received ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court affirmed
his conviction and sentence. United States v. Mata, 614 F. App’x 35 (2d
Cir. 2015) (summary order).
3 In 2016, Mata filed his first motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
which the district court denied on the merits. He then moved for
reconsideration, arguing that the attorney assisting him with his
§ 2255 motion had failed to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel regarding his original defense counsel. The district court
denied the reconsideration motion, and our Court denied Mata a
certificate of appealability.
Mata now seeks to bring a second motion pursuant to § 2255
and, as required by statute, moves in this Court for leave to do so.
Mata raises two claims: one, that his conviction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) must be vacated in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Rehaif; and two, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel
during the course of his plea and sentencing.
II. Discussion
To file a second or successive motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255, a petitioner must “move in the appropriate court of appeals
4 for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.”
Id. § 2244(b)(3)(A). This Court may authorize such a motion “only if
[the Court] determines that the application makes a prima facie
showing that the application satisfies the requirements” of the statute.
Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C). We may grant the motion only if the application
contains:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
Id. § 2255(h).
Mata argues that his Rehaif claim is based on a new rule of
constitutional law that qualifies for relief under § 2255(h)(2). He also
asserts that his ineffective assistance claim relies on new evidence that
falls within § 2255(h)(1). We reject both arguments and write
5 specifically to clarify that claims based on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Rehaif do not come within the scope of § 2255(h)(2).
The Supreme Court’s Rehaif decision resolved only a question
of statutory interpretation and did not announce a rule of
constitutional law (much less a new one, or one that the Supreme
Court has made retroactive on collateral review or that was
previously unavailable). Rehaif clarified the mens rea applicable to a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), holding that the government must
prove that a defendant knew both that he possessed a firearm and
that he belonged to the relevant class of persons barred from
possessing a firearm. See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200. In reaching that
decision, the Supreme Court applied a standard “interpretive maxim”
to discern “congressional intent” about the meaning of the word
“knowingly” as it appears in the text of § 922(g). Id. at 2195. In other
words, the Supreme Court was simply construing a statute.
6 Because Rehaif did not announce any rule of constitutional law,
Mata has not made the required prima facie showing that his claim
satisfies the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h)(2). See Massey v.
United States, 895 F.3d 248, 252 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding that the
defendant was not authorized to file a second or successive motion in
reliance on Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), because that
decision interpreted only the Armed Career Criminal Act’s force
clause and “did not announce a new rule of constitutional law”);
Washington v. United States, 868 F.3d 64, 66 (2d Cir. 2017) (denying
leave to file a second or successive motion pursuant to Mathis v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), because the Supreme Court “was
interpreting [a statute], not the Constitution”).
In so holding, we join the uniform view of other courts of
appeals that have addressed this question. See In re Price, 964 F.3d
1045, 1049 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Rehaif did not announce a new rule of
constitutional law . . . .”); In re Sampson, 954 F.3d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 2020)
7 (per curiam) (“Rehaif did not state a new rule of constitutional law at
all.”); see also United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(concluding in a different context that Rehaif “resolved only
question[s] of statutory interpretation” and did not touch on the Due
Process Clause (alteration in original)).
In addition to his Rehaif claim, Mata raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, ostensibly on the basis of newly discovered
evidence. Section 2255(h)(1), however, obliges a defendant to identify
what the new evidence is and to show “that he could not have
discovered this information through the exercise of due diligence
prior to the filing of his first § 2255 motion.” Herrera-Gomez v. United
States, 755 F.3d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 2014). Mata has done neither.
Moreover, Mata has not shown that any newly discovered
information about his attorney’s shortcomings, “if proven and
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable
8 factfinder would have found [Mata] guilty of the offense” to which he
pleaded. Id. at 145. Mata has not shown that the allegations about
counsel have any bearing on his guilt or would be enough to
overcome the “strong presumption of verity” given to his admission
of guilt, under oath, at his plea hearing. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 74 (1977). Accordingly, Mata’s claim regarding ineffective
assistance of counsel does not pass the gatekeeping requirements of
§ 2255(h)(1).
III. Conclusion
To summarize, we hold as follows:
1. The Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif involved only a
question of statutory interpretation and thus did not announce a new
rule of constitutional law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2).
As a result, the Rehaif decision cannot serve as a basis for a second or
successive motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
9 2. Mata has failed to state a claim for ineffective assistance
of counsel that satisfies the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1).
We therefore DENY Mata’s motion for leave to file a second or
successive § 2255 motion.